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Abstract
The world is currently afflicted by unstable and undemocratic political systems which are 
frequently a product of failed political transitions. At the point of transition, states are often 
presented with the unique opportunity to address past human rights violations and restore 
divided societies, through the implementation of thorough and effective transitional justice 
processes; truth commissions remain one of the most influential tools in orchestrating these 
practices. However, as recent history demonstrates, when implemented incorrectly, the 
transitional justice processes facilitated by truth commission enquiries can not only be 
ineffective but also damaging.
To account for these inadequacies, this thesis seeks to address three key issues: a common 
misunderstanding of the core concepts promoted by truth commission investigations, the need 
to notate and comprehend the positive and negative outcomes of past commission enquiries 
and the current lack of ‘case-specific’ guidance for future truth commission architects. With 
reference to these studies, the thesis will then seek to develop a three-pronged truth 
commission guidance framework to account for the three modes of political change through 
which transitional states can pass and recommend the establishment of a ‘Truth Commission 
Advisory Body’ to oversee and assist the process. These frameworks will then be applied to 
the case study of Zimbabwe, which is considered to be a candidate for political transition in 
the near future.
The current proliferation of truth commission investigations reflects the common belief that 
they are the best response when confronting a transitional state’s troubled past; this belief can 
only be vindicated by a substantial increase in the positive and lasting effects of future 
commission endeavours. Ultimately, this will only be achieved by an increased understanding 
of these complex processes and the provision of more extensive guidance to those seeking to 
foster them; this thesis represents a step closer to this eventuality.
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Introduction
“In virtually every state that has recently emerged from authoritarian rule or civil war, and in 
many still suffering repression or violence, but where there is hope for transition soon, there 
has been interest in creating a truth commission -  either proposed by officials of the state or 
by human rights activists or others in civil society.” 1
Since the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war, increasing numbers of states 
have undergone political transition from authoritarian rule and conflict in an attempt to
| achieve relative peace and stability through more democratic forms of governance. At present|
j these transitions are currently occurring across Northern Africa and the Middle East as a
| result o f the ‘Arab Spring.’
As part of this transitional process, newly formed governments are pushed to decide how they 
are going to deal with past human rights violations committed by former regimes and power 
groups: “When a period of authoritarian rule or civil war ends a state and its people stand at a 
crossroads.” In response to this predicament, it is now increasingly commonplace for these 
governments to facilitate transitional and restorative justice processes in order to address 
these violations and promote accountability without damaging their often fragile and 
vulnerable political systems.
Out of the various transitional justice options available to transitional and post-conflict states, 
in recent years, truth commissions have rapidly become the popular choice when confronting 
a country’s history of human rights violations. They achieve this by attempting to unearth the 
truth behind past atrocities, and by helping both victims and perpetrators confront and 
acknowledge these truths. Then through the implementation of various restorative initiatives 
and often in co-ordination with other transitional justice practices, these bodies can help 
encourage said individuals and groups to reconcile their differences and peacefully coexist 
within their societies.
1 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p23.
2 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p4.
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That being said, a thorough analysis of the truth commission investigations to date would 
sh»w that they have often fallen well short of their stated objectives. Such a study would 
attibute these failings to the lack of power and influence granted to commissions in their 
maidates; these limitations have prevented past commissions from establishing 
aciountability, providing victims with socio-economic restitution, influencing effective 
pncesses of reform and even preventing impunity. There is also strong evidence to suggest 
thct past commissions have not only suffered from a lack of government support, but have 
alo been subject to government manipulation. Past commission investigations have also been 
blighted by poor communication, a poor representation of different cultural and gender
I grtups and the failure to protect the basic civil liberties of those involved in the process. As ai
I coisequence, despite their apparent proliferation, it is very difficult to reference a past truth 
conmission enquiry which has fulfilled all of the requirements stated in its mandate.
Gi/en that truth commission investigations have been in operation since the introduction of 
the Ugandan Truth Commission in 1974, why is it that the more recent truth commission 
enquiries still suffer from the aforementioned flaws? The opening chapters of this thesis seek 
to account for the prevalence of these fundamental shortcomings by addressing three key 
issies:
1. A misunderstanding of the core concepts promoted by truth commission 
investigations -  the success of any truth commission investigation is dependent on a 
comprehensive understanding of the core concepts which are embodied by its 
enquiry; namely truth, reconciliation and justice.
Investigating and disclosing the full truth behind past human rights atrocities is one of 
the central objectives of truth commission enquiries. A comprehensive understanding 
of the different types of truth encountered by investigations and the techniques which 
can be used to present these truths in a commission’s final report is therefore a 
prerequisite to any enquiry. The possible negative impacts of the truth should also be 
acknowledged; extensive truth seeking processes will not always be appropriate and 
in some instances can jeopardise potential recovery processes.
Particularly since the establishment of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, promoting reconciliation is seen as one of the central functions of
8
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modem day commissions. If future commissions are to continue performing this role, 
more appreciation of the complexities of these processes is required, including an 
understanding of the specific characteristics of both ‘macro’ and ‘micro-level’ 
reconciliation processes, the different stages of reconciliation through which a society 
can pass and the role of forgiveness. This thesis emphasises the importance of a 
society’s pre-existing commitment to justice in order to accommodate these 
processes; it states that this commitment can be fostered by religious and 
philosophical belief systems with specific reference to the influence of the Ubuntu 
philosophy in assisting reconciliation processes throughout transitional states in 
Africa.
Lastly, future commission investigations would benefit from a greater understanding 
of the potential roles of both retributive and restorative justice in assisting the 
transition process. Both of these practices and their justifications are explored here.
2. The need to account for and understand the positive and negative outcomes of 
past truth commission investigations -  by accounting for the successes and failures 
of past truth commission enquiries; future commission architects can ensure that their 
structures benefit from the hindsight of these investigations.
3. The lack of ‘case-specific’ guidance for future truth commission architects -  In
recent years, NGOs and civil society groups have sought to provide guidance for 
governments considering the formation of truth commission enquiries. However, in 
most cases, this guidance is far too generalised and non-specific to benefit the 
architects of future commissions and prevent the recurrence of the aforementioned 
weaknesses of past commission investigations; this is demonstrated with reference to 
‘Rule-Of-Law Tools fo r  Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions, ’ a booklet 
published by the office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights. 
This publication is designed to assist states seeking to develop truth commission 
bodies in response to large scale human rights violations. The booklet itself provides a 
‘truth commission’ definition, describes situations in which said bodies may be 
established, offers guidance on the physical structuring of truth commissions and 
discusses their main activities and the possible challenges which they may encounter.
9
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Although this information may well be of some use to its target audience as a form of 
very basic assistance, in order to form ‘country specific truth commission models’3 
more detailed guidance is required including information relevant to states facing 
differing political, social and economic preconditions. It is the central argument of 
this thesis that the failures of past truth commission investigations can be attributed to 
the dearth of more case specific support for truth commission architects. It is 
generally agreed that ‘one-size-fits-all’ frameworks do not acknowledge the specific 
conditions which can result from different political transitions; it is therefore 
unsurprising that the guidance provided by NGO and civil society groups fails to 
accommodate these variations.
Once these issues have been addressed, the thesis will then seek to develop a three-prong 
truth commission advisory framework which can be developed to fill this void and provide 
future truth commission architects with more case-specific guidance when setting up their 
enquiries. Prior to the development of these frameworks, the thesis defines the type of 
political transition through which a state passes as the ‘key variable’ which has the greatest 
influence over the political, social and economic pre-conditions which have to be 
accommodated by truth commission investigations. As a consequence, each of the three 
frameworks presented by this thesis are moulded around the three types of political transition; 
‘political overthrow,’ ‘political reform’ and ‘political compromise,’ as defined by Samuel 
Huntington and Jeremy Sarkin.4 This approach will provide transitional states with specific 
guidance depending on the type of political transition which has occurred.
Furthermore, the thesis investigates the possibility of establishing a possible ‘Truth 
Commission Advisory Body’ designed to provide assistance with key phases of the 
development of future commissions. As well as providing specific advice regarding the 
application of the frameworks designed by this thesis, this organ could also assist with other 
important stages of the commission’s development, such as the drafting of its mandate and 
the selection of truth commissioners. This thesis recommends the newly formed United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission as a possible candidate to fulfil this role; this is due to the
3 ‘Rule-of-law Tools fo r  Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions, ’ (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: New York, 2006) p5.
4 Sarkin, Jeremy: “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda,” (Journal o f African Law: 
Vol.45, No.2, 2001) pl45.
10
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numerous overlapping ambitions shared by the recently created PBC and transitional justice 
processes.
The final chapter of the thesis will apply these frameworks to its main case study; Zimbabwe, 
after political transition. Zimbabwe is selected as a case study by this thesis because it is 
considered to be a potential candidate for regime change in the near future, and could be
i greatly assisted by comprehensive transitional justice processes; Zimbabwean civil society
\
I groups have been collating evidence in recent years for this exact purpose. However, there 
exists a great deal of uncertainty with regards to the type of political transition which will 
occur. One of the strengths of the three-prong approach promoted by this thesis is that it is 
able to accommodate each transitional eventuality. In preparation, the final chapter of the 
thesis applies each of these frameworks to a transitional Zimbabwe context; this will 
highlight the various political, social and economic conditions which can result from each of 
the modes of transition and provide specific guidance to help a future Zimbabwean truth 
commission accommodate these circumstances.
To summarise, this thesis aims to contribute towards a greater understanding of the potential 
impact transitional justice processes and truth commission investigations can have upon 
societies in political transition. By addressing the three aforementioned issues, and by 
developing a three-prong truth commission guidance framework to account for each of the 
three modes of political transition and by introducing a ‘Truth Commission Advisory Body,’ 
this thesis aims to provide the necessary support and guidance to encourage the development 
of more successful commission investigations in the future. It is hoped that this will end a 
lasting legacy of second-rate truth commission investigations and help more societies 
confront their turbulent histories in the hope of developing sustainable peace.
11
Chapter 1
Defining ‘Truth Commissions’ as Successful and Effective 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms
Introduction:
“Despite numerous studies, many cases, and extensive literature we know surprisingly little 
about transitional justice mechanisms.”1
| Unsurprisingly, due to the scale and challenge of the task at hand and the contrasting 
political, social and economic make-up of these transitional societies, truth commissions are 
highly complex and diverse entities. This chapter will seek to explain and simplify these 
complexities to help create a better understanding of what truth commissions are, what they 
can achieve, and their role within an ever-present era of transitional justice politics.
By explaining the possible outcomes of truth commission investigations, with the help of 
both advocates and critics, the chapter will also address three processes key to the success of 
transitional and restorative justice practices; truth, reconciliation, and justice. To understand 
these concepts is to comprehend why truth commissions have gained increasing recognition 
in international and human rights politics. This understanding will also enable future truth 
commission architects to adapt the designs of their commission frameworks to ensure that 
they facilitate each of these processes throughout the course of their enquiries; if successful 
this will make a significant contribution towards the rehabilitation and restoration of 
previously divided transitional and post-conflict societies. A thorough analysis of the 
aforementioned concepts and processes will also greatly assist the development of our truth 
commission guidance frameworks in the latter stages of this thesis.
1 Olsen, Payne, Reiter: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace 
Press, 2010) p i60.
13
Introducing Transitional Justice:
2
“Transitional Justice has become a constant in the political arena for nearly four decades.”
Before focusing primarily on the impact and contributions made by truth commissions when 
investigating large-scale human rights violations committed by past authoritarian regimes, it 
is first necessary to understand the overall context within which these highly complex bodies 
are developed. This approach will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
motives and aspirations of truth commission architects when they first set out to develop 
these mechanisms. The overall context referred to here is known as ‘Transitional Justice.’
Transitional justice arises from an era of thinking which reinforces the importance of 
upholding individuals’ basic human rights whilst strengthening democracy and peace within 
newly transitioned political systems. It was first developed in the 1970/80s in response to the 
various political transitions which were occurring throughout Latin America and Europe 
resulting from the fall of authoritarian regimes and the end of the Cold War. Its central goal 
was to assist these states with their transition to democracy.
As increasing numbers of states underwent political transition, when dealing with past gross 
human rights violations, it was recognised that the application of isolated retributive justice 
procedures (the prosecution of guilty parties through judicial proceedings), unaccompanied 
by any other process, was no longer effective. Although such a system is adequate when 
dealing with individual human rights breaches on a small scale, when dealing with ‘mass’ 
violations of human rights, on an large scale, it is ineffective at best; in these circumstances 
criminal justice processes are ill-equipped to promote the types of political, social and 
economic restoration required by transitional societies. “Justice systems are designed to 
handle crime as an exceptional occurrence.” In addition, it is seldom the case that 
transitional and post-conflict states have the resources and infrastructures available to them to 
permit the pursuit of retributive justice processes on such a large scale.
As the inadequacies of retributive justice became increasingly evident and the overall growth 
of the field of human rights increased, the era of transitional justice was bom. As was aptly 
stated by a representative of the United Nations, when defining transitional justice;
2 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2010) 
p38/39.
3 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) plO.
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transitional justice promotes “justice in times o f transition.”4 It achieves this by seeking to 
“address effectively the systematic abuses o f former regimes but still reinforce -  and not 
derail -  the political transformations that were underway.”5 However, the justice referred to 
here is not justice as it was originally known (the prosecution and punishment of those guilty 
of breaking the law) but instead the provision of justice for society as a whole. This concept 
was effectively explained by Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his 
report, ‘The rule o f  law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, ’ where 
he states that “the notion of transitional justice... comprises the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large- 
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”6
Since its abrupt entrance into the international political arena, political theory books are 
inundated with transitional justice definitions and analyses, each seeking to provide the most 
concise yet thorough definition of this complex concept. One of the more concise 
descriptions is presented in the introduction of Paul Gready’s most recent publication, 'The 
Aftermath o f  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond’: “The
n
ideal makes way for the possible, although it never stops asking the possible for more.” This 
stresses that, whilst transitional justice practices are often only selected when criminal justice 
procedures are implausible, this is a necessary compromise as they are considered better- 
equipped to deal with the challenges presented by transitional and post-conflict societies.
It seems that the most widely used transitional justice definition is provided by the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice: “Transitional justice is a response to systematic 
or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion of 
possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form 
of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive 
human rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they
4 The United Nations: ‘What is Transitional Justice?’ Available at:
http://www.un.org/fr/peacebuilding/wgll/justice times transition/26 02 2008 background note.pdf (Last 
accessed June 22nd 2011).
5 The United Nations: ‘What is Transitional Justice?’ Available at:
http://www.un.org/fr/peacebuilding/wgll/justice times transition/26 02 2008 background note.pdf (Last 
accessed June 22nd 2011).
6 Annan, Kofi: “Report o f the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post- 
conflict societies,” (U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 2004) p4.
7 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p i.
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may take place over many decades.”8 This particular definition notes the ability of 
transitional justice mechanisms to evolve and adapt to deliver for the differing needs and 
circumstances of the societies in which they operate.
In a recent assessment of the growing presence and impact of transitional justice practices in 
international politics, a study by Olsen, Payne and Reiter analysed the various transitional 
justice practices implemented across 161 different countries over the past 37 years.9 These 
figures alone demonstrate the rapid proliferation of these processes across the globe.
Transitional justice also has a growing presence within international law having been 
endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights and United Nations treaty bodies such as 
the Human Rights Council: “The Commission on Human Rights regularly adopted a series of 
resolutions that address questions of impunity, the right to restitution, and forensic science.”10
Throughout his analysis of the growth o f transitional justice as ‘an industry,’ Gready asks 
important questions about the driving forces behind the rapid development of transitional 
justice policy. He discusses whether or not transitional justice has developed into an 
‘international movement’ spearheaded by an ‘international, knowledge-based, elite 
professional and donor network’ rather than existing as a series of regional initiatives driven 
by local authorities and representatives.11 He shows concern over the ‘holistic’ presentations 
of transitional justice processes now provided by international advisory bodies, following the
successes of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “Definitions become too
12broad to be meaningful.” This thesis echoes these concerns, arguing that transitional justice 
mechanisms should never be seen as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution suitable for every scenario; 
international advisory bodies would be better advised to provide a series of detailed 
frameworks which can be adapted to accommodate and account for specific political, social 
and economic contexts.
8 “What is Transitional Justice?” (International Centre for Transitional Justice: 2009) Available at: 
http://icti.org/about/transitional-justice (last viewed March 18th 2012).
9 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2010) 
p4.
10 “Transitional Justice in the United Nations Human Rights Council,” (International Centre for Transitional 
Justice: June 2011) Available at: http://ictj.org/publication/transitional-justice-united-nations-human-rights- 
council (last viewed: March 18th 2012) p3.
11 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p3-4.
12 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p3-4.
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Given its apparent rapid growth and international influence, political analysts have also set 
about trying to determine the exact contribution of transitional justice practices in transitional 
and post-conflict states. Rather surprisingly, to date, the results are not overly encouraging for 
transitional justice advocates. Although the empirical analysis results published by Olsen et al
for example, suggest that “in general [transitional justice] appears to have a positive and
1 ^significant influence on democracy and human rights” the outlook is not so positive for 
transitional justice mechanisms working in isolation from other transitional justice tools. 
Some results even show that operating independently, truth commissions, for example, have a 
negative impact upon strengthening democracy and promoting human rights practices in 
transitional and post-conflict societies: “Those countries that only use truth commissions are 
likely to experience a decrease in measures of democracy and human rights.” 14 What could 
possibly account for these findings?
In a recent report entitled ‘State-Level Effects o f Transitional Justice, ’ Thoms, Ron and Paris 
claim that these results could be considered as inaccurate and inconclusive.15 They suggest 
that better testing procedures need to be developed as current methods use biased statistics 
and fail to account for the impact of other factors. Indeed it may be virtually impossible to 
devise an entirely accurate method of assessing the impact of transitional justice practices in 
the future.
If the negative results produced by these tests are vindicated, this thesis suggests that despite 
that vast amounts of literature now covering the subject, this stems from a lack of 
understanding of how and when transitional justice processes can and should be 
implemented. The fact is that there seems to be too much discussion about what should be 
done and little guidance provided showing how this can be achieved. The aforementioned 
holistic definitions and guidelines which are now commonplace, may well fit nicely into our 
theory books but do little to assist states seeking to implement successful transitional justice 
practices within their own political, social and economic contexts.
That is not to say that this will be an easy process. After forty years of analysis, it is apparent 
that we are still struggling to get to grips with the essence of this highly complex subject.
13 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010) 
p i 46.
14 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2010) 
pl53.
15 Oskar Thoms, James Ron and Roland Paris: “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What do we Know?” 
(The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2010, 1-26).
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These complexities should not be underestimated: “Transitional justice is the art of imperfect 
solutions and difficult choices, in the context of competition for finite resources and delicate 
political dynamics.”16
These complexities are a consequence of the vast array of issues which transitional justice 
mechanisms must confront; each mechanism must be moulded according to the 
characteristics of the specific transitional society within which they are to operate. Some of 
these issues will now be addressed.
Problems Faced by States Undergoing Political Transition
According to Priscilla Hayner, as written in ‘Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  
Truth Commissions’,17 the following problems are faced by states undergoing political 
transition:
1. They have to attempt to reconcile their societies in order to accommodate both 
victims and perpetrators of gross violations of human rights.
2. They have to deal with their nation’s troubled pasts and decide whether or not it is in 
the interests of peace to either forget or acknowledge past atrocities.
3. They have to decide whether to punish or to grant amnesty to those guilty of the 
human rights abuses in question.
4. They have to take the steps necessary to ensure that atrocities are not repeated, 
whether by the introduction of various societal reforms or through the removal of 
those responsible from positions of power and influence.
Although the above problems have only summarised the tasks faced by newly established 
governments when attempting to create stable democracies within their fractured societies, 
they do demonstrate the inadequacies of the retributive justice system (see the retributive v 
restorative debate) when dealing with states under political transition. For example, how
16 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p7.
17 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p4.
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would a judicial process (which may itself have been corrupted by the state) successfully 
reconcile a society and provide victims with the reparation and reimbursement they deserve?
The aforementioned problems do not account for other structural and localised issues faced 
by states undergoing political transition. For example, the societal infrastructures of many 
states recovering from authoritarian leadership are often damaged or destroyed. The 
destruction of a state’s judiciary for example would make the pursuit o f domestic judicial 
processes impossible. It is also important to understand that every transition is different and 
presents new problems which must be dealt with by the governments in question. Each of 
these political, social and economic contextual issues will be explored in greater detail when 
assessing the tasks faced by truth commissions later in this chapter. They are referred to 
briefly at this point to emphasise the role which must be played by transitional justice 
mechanisms and to demonstrate the inadequacies of the sole implementation of criminal 
prosecutions when dealing with the mass atrocities carried out by former authoritarian 
governments. This realisation grew significantly throughout the 1980s/90s as increasing 
numbers of states sought ways in which they could effectively deal with their troubled pasts; 
the role of transitional justice processes in international politics have grown ever since.
Political Transition without Transitional Justice: ‘From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe’
The increasing demand for transitional justice mechanisms throughout the second half of the 
20th century is best illustrated by referring to a political transition which occurred without the 
assistance of these tools.
The story of present day Zimbabwe is a tale of widespread social unrest, economic 
deprivation and political instability. Today’s news headlines are often dominated by stories 
discussing the frailty of Zimbabwe’s weakening political coalition, growing concerns over 
the devastating impacts of her Cholera epidemics, and shocking hyper-inflation, 
unemployment and poverty statistics. But what are the reasons for such eventualities? How,
in the space of 30 years, can a society go from being one of Africa’s strongest economies,
1 8often labelled the ‘breadbasket of Africa’ to a ‘failed state?’ By a ‘failed state’ we mean that
18 “Mugabe Attacks Enemies at Food Summit,” (The Zimbabwe Times, November 18, 2009) Available at: 
http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=25148&utm source=feedbumer&utm medium=email&utm campaign= 
Feed%3A+TheZimbabweTimes+%28The+Zimbabwe+Times%29&utm content=Yahoo%21+Mail (Last 
accessed June 22nd 2011).
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the Zimbabwean government is “unwilling to protect its citizens from violence or perhaps 
even destruction,”19 is unable to provide and maintain basic public services and is isolated 
from the international community. One answer is that Zimbabwe suffered and continues to 
suffer from the consequences of an unstable, and mismanaged political transition. This 
transition is briefly explored below, and will be more thoroughly addressed throughout 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.
During the days of colonial rule, Rhodesia, as it was formerly known, was seen to be one of 
Africa’s strongest economic nations and was even described by President Samora Machel of
9 0Mozambique as the ‘jewel of Africa.’ Despite its economic strengths, as was a common 
characteristic of most colonial nations, the vast majority of the nation’s population was not 
fairly represented by the political system in place; Rhodesia’s 1961 Constitution gave roughly
95% of the vote to the educated and wealthy sectors of society, namely the white
21population. The fact that the white populace contributed to below 5% of the overall 
population is an illustration of the inequality and underrepresentation that was promoted by 
Ian Smith’s colonial government. Such oppressive policies would surely have long-term 
repercussions.
These repercussions came in the form of the ‘The Bush War,’ fought between the Black 
Nationalist parties; The Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) and The Zimbabwean 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the predominantly white, Rhodesian Army. Despite 
being heavily outnumbered, the Rhodesian army, thanks to superior technology and initial 
overseas support, managed to hold off the nationalist threat. Although, as the war dragged on, 
the government’s position became increasingly weakened, their resistance to majority rule 
finally broke in 1979, upon the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement.22 Though the 
agreement itself paved the way for political transition to majority rule, its clumsy structure 
and inability to deal with transitional problems such a land inequality issues and uneven 
political representation, played a key role in Zimbabwe’s rapid decline.
19 For a more comprehensive definition of a failed state see: Chomsky, Noam: “Superpower and Failed States,” 
(Khaleej Times, April 5th 2006). Available at http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20060405.htm (Last accessed 
June 7th, 2011).
20 “The Jewel o f  Africa,” ( ‘The Insider,’ April, 2003) Available at: http://www.insiderzim.com/ap03guest.html 
(Last viewed June 22nd 2011).
21 “The 1961 Constitution: Legislative Assembly o f  Southern Rhodesia,” (‘Parliament o f Zimbabwe’) Available 
at: http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/inside.aspx?mpgid=3&spid=16 (last viewed June 22nd 2011).
22 “The Lancaster House Agreement,” Available at: http://home.wanadoo.nl.rhodesia/lancl.html (last viewed 
June 22nd 2011).
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Despite talk of reconciliation and reintegration, following the 1980 elections, the newly 
elected PM of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, soon began a process of oppression and 
intimidation against his former enemies and political opponents. The ruling ZANU 
government also sought to manipulate the political system to increase its hold over 
Zimbabwean society. Mugabe’s men also sought to gain economic dominance by throwing 
white land owners off of their lands. This policy was legally endorsed by the ‘Land 
Acquisition Act’ which was introduced in 1992, and hastened by Mugabe’s 2000 ‘fast track’
23policy; this course of action not only left many former-landowners homeless, but also 
severely damaged the nation’s ability to feed itself.
When accounting for this failed transition, as well as assessing the responsibility of Mugabe 
and his co-conspirators, Chapter 5 of this thesis also places much blame upon the 
inadequacies of the Lancaster Agreement and its failure to address key political and 
economic inequalities, such as the imbalance of land ownership and political representation, 
as Eddy Cross, policy director of the Movement for Democratic Change argued: “At 
Lancaster House we made further mistakes, imposing on Zimbabwe a British style of 
constitution and failing to consult the majority.”24 The fact that 1% of the population 
maintained ownership of 70% of the land and the fact that as part of the Lancaster 
Agreement, the white community would maintain 20 parliamentary seats until 1987, could 
only have served to increase the resentment of the black population.25 Such imbalances 
should have been addressed prior to the signing of the agreement.
The Zimbabwean example demonstrates the importance of addressing political, social and 
economic tensions present at the point of the transition; had a transitional justice mechanism, 
such as a truth commission been employed during the negotiation process of the Lancaster 
Agreement, these tensions could have been addressed and Mugabe’s government might not 
have felt so inclined to avenge political, social and economic imbalances of the past. Such a 
body may well have taken the necessary steps to reconcile Zimbabwe’s opposing political
23 Cross, Eddy: “Where Did We Go Wrong?” (The Zimbabwe Times, July 12, 2009) Available at: 
http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=25148&utm source=feedbumer&utm medium=email&utm campaign= 
Feed%3A+TheZimbabweTimes+%28The+Zimbabwe+Times%29&utm content=Yahoo%21+Mail (Last 
viewed June 22nd 2011).
24 Cross, Eddy: “Where Did We Go Wrong?” (The Zimbabwe Times, July 12, 2009) Available at: 
http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=25148&utm source=feedbumer&utm medium=email&utm campaign= 
Feed%3 A+TheZimbabweTimes+%28The+Zimbabwe+Times%29&utm content=Yahoo%21 +Mail (Last 
viewed June 22nd 2011).
25 “The Lancaster House Agreement,” Available at: http://home.wanadoo.nl.rhodesia/lancl.html (last viewed 
June 22nd 2011).
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forces and reform her political and economic system to better represent and serve the people 
of Zimbabwe.
Chapter 5 of this thesis will seek to develop a truth commission framework which could be 
employed in Zimbabwe following the cessation of Mugabe’s regime. It is hoped that this 
commission will be able to succeed where the Lancaster Agreement failed and address long­
term political and social tensions, in order to prevent further conflict and assist the 
establishment of a peaceful, democratic Zimbabwe.
The Five Mechanisms of Transitional Justice
Having introduced transitional justice theory, the conditions within which its processes 
operate, and the consequences of political transitions occurring without these tools, it is now 
necessary to look at the specific mechanisms which enact these processes:
1. Prosecutions
Criminal prosecutions perform a critical role in response to human rights violations. They 
can take place in a wide range of formats from criminal, civil, national, international, 
foreign or domestic prosecutions. Although in an ideal world, post-conflict states would 
carry out domestic trials which would lessen their reliance upon international assistance, 
this is often not possible when national and civil court infrastructures are damaged by 
conflict, restrained by economic limitations or hampered by corruption or bias. As a 
consequence, states are often dependent upon international criminal prosecution processes 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Prosecutions have a substantial impact upon transitional societies in a number of ways. 
Primarily, they promote accountability by prosecuting individuals and groups guilty of 
committing human rights violations; such a process can help terminate long periods of 
impunity and set a precedent which will act as a deterrent against future crimes. Criminal 
trials also provide redress for the victims of these violations, which may eliminate the 
need to orchestrate personal retribution and may prevent future resentment against the 
state. In addition to assisting with the removal of criminal parties from society, 
prosecutions also help reinforce the rule of law and develop a culture which respects and
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protects the human rights of its citizens. Each of these factors is essential when 
rehabilitating post-conflict societies as Hayner and Freeman testify: “The importance of 
criminal trials remains unrivalled. No other mechanism is perceived to have a greater 
impact on specific and general deterrence, public confidence in the state’s ability and
• 9 f\willingness to enforce law, and a victim’s sense of justice.”
2. Truth Commissions
Truth Commissions are established to investigate and create formal accounts of past 
human rights violations. Their specific characteristics will be explored shortly.
3. Reparations
Reparations can also serve as an integral part of transitional justice processes. Their main 
function is to compensate victims of past human rights violations for the unwarranted 
persecution they have previously endured, by providing them with monetary 
compensation which is designed to assist them when dealing with the consequences of 
their abuse e.g. paying for medical assistance, the recovery of possessions or property etc. 
Reparations can be provided to victims in the form of basic services or guarantees to 
assist their future rehabilitation and development. Additionally, reparations can take the 
form of symbolic gestures such as public apologies or the creation of memorials to 
provide further acknowledgement of the occurrence of past atrocities. Each of these 
practices can assist the healing process of victims and fractured societies.
Despite the positive impacts which they can make, it is often very difficult for transitional 
and post-conflict societies to budget for extensive reparations programmes. Chapter 2 
provides evidence of the failure of governments to live up to reparations commitments for 
this very reason.
26 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) plO.
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4. Institutional Reform
“Institutional reform is the process of reviewing and restructuring state institutions so that 
they respect human rights, preserve the rule of law, and are accountable to their 
constituents.”27
A critical part of the transition process from an authoritarian regime to a democracy is the 
removal and reformation of state structures which once promoted and enforced 
oppression and the systematic violation of human rights. Effective reforms ensure that 
these institutions are redesigned to act on behalf of their citizens and protect their basic 
human rights and the rule of law.
As well as the restructuring of institutions, such as the state’s constitution, laws, legal 
systems, education systems, armed forces etc., institutional reform policies can also 
include a comprehensive vetting process. This involves the banning of members of past 
authoritarian regimes and those responsible for the orchestration of human rights, from 
retaining public office and other positions of influence. In the long-term, this might well 
repair damaged relations and trust between a state and its citizens.
5. Amnesties
Transitional justice processes can also involve the granting of amnesties to guilty parties. 
Although many take a dim view of such policies (see retributive v restorative justice 
discussion), arguing that they only serve to encourage the growth of impunity within 
transitional societies; they do so from a narrow-minded perspective. Though this debate is 
looked at in more detail throughout the justice section of this chapter, it is important to 
note that whilst the granting of blanket amnesties may be considered unjust and a threat to 
accountability processes, conditional amnesties working alongside other transitional 
justice mechanisms can have the opposite effect. Recent analysis supports the viewpoint
that when working alongside criminal justice processes, conditional amnesties can indeed
28strengthen democracy and promote the protection of human rights.
It should be noted that the five mechanisms introduced here are often interdependent and can 
work alongside each other to promote transitional justice; for example, truth commission
27 “Institutional Reform,” (International Centre for Transitional Justice) Available at: http://icti.org/our- 
work/transitional-justice-issues/institutional-reform (Last viewed January 12th 2012).
28 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2010) 
p!47.
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enquiries can pass on evidence gathered to assist with trials and judicial proceedings. In a 
similar way, if effectively introduced, reforms to a state’s judicial infrastructure can 
significantly improve the impartiality and effectiveness of domestic criminal prosecutions. 
When looking at the impact of transitional justice mechanisms in recent history, Olsen et al 
determine that transitional justice mechanisms have the greatest impact when they work 
together: “Two important goals for transitional justice policy are to strengthen democracy and 
to reduce human rights violations. The empirical analysis suggests that the best method for 
achieving these two goals is via multiple mechanisms: trails and amnesties, or trials, 
amnesties and truth commissions.”29
The involvement of each of these mechanisms within the transition process will vary 
depending upon the individual circumstances faced by the society in question and the 
availability of resources. As Hayner states, the varying circumstances faced by states mean 
that their overall objectives often differ significantly: “A state may have a number of 
objectives in responding to past abuses: to punish perpetrators; establish the truth; repair or 
address damages; pay respect to victims and prevent further abuses. There may be other aims 
as well such as promoting national reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past, or 
highlighting the new government’s concern for human rights and therefore gaining the favour 
of the international community.” Inevitably the degree of involvement of the five 
mechanisms of transitional justice will also heavily depend on the resources available at the
a  1
point of transition; ‘holistic transitional justice strategies’ can be hampered by damaged 
economies or corrupted state infrastructures. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive breakdown 
of the political, economic and social assessments required prior to the application of holistic 
transitional justice approaches.
It should also be emphasised that although the evidence suggests that holistic approaches to 
transitional justice practices are often more effective, the circumstances faced by transitional 
states often mean that this approach is not only implausible but sometimes unnecessary. 
Localised human rights abuses for example, can often be dealt with through the 
implementation of concentrated regional initiatives involving a minority of these transitional
29 Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” (Washington D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2010) 
?o159'Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pi 1.
31 A ‘holistic transitional justice strategy’ is a method of dealing with gross violations of human rights using a 
combination of many if not all transitional justice practices (see: Olsen et al: “Transitional Justice in Balance,” 
(Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010) p24.
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justice tools; a clear differentiation between localised and systematic human rights violations 
must be made when assessing whether or not a holistic approach is required.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of these mechanisms will be heavily dependent on the nature 
of the political transition through which the state in question had passed. As will be further 
discussed when developing prospective truth commission frameworks in Chapter 3, the 
nature of the transition in question will dictate the degree of authority and freedom possessed 
by the newly instituted government and any transitional justice mechanism which they 
introduce. The nature of the transition thus dictates the chances of success of the transitional 
justice mechanism/s established. The progress made by societies whose governments remain 
heavily influenced or controlled by previous power groups, is often severely hindered: “The 
need of victims and the society as a whole to heal from the wounds inflicted upon them by 
the former regime often has to be balanced against the political reality in which the new 
government may have limited political power, and in which it may have inherited a political
32state.” An example of this can be seen by referring to the political transitions which 
occurred in Chile and El Salvador: “The modes of transition used in Chile and El Salvador 
allowed authoritarian actors to impose significant enclaves on the transitional polities of both 
countries.” 33 Because of the nature of the political transitions in these states (political 
reform/compromise), those responsible for past atrocities maintained significant degrees of 
political influence. This meant that they were able exert influence upon the transitional justice 
processes enacted in their countries, to ensure that their involvement would not be 
investigated. It is therefore important to note that the progression of transitional justice 
mechanisms may be blighted by the political contexts which result from the characteristics of 
the political transition through which a state has passed.
32 Sarkin, Jeremy: “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda,” (Journal of African Law: 
Vol.45, No.2, 2001) pl43.
33 Gairdner, David: “The Role o f truth commissions in political Transition in Chile and El Salvador,” ( Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and human rights, R 1998: 8) p32.
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The ‘Truth Commission’
“Truth commissions have come to be seen as valuable tools to balance demands for 
accountability for past human rights abuses with the fact that perpetrators often retain some 
influence over the course of the transition.”34
Of all the transitional justice mechanisms and practices introduced here, this thesis will focus 
primarily upon the work of truth commissions and the impact they can have through the 
implementation of transitional justice practices throughout transitional and post-conflict 
societies.
This specific mechanism has been selected above others because of its adaptability, which 
allows it to operate within societies with varying political, social and economic contexts; this 
is reflected by its increasing popularity as a response to the gross violations of human rights
o c
in recent years: “Truth commissions have become a staple of post-conflict peacebuilding.”
In addition, the truth commission is a mechanism which best incorporates most of the 
transitional justice processes discussed throughout the opening stages of this thesis; with the 
exception of trials and criminal prosecutions. This allows them to “necessitate an approach 
that balances a variety of goals, including the pursuit of accountability, truth and reparation,
36the preservation of peace and the building of democracy and the rule of law.”
Truth commissions are also mechanisms which are able to work effectively in conjunction 
with other bodies, such as criminal prosecutions. There is much evidence to suggest that this 
‘holistic approach’ can prove highly effective when investigating human rights violations in 
post-conflict societies: “Truth commissions work better when they complement the full 
exercise of victims’ rights to pursue criminal justice and reparations rather than serve as a 
substitute for those rights.37
34 Brahm, Eric: “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commissions Success and Impact,” (International 
Studies Perspectives, (2007) 8) pl7.
35 Brahm, Eric: “Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2010) p i29.
36 Annan, Kofi: “The Rule o f Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the 
Secretary-General,” ( United Nations Security Council: 23rd August 2004) p9.
37 “Truth Commissions,” (International Centre fo r  Transitional Justice) Available at:
http://icti.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Truth-Commissions-2008-English.pdf (Last accessed: 16th January 
2012).
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Truth commission advocates would argue that out of the approaches available, truth 
commissions are most effective at strengthening transitional democracies and promoting 
human nghts values. These claims have been highly disputed in recent investigations. The 
unfavourable results produced by recent analyses gauging the success rate of recent truth 
commission investigations demonstrates the need to provide better guidance to governments 
considering the adoption of these tools. This particular argument will be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis.
The decision to select truth commissions above other transitional justice mechanisms, as a 
point of focus throughout this thesis, is further justified by a comprehensive definition of 
these structures and what they can achieve.
Defining a ‘Truth Commission’
“A truth commission is an ad hoc, autonomous and victim-centred commission of inquiry set 
up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on 
the principle causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe 
violence or repression that occurred in the state during the determinate periods of abusive rule
I Q
or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and future prevention.” The 
above definition, cited in Mark Freeman’s 'Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, ’ 
best defines the overall concept of ‘the truth commission.’ Freeman introduces several 
important characteristics here which are vital to both the success of the truth commission and 
to the overall concept of transitional justice.
Primarily, he states that truth commissions are ‘victim-centred’ bodies. This is of particular 
significance as it is the key distinction between truth commissions and criminal justice 
systems; whereas criminal justice mechanisms operate on behalf of the state, to adjudicate the 
crimes of individuals, truth commissions act on behalf of the victims themselves. In doing so 
they address many key issues, often omitted by judicial hearings: “Peace and stability can 
only prevail if the population perceives that politically charged issues, such as ethnic 
discrimination, unequal distribution of wealth and social services, abuse of power, denial of
38 See: Thoms, Oskar et al: “State-Level Effects o f Transitional Justice: What do we Know?” (The International 
Journal o f Transitional Justice, 2010, 1-26).
39 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p i8.
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the right to property or citizenship and territorial disputes between states, can be addressed in 
a legitimate and fair manner.”40 Therefore, by acting on behalf of the victims themselves, 
truth commissions provide reassurance to these individuals that their suffering will be 
investigated and acknowledged by a state-endorsed institution. Although victims often feel 
that justice can only be served by criminal convictions, such a process omits some forces 
which are fundamental to the development of forgiveness and reconciliation processes. In 
other words, whilst judicial trails aim to convict guilty parties who are in violation of state 
laws, they often fail to reconcile fractured societies or compensate victims. These 
inadequacies will be further examined later in this chapter when we introduce the ‘restorative 
v retributive’ debate.
The second characteristic introduced by Freeman and discussed here by Eric Brahm, 
describes truth commissions as bodies which are established and endorsed by the state: 
“Truth commissions are officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state. This, in 
principle, allows the commission to have greater access to information, greater security, and 
increased assurance that its findings will be taken under serious consideration.”41 Brahm 
describes here the advantages of truth commissions being ‘officially sanctioned’ by the state. 
The words ‘in principle’ here reflect the reality that this support is not always forthcoming; as 
this thesis argues, this is heavily dependent on the state’s political characteristics which often 
result from the type of political transition which has occurred. It should also be stressed that, 
despite their ties with governments, truth commissions, in principle, remain independent 
bodies acting without influence from the state. This is also heavily dependent on the 
aforementioned factors; evidence presented in Chapter 2 demonstrates that there have been 
occasions in the past where governments have sought to influence or manipulate the work of 
truth commission enquiries.
Thirdly, Freeman’s definition states that truth commissions ‘investigate and report on the 
principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence 
or repression.’ This clearly differentiates them from judicial processes whose main purpose is 
to investigate and adjudicate on specific events. The periods of time investigated by 
commissions are usually established in their mandates, and can sometimes span back as far as 
a few decades or more. These mandates perform a critical task in setting out the overall
40 Annan, Kofi: “Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post- 
conflict societies,” (U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 2004) p4.
41 Brahm, Eric: “What is a Truth Commission?” Available at:
www.bevondintractabilitv.org/essay/truth commissions (last accessed June 22nd 2011).
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parameters of the commission’s investigation. This is essential as it ensures that commission 
enquiries are refined and focused on achieving specific objectives: “The mandate and the 
powers bestowed on a truth commission are crucial in determining the impact the 
commission is able to have on reconciliation... how long the commission will be working... 
what violations are under investigation and what powers the commission has.”42 The 
investigative nature of truth commissions allows them to evaluate the causes and 
consequences of atrocities; this is essential when seeking to prevent the repetition of past 
atrocities.
The final point in Freeman’s definition states that truth commissions attempt to prevent the 
repetition of past atrocities through the publication of recommendations in the form of a post- 
investigatory report. This is one of the most important functions of the commission. The 
report published by the commission can highlight its key findings; outline patterns of abuse; 
and most importantly create a set of recommendations advising upon various societal reforms 
which will ensure that past atrocities are not repeated. These reforms, if implemented, often 
assist societies with the transition process: “Commissions can identify and recommend 
specific legal and institutional reforms that will enable the country to achieve long-term 
social, economic and political objectives that are essential to achieving a better future.”43 
These reports can also advise on various forms of reparation which can be provided to 
compensate victims. It is therefore essential that these reports are widely distributed and that 
the reforms included within them are seriously considered by the governments to which they 
are recommended. In past years the impacts of truth commissions have been severely 
hampered by the unwillingness of governments to observe and implement the 
recommendations and reforms published within their final reports. Again, this is heavily 
reliant upon the political stance of the government and the nature of the transition which 
precedes the commission’s introduction.
The lack of powers of prosecution granted to truth commission investigations is one 
important characteristic not covered by Freeman’s definition. Kerr and Mobekk state that “a 
truth commission cannot determine culpability of the individual, and it cannot punish or
42 Kerr, Rachel and Mobekk, Eirin: “Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War,” (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007) p 131/2.
43 Freeman, Mark and Hayner, Priscilla B: “Truth-Telling” (Taken from: David Bloomfield and Teresa Barnes: 
“Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2005)) p i26.
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sanction perpetrators of human rights abuses.”44 For this reason, truth commissions are 
granted relative freedom when constructing their mandates and conducting their 
investigations. However, this characteristic has been stretched somewhat in recent years, 
particularly since the establishment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission which was granted the authority to award amnesty to individuals who disclosed 
information about past events. Although its mandate did not grant it the power of prosecution, 
the inclusion of the power to grant amnesty should be seen as a significant development in 
the evolutionary process of truth commission mandates. Such a power could directly clash 
with judicial authorities and should only be implemented after serious consideration by the 
relevant authorities.
In general though, truth commissions operate as investigatory bodies only. This characteristic 
enables them to form more comprehensive investigations as perpetrators are more willing to 
assist them with their enquiries, without fear of punishment. Truth commissions also often 
have better access to evidence; those under investigation are more likely to co-operate 
knowing that they are unlikely to face criminal prosecutions charges. The absence of this 
threat encourages a greater participation of both perpetrators and victims.
Despite their inability to prosecute, truth commissions can promote accountability and can 
assist criminal prosecutions by working in conjunction with judicial bodies. The South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission demonstrated this when hearing the case of 
Colonel Eugene De Kock. The testimony of Colonel De Kock, Commander of the C l Unit of 
the South African Police Counter-Insurgency Group, represents one of the main success 
stories of the TRC. As part of an amnesty plea De Kock disclosed the truth regarding past 
human rights violations and even linked two former presidents to these criminal acts.45 He 
was later denied amnesty by the commission, because the TRC decided that he had failed to 
provide a political motive for his actions;46 amnesty applications were only successful if 
guilty parties could prove that their actions were politically motivated. Some of the evidence 
he provided was passed on to a criminal court and he was sentenced to 212 years 
imprisonment in August 1996. This demonstrates the ability of these truth seeking bodies to 
establish a comprehensive account of past events and to pass on evidence to judicial bodies.
44 Kerr, Rachel and Mobekk, Eirin: “Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War,” (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007) p i30.
45 “Truth and Reconciliation o f  South Africa Report,” (Volume 6) Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/rep.pdf (Last accessed June 22nd 2011).
46 “Apartheid Death Squad Boss Denied Amnesty,” (BBC Online News: December 14, 1999) Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/564442.stm (Last accessed June 22nd 2011).
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Sadly for the TRC, the case of Eugene De Kock was one of very few successful convictions
! secured using evidence gathered by the commission.
[• Another significant truth commission characteristic is the temporary nature of a
1
[ commission’s investigation process -  in general truth commissions only operate for short
periods of time, from 6 months to 2 years, though more recent commissions have operated for 
extended durations. This is of course dependent upon the nature and scale of the investigation 
and the investigatory techniques employed by the specific commission. It is important that 
truth commissions do not conduct prolonged investigations; the longer they take the less 
reliable their sources will become, the less support they will receive and the overall impact of 
their final report will diminish. The investigation of the Ugandan Truth Commission for 
example, extended for a prolonged period of time, and submitted its report nearly a decade 
after its initial establishment, due to funding shortages; because of its reliance upon 
international donors, commissioners had to work part-time which further drew out 
proceedings. By the time it was published, the commission’s report was all but ineffective. 
The temporary nature of a commission ensures that it carries out its investigation quickly and 
efficiently. This case is examined alongside others throughout Chapter 2 of this thesis.
The final characteristic omitted from Freeman’s description regards the timing of the 
establishment of these commissions. Truth commissions are established during periods of 
political transition, and often after conflict; one of their main goals is to assist with this 
transition process: “Most of these commissions were created to be a central component to a 
transition from one government to another or from civil war to peace.”47
The differing characteristics of truth commissions demonstrate their ability to use a number 
of different techniques to address political, social and economic problems faced by states 
undergoing political transitions. In order to comprehend the full extent of the support offered 
by these bodies, it is necessary to analyse in detail exactly what truth commissions can 
achieve when operating to their full potential.
47Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pi7.
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What can a Truth Commission Achieve?
Despite the apparent diversity of truth commission investigations, due to the differing 
political, social and economic conditions they encounter, their core objectives can be 
narrowed down to three specific categories: their ability to disclose the truth over past events; 
their ability to cultivate and assist reconciliation processes; and their ability to promote 
restorative justice. Each of these objectives and outcomes are given due consideration below:
A. Establishing the Truth
“We kid ourselves if we say bygones are going to be bygones. The past remains and unless 
you... look the beast in the eye, the beast is going to come back to haunt you.”
Investigating and disclosing the full truth behind past events, is without doubt one of the main 
objectives and targeted outcomes of truth commission bodies: “Truth commissions thus 
seek... to uncover the past in order to answer questions that remain unanswered: What 
happens to husbands, sons, wives, and lovers at the hands of the ousted regime? Who gave 
the orders? Who executed the orders? What was the grand design? Who benefitted? Getting 
the facts provides closure, at least in theory.”49 Here Rotberg introduces examples of some of 
the many questions which truth commission investigations seek to answer when developing a 
full account of past events. This is considered an imperative part of transitional justice; it is 
widely believed that for reconciliation processes to develop, establishing the truth about past 
events is essential: “If societies are to prevent recurrences of past atrocities and to cleanse 
themselves of the corrosive enduring effects of massive injuries to individuals and whole 
groups, societies must understand - at the deepest levels -  what occurred and why.”50 
However, reconciliation is an extremely complex concept; there exists much debate 
surrounding the factors which both encourage and thwart the development of this process. It 
is commonly argued that truth-seeking can act as a catalyst for reconciliation processes; at the 
same time intensive truth-seeking processes can also damage more fragile societies.
48 Tutu, Desmond: “Confronting the Truth: Truth Commissions and Societies in Transition (DVD),” (York 
Zimmerman Inc, EAN: 718122409021, July 15th 2007).
49 Rotberg, Robert I: “Truth v. Justice: The Morality o f Truth Commissions,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press, 
2000) p3.
50 Rotberg, Robert I: “Truth v. Justice: The Morality o f Truth Commissions,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press, 
2000) p3.
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Inevitably, the impact of such a process will depend upon the characteristics of the society in 
question.
The Different Levels of Truth
“The commissioners should pay particular attention to the different levels of truth, while 
underlining the very subjective element in narrative truths. Importantly, regardless of the 
complexities of the concept, the fact remains that when such truths have been voiced they can 
no longer be denied, which may lay the foundation for a process of reconciliation.”51
According to Kerr and Mobekk in their recent publication: ‘Peace and Justice: Seeking 
Accountability after War, ’ most truth commissions underestimate the complexities of truth- 
seeking processes. It is claimed here that their investigations are hampered by a 
misunderstanding of the differing origins of the evidence they gather; this can jeopardise the 
overall reliability of the truths they present in their final reports and can have a negative 
impact upon the potential reconciliation processes they seek to foster.
Kerr and Mobekk argue that there are three levels of truth which are commonly unearthed by 
truth commission investigations.52 These are as follows:
1. Factual/forensic truth -  Factual truth stems from the provision of empirical evidence 
and details which are indisputable; this evidence is presented as it is found, 
objectively and without interpretation or bias, e.g. figures regarding the numbers of 
those injured or killed by during specific atrocities. In a similar way, forensic truths 
come from the provision of indisputable information obtained by scientific methods 
such as ballistics, blood tests, DNA tests etc. Although the gathering of such evidence 
can prove costly both in terms of time and expenditure, it is the most reliable and 
valuable in any investigation.
51 Kerr, Rachel and Mobekk, Eirin: “Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War,” (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007) p i34.
52 Kerr, Rachel and Mobekk, Eirin: “Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War,” (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007) pl33.
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It should be noted that although factual/forensic truths can be regarded as objective 
evidence, potential bias can be shown in the selectivity of such findings; specific 
evidence may be selected or ignored depending on the case being made.
2. Personal/normative/narrative -  This form of truth is based on personal accounts and is 
subjective in form. This is significant as it means that the account will be influenced 
by the person’s own opinions or experiences. For example, if you interview an 
Apartheid policeman, and a member of the ANC about a specific event, there is a 
good chance that their accounts will differ due to their individual political standings 
and their own personal feelings towards the morality of the Apartheid system. As a 
result it is less reliable than factual truth. In addition, these testimonies often become 
distorted as the margin of time between when the crime is committed and when the 
testimony is taken increases. Truth commissions are often more reliant upon this form 
of the truth if they have limited authority, or if factual/forensic truth is lacking. 
However, this form of evidence can be extremely useful when gauging how a truth 
commission report will be received by its audience.
3. Dialogue truth -  This form of truth can be derived from discussion between victims 
and perpetrators. Although useful, it can be difficult to obtain, and as the authors state, 
can often fail to establish the reasoning behind past occurrences. Although also 
subjective in format, as individuals share their own personal experiences, the opening 
up of a dialogue between victims and perpetrators can increase the onset of empathy 
and possible micro-level reconciliation processes between these groups. South 
Africa’s TRC court-style public hearings sought to encourage the development of 
dialogue truths. This thesis endorses the establishment of local-level reconciliation 
workshops by civil society groups which encourage open dialogue communication 
between previously divided groups; this ensures that the commission’s investigation 
will actively involve its intended audience.
One form of truth which can be encountered by truth commission investigations and is not 
mentioned by Kerr and Mobbek is ‘reparational truth.’ This should be considered a negative 
product of truth commission investigations and occurs when victims exaggerate accounts in 
order to qualify for greater compensation. Commission staff must be aware of this possibility 
when offering compensation to victims, particularly when reparations payments are defined 
by the extremity of the violations incurred.
35
It is essential to categorise the different aspects of truth, as each carries differing levels of 
validity and reliability. Each level of truth contributes to an investigation in differing ways; 
whereas objective truths greatly assist the publication of impartial reports, subjective truths 
are essential when gauging the impact of incidents upon different identity groups within a 
society. It is essential that truth commissions appreciate the complexity of these different 
aspects of the truth when deciding upon the type of report they wish to publish. This leads us 
to the important question of what types of truths truth commissions should seek to include 
within their reports?
Which Truths do Truth Commission Reports Seek to Present?
An understanding of the three types of truths presented by Kerr and Mobekk is 
inconsequential unless truth commission architects establish exactly which truths they wish to 
present and how they wish to present them, in their final reports. Although most truth 
commission investigations share similar titles and appear to have similar goals, the ways in 
which they present these truths are often fundamentally different, depending on the ambitions 
of the commission’s architect and the requirements of the state.
Throughout “The Aftermath o f  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and  
Beyond, ’ Paul Gready argues that most modem day truth commissions are undermined by 
genre confusion. By ‘genre,’ Gready refers to the “language use in a conventionalized 
communicative setting in order to give expression to a specific set of communicative goals of 
a disciplinary or social institution.” In other words, the way in which the results of a tmth 
commission report are gathered and communicated will be dictated by the ‘genre’ or 
communicative approach chosen by those in charge of the process.
In this way, Gready argues that tmth commission investigations and reports are forged by the 
degree of emphasis placed on the following three approaches:
1. State Enquiry -  This specific genre suggests that commission investigations will be 
orchestrated according to the needs of the state, e.g. to enhance state legitimacy, form 
a break from the past, fulfil social repair etc. In this instance, the state can use the
53 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p28.
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commission to influence a political transition. Gready uses the example of South 
Africa’s TRC which was used to prioritise a process of reconciliation.
2. Human Rights Report -  This specific approach presents the information gathered 
concerning human rights abuses without interpretation but simply as information; it 
does not concern itself with the impact this information will have upon, or the way it 
will be perceived by the different identity groups from within its society.
3. Official State History -  This final genre seeks to use evidence gathered to form an 
undisputed ‘official state history’ which can be used to rewrite a specific societies 
history books: “official histories, in short, rewrite the past, draw a line under the past, 
create a moral community/nation, and provide a foundation for the future.”54 
Concerns have been voiced over impartiality of this approach; as Gready suggests, 
official histories can often become ‘victors’ histories,’ where the state can seek to 
pursue one specific interpretation of the past.
Gready’s analysis of the three genres provides an insight into the choices which must be 
made by truth commission architects when deciding upon the specific approach of their 
commission’s investigation and the outlook of its final report. By ‘genre confusion’ Gready 
argues that truth commissions often ‘render multiple genres’ which end up being ‘mutually 
undermining,’ rather than complimentary; commission architects must be clear on the degree 
of emphasis they place on each genre to ensure compatibility. These choices are critical; they 
dictate not only the impartiality and legitimacy of the final report, but also its impact upon its 
intended audience. These decisions will also influence the structure of the commission’s 
mandate.
The Role of a Truth Commission’s Mandate
A truth commission’s mandate sets out a framework which governs how its investigation 
should be coordinated. The mandate also establishes boundaries which control the 
investigative freedoms of the commission; these boundaries are usually set up by the state or 
body which founded the commission or by the commission’s chairperson. Much debate 
surrounds the benefits and disadvantages of flexible or inflexible mandates.
54 Gready, Paul: “The Aftermath o f the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond,” 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2011) p45.
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Priscilla Hayner argues that the broader the mandate the better for a commission as it will 
allow the commissioners to carry out more thorough and unrestricted investigations: “As a 
general rule, terms of reference should be sufficiently broad and flexible to allow 
investigation into all forms of rights’ abuses, leaving the commission the decision of what 
specific cases or practices to investigate or report.”55 And indeed, it is often the case that 
commission mandates are purposefully left broad and flexible to grant commission staff the 
freedom to determine the direction and scope of their own investigations.
However, it could also be argued that the more investigative freedom granted to 
commissions, the more likely it is that they will lose focus and try to investigate too many 
cases over too broad a period of time; given the vast periods of time during which some 
atrocities are carried out by former regimes, with a broad mandate, this is a distinct 
possibility. Rwanda’s ‘National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’ suffered from this 
flaw. The freedom granted to it by its mandate meant that it lost its investigative focus and 
attempted to cover more cases than it could manage, given the limited time and resources 
available to it. Further examples of this are presented throughout Chapter 2.
The most effective commissions investigate cases which can be considered as adequate 
representations of all the atrocities which were carried out. Once effectively investigated, 
these cases will then hopefully provide commissions with an overall assessment o f “the 
causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or 
repression”.56 In an ideal world truth commissions would investigate every case in which 
human rights violations occurred. Given the limited resources, funding and time available to 
commissions this is seldom possible. A more focused mandate will encourage truth 
commissions to concentrate on specific cases/events which will help them narrow down their 
investigations, without leaving any hidden truths. Argentina’s ‘National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons’ was commended for achieving this.
However the pitfalls of placing such restrictions on commission mandates are also clear. Such 
an approach may limit the investigative potential of a commission and its staff; commissions 
with well-qualified and influential staff may seek to alter the direction of their investigations 
to maximise their findings; this potential is prevented by rigid mandates. Unwarranted
55 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p73.
56 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p i8.
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restrictions may also limit the scope of a commission’s investigation to prevent the 
incrimination of specific groups; provided that the commission’s staff are both qualified and 
democratically elected, broad mandates encourage a more thorough and unadulterated 
process.
The specific mandate restrictions referred to here will be discussed when analysing the 
structures of truth commissions in Chapter 4. As ever, the outcome of flexible or rigid 
mandate debate will depend on the resources available to the commission and the scale of the 
events under investigation; only once these variables have been assessed, can an ultimate 
decision be made.
The final point to make concerning truth commission mandates is that it is imperative that 
these mandates are not manipulated by the authorities of previous regimes in order to conceal 
specific truths. As will be explored in Chapter 4, when truth commissions are established, 
depending on the nature of the political transition which has occurred, often those responsible 
for the atrocities of previous regimes maintain influence within the new government/society. 
In these situations, the manipulation of commission mandates is a distinct possibility as they 
may not wish commissions to investigate particular periods of time when specific crimes 
were committed; as previously discussed, this can be prevented by maintaining broad 
commission mandates with limited restrictions. It is essential that truth commission architects 
are impartial and design truth commission mandates to establish the full truth concerning past 
atrocities without exception or hidden agenda: “The authority that establishes the mandate
CH
has a direct impact on a truth commissions perceived legitimacy.”
Disclosure of the full truth here includes revealing the truth behind atrocities committed by 
both victims and perpetrators. Truth commissions need to help societies understand that all 
human rights violations are wrong, not just violations committed by selected groups. This is 
particularly necessary when investigating civil wars: “After a civil war, investigating both 
sides can be critical to a commission’s popular legitimacy, and important in contributing to
CO
national unity and reconciliation.” It is key to the preservation of the integrity of truth 
commissions that they are seen to be investigating the human rights abuses committed by all 
parties involved. As Martha Minow stresses, The South African Truth and Reconciliation
57 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006) p28.
58 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002)p75.
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Commission was heavily criticised by former President De Klerk for its lack of investigation 
of the crimes committed by Winnie Mandela. As a result, he labelled the process a ‘witch 
hunt,’ and withdrew from the commission hearings.59
The Negative Impacts of the Truth
All previous arguments have worked under the assumption that the full disclosure of the truth 
will help a society to reconcile and heal its wounds. However, it is also important to 
acknowledge that such an approach is not always appropriate. There are certain situations 
where investigating and unearthing the truth behind past atrocities can not only prevent 
reconciliation and healing, but can even cause societies considerable amounts of pain and 
suffering. As Hayner argues, this approach, in some situations, can result in the reopening of 
old wounds: “There has been no study to date of the psychological impact of truth 
commissions on survivors, but the evidence that is available is enough to raise some serious 
questions.”60 She claims that there are a numerous ways in which truth-seeking bodies can 
damage rather than heal a society:
1. Forcing victims to revisit traumatic experiences -  Some victims do not respond well 
to the revisiting of past atrocities. This is because in some cases the experiences of 
victims are so severe that the only way they can deal with them is by forgetting. 
Should they be forced to reopen these wounds, whether it be through public or private 
testimony, the consequences could be disastrous: “Victims and witnesses can in effect 
be re-traumatized by giving testimony to a commission, which may be so severe as to 
result in a multitude of debilitating symptoms, such as confusion, nightmares, 
exhaustion, loss of appetite, and sleepiness.”61 It is therefore important that victims 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis before they are encouraged to revisit past 
atrocities. Governments must not assume, as many wrongly do, that truth will lead to 
healing and reconciliation. In some cases the truth can be too painful and destructive 
for some victims to confront.
59 Minow, Martha: “Between Vengeance and Forgiveness,” (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) p87.
60 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p i35.
61 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pl41.
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2. Failure to provide the necessary psychological/emotional support -  Another way, in 
which the truth can be damaging, is if victims are not provided with the necessary 
psychological and emotional support when revisiting traumatic experiences. This 
commonly occurs when truth commissions are underfunded and as a result fail to train 
their staff with the necessary skills to support witnesses during the testimony process: 
“Given the great number of victims that come forward and the short period of time 
that a commission has to complete its work, truth commissions to date have not been 
able to offer any serious psychological support services, nor generally respond well to 
the occasional follow-up phone calls of distress or requests for information on the 
progress of investigation on a particular case.” Furthermore, Hayner adds that the 
truth-seeking process can also be damaging for the staff employed by commissions 
should they not be adequately trained. She calls this ‘secondary traumatisation’: “Staff 
are often not given many tools to process the pain and agony they hear on a daily 
basis.” ‘ It is therefore essential that truth commissions provide the necessary support 
to victims and commission staff, if they are going to both cope with the revisiting of 
potentially traumatic experiences. This will be further explored in Chapter 2.
3. Stimulating revenge-seeking -  Another possible consequence of truth-finding which 
was not touched on by Hayner, is the possibility that it can lead to victims seeking 
revenge upon their oppressors. The truth-seeking process can often uncover 
information that was previously unknown by victims. Upon hearing such information, 
rather than reconcile with the orchestrators of atrocities, in some cases angry victims 
may seek to avenge their friends or relatives by attacking their former oppressors. 
This should be seen as a natural human reaction and a real threat towards potential 
reconciliation processes. Governments should not assume that their citizens will be as 
forgiving as the people of South Africa were when truths were established by the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
It is therefore essential that newly formed governments do not always assume that truth- 
seeking will contribute towards reconciliation and healing. As we have discussed, the truth 
can often have potentially damaging consequences which can prevent reconciliation and
62 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pl40.
63 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p i50.
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healing from taking place in unstable transitional societies: “A truth commission is a high- 
risk endeavour. For some societies, it is a risk best avoided.”64 It is equally important that 
international actors do not force societies to implement truth commissions under the same 
assumption: “Ultimately, the decision whether or not to institute broad truth-seeking should 
be made by the country itself.”65 This argument is supported by the cases of Mozambique and 
Cambodia.
The example of Mozambique presents us with a case study which suggests that in some 
instances it is better to leave the past alone and avoid the implementation of truth-seeking 
mechanisms. In this particular instance, gross human rights violations were committed by 
both the Mozambique government and the Renamo (rebel) forces, which devastated 
Mozambique’s society. However, rather than establish a commission to investigate what 
happened and why, it was decided by the newly instituted government that it was within the 
interests of the people of Mozambique and the future prosperity of the nation, to overlook the 
past and focus on the future: “we will talk and we may govern, but we will not bring up the 
past.”66
Though it is unclear whether in fact this policy was consented by the people of Mozambique, 
it was commonly believed that both sides were equally responsible for the crimes committed 
and shared equal guilt: “Since the two parties negotiating the peace accord were both 
responsible for abuses during the war, neither was much interested in airing their crimes in
67public or under the painful examining light of the negotiation table.” Though at the time this 
strategy roused much scepticism on the international circuit, this approach has proven to be 
effective in Mozambique. By overlooking the past and moving on without knowledge of the 
truth, victims learned to co-exist with perpetrators and peace was restored.
In such a situation though you have to wonder to what extent this was actually the will of the 
people? Throughout ‘Democracy in Mozambique: The significance o f multi-party elections, ’ 
Graham Harrison suggests that elections were forced upon the people of Mozambique, and
64 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p37.
65 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p i86.
66 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pl91.
67 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) pl91.
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that they did not necessarily represent a significant movement towards reconciliation: “There 
is not necessarily a feeling of reconciliation or at least post-war stability that one would
z :o
expect after a massive popular election.” Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that 
Mozambique has successfully avoided a return to conflict since the peace agreements of the 
early 1990’s: “Today, the two main political parties - adversaries in war not that long ago - 
peacefully share power at the municipal level for the first time in history.”69 As a result, the 
case of Mozambique supports the argument that in some cases, to achieve peace, it is best to 
leave the past alone.
Conclusions
Each of the aforementioned arguments for and against the pursuit of the truth leads to one 
inevitable conclusion; when deciding whether or not to pursue the truth over past atrocities 
through the implementation of truth commissions, it is first necessary to understand the 
specific social and political context present within the society under consideration. It is only 
through recognising the specific social and political contexts of transitional states that we can 
determine whether or not truth-seeking bodies will assist or hinder reconciliation processes.
What cannot be denied is the impact that truth-seeking mechanisms have had and continue to 
have on societies in transition. This is particularly the case when the historical accounts 
formed by truth commissions are officially recognised: “Knowledge that is officially 
sanctioned and thereby made part of the ‘public cognitive scene’ ... acquires a mysterious 
quality that is not there when it is merely the ‘truth.’ Official acknowledgement at least 
begins to heal the wounds.”70
Investigating the truth behind gross human rights violations remains one of the central 
functions of ‘the truth commission’ and an integral part of reconciliation processes for states 
undergoing political transition.
68 Harrison, Graham: “Democracy in Mozambique: The significance o f multi-party elections,” {Review of  
African Political Economy, Vol.23, No.67, March 1996) p31.
69 “Strengthening Democracy in Mozambique,” (USAID: August 17, 2009) Available at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/stories/mozambique/ss mozambique election.html (Last accessed June 22nd 2011).
70 Mendez, Juan: Review o f “A Miracle, and Universe,” by Lawrence Weschler, {New York Law School Journal 
of Human Rights 8, 1991) p8.
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B. Reconciliation
“It was Tutu who elicited its [reconciliation] meteoric crescendo... Tutu’s performance as the 
commission’s chairman delivered the concept its global fame. Reconciliation has 
subsequently become eponymous for truth commissions in Peru, East Timor, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria, Liberia, Morocco and Chad.”71
Since the birth of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, promoting 
reconciliation has become one of the primary objectives of most modern-day truth-seeking 
commissions. It is not uncommon when introducing the concept of a truth commission to 
someone for the first time, to be interrupted by the comment “don’t you mean truth and 
reconciliation commission?” This highlights a common misconception which believes that all 
modern-day truth commissions are designed and created for the sole purpose of promoting 
reconciliation. This is clearly not the case; there exists a diverse range of truth commissions, 
each with differing objectives and agendas. This does however demonstrate the increasing 
use of this concept in modem day international politics.
There also exists a lack of clarity over the definitive definition of reconciliation and its 
application: “What is reconciliation? How is reconciliation achieved? And under what 
conditions should it be sought? Curiously, given the frequency with which the term 
‘reconciliation’ is used, no one is saying.”
Defining Reconciliation
In ‘Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, ’ David Bloomfield defines 
reconciliation as: “An over-arching process which includes the search for tmth, justice, 
forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside 
former enemies -  not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, 
but to co-exist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share a society
71 Philpott, Daniel: “Religion, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: The State o f the Field,” (New York: 
SSRC Working Papers, October 17, 2007) pl5.
72 Dwyer, Susan: “Reconciliation for Realists,” (Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, March 
1999) p81.
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with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately.” 73 This
definition best defines the reconciliation which is fostered by truth commission
investigations. It also addresses the complex relationship shared between truth, justice, 
forgiveness and healing. Each of these factors may or may not contribute towards a process 
of reconciliation; every transitional or post-conflict state will have differing circumstances to 
deal with when constructing their reconciliation programmes: “As every conflict is different, 
and every democratic settlement is different, so a reconciliation process will differ from all 
others in important respects, even as it shares many similarities with them.”74
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for example benefitted from the 
belief in forgiveness, embedded in the Christian religion. Despite this, in the context of 
transitional justice, reconciliation, as stated in the above quotation, does not always require
victims to forgive perpetrators; sometimes co-existence is all that is required. In these
situations reconciliation requires victims and perpetrators to be able to leave peacefully 
together within one society; this can be seen as the ‘end-state’ which is pursued by most 
reconciliation processes. That being said, if achieved at some level, forgiveness can play a 
significant part in the reconciliation process and in the strengthening of previously polarised 
societies. The various conceptions of forgiveness will be discussed shortly, but are referred to 
here as a demonstration of the different roles which are likely to be played by truth, justice, 
forgiveness and healing in differing socio-political contexts.
Reconciliation: the ‘End Result’ and the ‘Process’
In order to strengthen our understanding of this complex concept, it is necessary to further 
breakdown the concept of reconciliation. Firstly, as Bloomfield stresses, reconciliation should 
be considered as both ‘an end result’ and ‘a process’.75 Put simply, the ‘end result,’ as already 
discussed, describes a society in which victims and perpetrators reconcile their differences 
and are able to live together in relative peace; inevitably the specific characteristics of the end 
result will depend largely on key variables such as the nature of the conflict which has
73 Bloomfield, David: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005) p i2.
74 Bloomfield, David: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005) pl6.
75 Bloomfield, David: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005) pl2.
45
occurred. The ‘process’ of reconciliation on the other hand is far more difficult to define. 
Bloomfield describes it as an often long-term, broad and deep-rooted process which demands
7  f \the change in attitudes, aspirations, emotions and beliefs of entire societies.
Hayner argues that there are 3 questions which should be asked to decipher whether or not a
77reconciliation process has taken root:
1. How has the past been dealt with -  Can victims and perpetrators openly discuss past 
events without conflict?
2. What are the relationships between former enemies -  Are relationships between 
victims and their former oppressors based on the past or the present? Are past events 
still being used to cause tensions?
3. Is there a general consensus over past events -  Reconciliation relies on the agreement 
of one version of the past. In recent years, conflict after transition often results from 
the failure of a society’s people to agree on one version of the past, e.g. 
Palestine/Israel.
Hayner’s three questions represent a starting point which provides us with a basic idea of the 
material conditions which may result from successful reconciliation processes. They also 
demonstrate the key role which can be played by truth-seeking processes. This highlights the 
importance of the role which truth commissions can play in helping former enemies reconcile 
over past atrocities and live peacefully together within the same community.
The ‘Two Levels* of Reconciliation
Secondly, it is necessary to understand that reconciliation occurs on two different levels. 
Throughout her article ‘Reconciliation fo r  Realists, ’ Susan Dwyer defines these two levels as
• 78the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of reconciliation.
76 Bloomfield, David: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute 
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2002) p 161.
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1. Macro-level reconciliation -  This is reconciliation on a national/collective level. It can 
be encouraged by governments through the introduction of truth commissions which 
establish an official account of past atrocities e.g. The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. It is hoped that the truths published in these accounts 
will encourage ‘micro-level’ reconciliation.
2. Micro-level reconciliation -  This is reconciliation at an interpersonal level, between 
victims and their oppressors; it is far more complex and difficult to achieve than 
‘macro-level’ reconciliation. The main reason for this is that it cannot be introduced 
or enforced by any specific body or power group; micro-level reconciliation occurs at 
the will of the individuals concerned. The fact that every individual is likely to 
respond differently to a truth commission’s findings and a reconciliation process, 
further complicates proceedings: “Forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation are deeply 
personal processes, and each person’s needs and reactions to peacemaking and truth-
7Qtelling may be different.”
Northern Ireland: The Impact of ‘Micro-level’ Reconciliation
One particular case study which often arises when discussing ‘micro-level’ reconciliation is 
the case of Northern Ireland; this is probably the most convincing example to date which 
demonstrates the successful development o f ‘reconciliation from below.’
The story of Northern Ireland’s recent history is a tale of bitter ethno-political conflict which 
has divided communities and taken lives. At the heart of this conflict there exists a bitter 
rivalry between protestant unionist and catholic nationalist communities in Northern Ireland.
Despite its weak political institutions, there is no absence of strong, non-government civil 
society institutions; these groups are so powerful that it is argued they often wield more 
influence over Northern Ireland’s populace than its government. A ‘Civil Society Index 
Report fo r  Northern Ireland’ compiled by CIVICUS for example, indicates that Northern 
Ireland has a strong Civil Society environment, which is able to promote positive values and
78 Dwyer, Susan: “Reconciliation for Realists,” {Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, March 
1999) p83.
79 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p i55.
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has a ‘better than average’ impact level. Consequently, the conflict which has plagued this 
society for so long is often blamed on these power groups: “One of the main causes o f the 
prolonged and intractable conflict is precisely the inability of civil society to generate enough 
of a consensus to allow for governmental institutions powerful enough to provide social 
stability.”81
Whether or not Northern Ireland’s civil society groups should be blamed for her political 
strife, is not relevant to this particular discussion. The fact is that, in this instance, these same 
civil society groups share enough power and influence to be able to foster grass roots, ‘micro- 
level’ reconciliation processes which have began to heal and reintegrate the nation’s once 
divided communities: “It is incumbent upon all organisations operating in this arena to
89promote the values and principles that underpin civil society in Northern Ireland.”
Throughout his works on Northern Ireland, Scott Appleby describes “a rare occurrence of a
O'}
home-grown peace transformation that might actually work well.” Both Appleby and Wells 
attribute recent developments in Northern Ireland to the strengths and weaknesses of religious 
institutions: “The churches were once part of the problem; they are now part of the
OA
solution.” Whatever the reason for these developments, they do provide us with evidence to 
suggest that in some cases, ‘macro-level’ organs, such as truth commissions, may not be a 
necessary requirement of all reconciliation processes: “It means that the fabric of civil society 
is strong enough to encourage and enable discourse about forgiveness and reconciliation to 
go on without an ad hoc commission created for that purpose.”85
More than anything, the Northern Ireland example highlights the invaluable role which can 
be played by non-government civil society groups by encouraging the development of
80 McCarron, JJ: “Civil Society Index Report for Northern Ireland,” (CIVICUS, February 2006) Available at 
https://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI northern ireland Executive summarv.pdf (last accessed 24th 
February 2012).
81 Wells, Ronald A: “Northern Ireland: A Study o f Friendship, Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” (taken from 
Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2006)) p i90.
82 McCarron, JJ: “Civil Society Index Report for Northern Ireland,” (CIVICUS, February 2006) Available at 
https://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI northern ireland Executive summarv.pdf (last accessed 24th 
February 2012).
83 Appleby, Scott (taken from Daniel Philpott: “The Politics o f Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the 
Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” (Indiana: University o f Notre Dame, 2006)) pi 89.
84 Appleby, Scott (taken from Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the 
Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” (Indiana: University o f Notre Dame, 2006)) pi 89.
85 Wells, Ronald A: “Northern Ireland: A Study o f Friendship, Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” (taken from 
Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2006)) p!90.
48
‘micro-level’ reconciliation at a grass-roots level. This strategy often proves far more 
effective than the ‘macro-level’ reconciliation processes introduced by government 
institutions. Having said that, recent ‘macro-level’ organs developed by states such as South 
Africa, have demonstrated their ability to encourage ‘micro-level’ reconciliation: “The
authorities cannot impose trust and empathy by decree... Nevertheless, they can create a
86climate that encourages private steps towards reconciliation.”
In fact, where possible, there is no reason why both levels of reconciliation cannot be utilised 
when healing divided societies; this is the exact strategy which will used when designing our 
Zimbabwean Truth Commission framework in the concluding chapter of this thesis. For this 
to be possible, it is important that both the micro and macro level reconciliation processes are 
attuned; if the government and society pursue different agendas, reconciliation processes will 
often be ineffective and sometimes damaging. Examples of the negative impacts of these 
clashes upon truth commission investigations are presented in Chapter 2.
An understanding of both ‘macro-level’ and ‘micro-level’ forms of reconciliation 
demonstrates that each can play a substantial part in reconciling post-conflict societies. It also 
becomes apparent that all-embracing reconciliation can only occur if it is the will of the 
people (a fundamental requirement of micro-level reconciliation processes) and that a 
comprehensive understanding of the society in question is required in order to determine 
which levels of reconciliation are both feasible and appropriate.
The Varying Impacts of Violence
Before we explore in greater detail, the different stages of reconciliation, it is necessary to 
look at the various impacts of violence; a better understanding of these effects is required in 
order to account for the harmful consequences they can have for reconciliation processes. In 
the early stages of ‘The Politics o f  Past Evil, ’ Daniel Philpott seeks to outline long term 
consequences of state violence.87 These are summarised below:
86 Hyse, Luc: “The Process o f Reconciliation,” (Taken from: Bloomfield, David and Barnes, Teresa: 
“Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2005)) p26.
87 Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas of Transitional 
Justice,” (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2006)) p!7.
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1. Physical, psychological, economic or emotional harm -  The immediate consequences 
of state violence, according to Philpott are physical, psychological, economic or 
emotional harm. He compares the serious nature of this form of harm with the 
damage caused by natural disasters; although natural disasters can also lead to the 
above, state oppression seeks to directly target and victimise its civilians, instead of 
protecting their interests. These kinds of effects were witnessed among the victims of 
South Africa’s Apartheid regime: “The psychic damage and economic deprivation 
caused by the myriad of injustices of Apartheid were wounds wrought by systems of
o o
laws.” Therefore, the notion that South African state law had been specifically 
designed to endorse the oppression of various sectors of South African society would 
have been particularly psychologically and emotionally damaging for those targeted. 
This can also cause long-term damage to the relationship shared between a state and 
its citizens. As well as seeking to rebuild this tarnished relationship, transitional 
governments will also have to introduce extensive reforms to state infrastructures, 
including the introduction of more effective constitutions, to remedy this damage.
2. The victim can suffer from ignorance -  As previously discussed, when looking at the 
significance of finding out the truth behind the orchestration of past atrocities, victims 
can suffer greatly from not knowing what happened and why. Whether it be not 
knowing the location of their relatives or not knowing why crimes were committed 
against them; ignorance can continue to harm and torment victims long after the 
cessation of violence, and can seriously damage healing processes: “Not knowing the 
truth of one’s past, especially the most traumatic parts of it, is itself a serious form of 
torment.”89
3. The victim is made to feel ‘politically dead’ -  Another form of psychological harm 
can come from the knowledge that victims are not fairly represented by the state. As 
a result they are made to feel like they are not legitimate members of their own 
societies. The persecution of the Jews in 1930s/40s Germany can be drawn upon as 
an example of this form of torment. Hitler’s Nazi government engineered Germany’s 
political system so that it gave the Jewish sector of German society no political
88 Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f  Transitional 
Justice,” (Indiana: University o f Notre Dame, 2006)) p l7.
89 Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional 
Justice,” (Indiana: University o f Notre Dame, 2006)) p i 7.
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representation. This is a common strategy utilised by authoritarian regimes to oppress 
a society’s specific identity groups.
4. The victim is not recognised as a victim -  Leading on from the previous point, the 
victim is further traumatized when his or her hardships are not even acknowledged by 
the state. If the state does not recognise these individuals as victims, further 
psychological torment can result. Victims should have the right to have their 
sufferings acknowledged. Truth commissions often provide victims with this 
recognition and give them the opportunity to publically share their experiences, often 
in the presence of those responsible.
5. Lack of accountability -  Further damage is caused when those responsible for 
committing human rights violations are not prepared to acknowledge their part in 
proceedings. Having committed crimes of this magnitude, guilty parties should be 
held accountable not just to their victims but also to the state; though this does not 
necessarily imply that they should be punished. By not being held accountable for 
crimes committed against the state, guilty parties can seriously undermine the 
legitimacy and authority of the state in question.
6. Failure to confess and show remorse -  Finally, Philpott argues that further damage 
can result from the failure of guilty parties to confess and express regret for their part 
in proceedings. He states that this failure would not only cause the victims additional 
trauma, but would also prevent any possibility that the victim might forgive their 
oppressor. The failure to confess or show remorse can also harm the perpetrator; 
trauma and social exclusion can result from prolonged guilt and an inability to move 
on from past experiences. Though not always present in reconciliation processes, 
confession and forgiveness would undoubtedly help mend fractured societies.
Having gained a greater awareness of the damaging effects of violence, it is easier to 
comprehend how important it is that transitional justice processes should attempt to reverse 
these impacts in order to encourage conditions more in keeping with the promotion of 
reconciliation processes.
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The Different Stages of Reconciliation
As with any process, there are various stages of the ‘reconciliation process’ through which 
each society will pass as part of the healing process. Throughout ‘A Working Definition o f  
Reconciliation, ’ Brandon Hamber and Grainne Kelly argue that a comprehensive 
reconciliation process generally encompasses the following five interwoven and interrelated 
strands:90
1. Developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society -  Hamber and Kelly 
argue that the whole society, at all levels must develop one common vision of an 
‘interdependent, just, equitable, open and diverse’ shared future. They claim that this 
is a critical phase of the reconciliation process.
2. Acknowledging and dealing with the past -  They also argue that the society in 
question must acknowledge the ‘hurt, losses, truths and suffering o f the past.’ This 
process can be achieved with the assistance of the transitional justice mechanisms 
referred to throughout this chapter. Hamber and Kelly emphasise the importance of 
non-repetition of past wrongs through a process of repentance, acceptance and 
learning.
3. Building positive relationships -  Hamber and Kelly state that another key stage of the 
reconciliation process is the rebuilding of fractured relationships by addressing issues 
of trust, accepting commonalities and differences and accepting those with different 
identities.
4. Significant cultural and attitudinal change -  They also state that people must change 
their attitudes towards one another, by breaking down a culture of fear and mistrust 
and creating opportunities where ‘people can hear and be heard,’ in order to create ‘a 
culture of respect for human rights and human difference.’
5. Substantial social, economic and political change -  Finally, they argue that the social, 
economic and political structures responsible for past conflicts must be ‘identified, 
reconstructed or addressed and transformed.’ This is obviously a critical part o f any
90 Hamber, Brandon and Kelly, Grainne: “A Working Definition o f Reconciliation,” (Democratic Dialogue, 
Belfast, Sept 2004) p3/4.
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reconciliation process; it will be very difficult for a society to reconcile if the 
infrastructures responsible for the initial conflict remain in place.
Brandon and Hamber’s five strands of reconciliation have been presented here to serve as a 
rough guide of the various stages through which societies must pass as part of a 
comprehensive reconciliation process. They demonstrate what an all-encompassing process 
this must be; they stress the importance of the involvement of the entirety of the society in 
question. Whilst these strands show some strengths as ‘rough guidance,’ in the main, they are 
simply too demanding and unrealistic for most transitional societies. It seems highly unlikely 
for example, that ‘the whole [of a transitional] society’ will develop one common vision of a 
shared future; even the most well-established present-day democracies struggle to achieve 
this feat. In addition, the ordering of these five strands seems inaccurate; ‘substantial social, 
economic and political change’ must be one of the initial stages, as a prerequisite to help 
promote the other aforementioned strands of reconciliation. It should also be noted that the 
successful application of these processes will require the development o f both ‘macro’ and 
‘micro-level’ reconciliation.
Cited in ‘The Process o f  Reconciliation, ’ Luc Hyse presents a similar summary of the 
different stages of the reconciliation process, but places significant emphasis on the 
importance of communication and the role of pre-existing civil society groups: “This involves 
the building or renewal of communication inside the communities of victims and offenders 
and between them. Political and community leaders, non-governmental organisations and 
religious institutions have a responsibility here.”91 Hyse also stresses the importance of 
victims learning to ‘separate the sin from the sinner,’ and attempting to understand why their 
oppressors acted in such a way. He suggests that truth commissions can assist with this 
process by presenting the past in terms of ‘shared suffering;’ in such a way victims might 
learn to empathise with their former oppressors: “More important still is the recognition that
92victims and offenders share a common identity, as survivors and as human beings.”
Each of these strands introduced by Hamber, Kelly and Hyse, provides a useful insight into 
the progression of the reconciliation process. It should also be noted that the successful
91 Hyse, Luc: “The Process o f Reconciliation,” (Taken from: Bloomfield, David and Barnes, Teresa: 
“Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2005)) p20.
92 Hyse, Luc: “The Process o f Reconciliation,” (Taken from: Bloomfield, David and Barnes, Teresa: 
“Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2005)) p21.
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development of a comprehensive reconciliation process is not always dependent upon the 
presence of all of these strands. Each transitional state will have differing political, social and 
economic pre-conditions; these characteristics will influence the strands of reconciliation 
which are required to heal that particular society. Though inevitably, the more strands of 
reconciliation which are in place, the more likely it is that this process will succeed.
Conditions which Encourage Reconciliation
Transitional governments should seek to develop the following conditions within their 
societies in order to assist the reconciliation process:
1. Ceasing conflict -  It is clear from Hyse’s assessment that reconciliation can only be 
achieved in peaceful societies. Truth commissions are never established during 
periods of war as this jeopardises the safety of those involved and the success of the 
investigation. Therefore it is essential that governments pursuing reconciliation end 
any threat of violence, as their first course of action.
2. Restructuring society/addressing pre-existing inequalities -  As a consequence of 
prolonged periods of conflict, societal infrastructures are often severely damaged and 
unable to perform their day-to-day tasks effectively. This can seriously jeopardise the 
reconciliation process, which benefits from reformed government institutions and an 
impartial judicial system which upholds and protects the rule of law. Structures which 
encourage inequality, which were introduced by the outgoing regime, should also be 
reformed to ensure that all civilians’ human rights are equally respected.
3. Truth telling -  As already mentioned, finding out the truth about past events, to 
prevent victims suffering from ignorance, can go a long way towards reconciling 
them with their former enemies (see ‘Establishing the Truth’). Truth-finding organs 
such as the truth commission can act as catalysts for reconciliation processes by 
establishing a truthful account of past atrocities: "The presence of the commission, its 
public authority, the millions of witnessing citizens, and ultimately a permanent
93public record of the injustices committed all aid this restoration.” This process is
93 Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f  Transitional 
Justice,” (Indiana: University o f  Notre Dame, 2006)) p21.
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even more effective if the truth is endorsed by both all parties concerned, including 
the state.
4. Acknowledgement and accountability -  Victims can be greatly encouraged to 
reconcile with their oppressors once they feel that their hardships have been formally 
acknowledged by those responsible or by the state: “Victims often say that they 
cannot forgive their perpetrators, and have no desire or ability to reconcile, until those 
who have caused them pain acknowledge their acts and, ideally, ask for forgiveness 
and provide some form o f symbolic reparation.”94 This formal acknowledgement can 
be carried out in many ways, such as through the recognition of their crimes by 
perpetrators at public truth commission hearings. Having read numerous accounts of 
truth commission hearings, it has become evident that for guilty parties, having to sit 
and listen to victims’ testimonies and acknowledging that they are responsible for this 
suffering, can constitute a tough form of punishment; this is supported by the 
testimonies of perpetrators under investigation by South Africa’s TRC: “I have to live 
with this hell. The problem is in my head, my conscience. There’s only one way to be 
free of it. Blow my own brains out. Because that’s where my hell is.”95
Occasionally states formally acknowledge the historical accounts published within 
truth commission reports and publically apologise for the atrocities enforced by their 
predecessors. In Chile, for example, President Aylwin acknowledged the Chilean 
Commission’s report as being an accurate and legitimate account of what happened, 
in a televised national address. Such acknowledgements encourage victims to 
reconcile as they feel that their suffering has been formally recognised. Past truth 
commission enquiries which have facilitated the formal acknowledgement of past 
human right abuses; this will be explored further throughout Chapter 2.
In a similar way, accountability can strengthen reconciliation processes. By holding 
guilty parties accountable for their actions both against victims and against the state, 
victims often feel that their rights have been recognised: “Accountability can be 
designed flexibly to further the restoration of both the offender and his ambient
94 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 
2002) p i64.
95 Tutu, Desmond: “No Future without Forgiveness,” (London: Ryder, 1999) p51.
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broken relationships and to further the other practises o f reconciliation.”96 It should be 
noted though, that for some transitional and post-conflict societies, accountability is 
just not plausible. Often these societies are far too fragile or ill-equipped to achieve 
accountability; in such instances, they are much more reliant upon the willingness of 
both the victim and perpetrator to engage in ‘micro-level’ reconciliation processes.
5. Restorative/retributive justice -  Both forms of justice can assist reconciliation 
processes, though governments should avoid damaging already fragile reconciliation 
processes by forcing justice (in whichever form) upon a society when it is not 
appropriate. These forms of justice should only be implemented when it is determined 
that they will achieve a positive outcome for the society concerned (see retributive v 
restorative justice debate). It should be noted that the punishments meted out by 
retributive justice proceedings can encourage accountability and can be seen as a 
formal recognition of the rights of victims.
6. Time -  States must not expect reconciliation to occur over night; it is often a long 
process which occurs over prolonged periods of time. It is therefore important not to 
pass premature judgement upon truth commission investigations; time must be 
allowed for victims to learn to live with their oppressors once again and for wounds to 
heal.
As ever, the different measures required to enhance and accommodate the reconciliation 
process will depend on the circumstances and context faced by the society in question.
The Role of Forgiveness
It is clear from our analysis of this complex concept, that forgiveness can play a substantial 
part in well-established reconciliation processes. This is demonstrated by a closer look at its 
definition with reference to the characteristics of reconciliation processes already discussed in 
this chapter.
96 Philpott, Daniel: “The Politics o f Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f  Transitional 
Justice,” (Indiana: University o f Notre Dame, 2006)) p23.
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The standard dictionary definition of the verb ‘to forgive’ is usually divided into three parts; 
‘the ceasing of blame or resentment,’ ‘the granting of a pardon for wrongdoing’ and ‘the
Q1
freeing from obligation of debt.’ Each of these meanings holds particular significance when 
looking at the contribution of forgiveness to reconciliation processes.
The ceasing of blame or resentment is an integral part of any reconciliation process as it aids 
the restoration of the relationship shared between victim and perpetrator; whilst it grants the 
latter a fresh start and the opportunity to re-join society, it also enables the victim to heal, be 
free from anger and hatred and be at peace with the past.
The granting of a pardon for wrong-doing and the freeing from obligation of debt promotes 
reconciliation through social repair as it eradicates the lasting legacy of past human rights 
abuses and allows both parties to re-establish themselves within a society on equal terms. It is 
important to note, that as a necessary condition, that this can be achieved by both forgiveness 
and by retributive justice; the latter pardons the perpetrator after they have fulfilled the terms 
of their punishment. Forgiveness also promotes other positive emotions such as compassion, 
empathy and understanding which reinforce this social repair.
The positive impacts of forgiveness can be demonstrated by looking at the negative impacts 
of ‘unforgiveness.’ Throughout ‘Forgiveness, Unforgiveness, Health and Disease, ’ Harris 
and Thoresen present the destructive effects of ‘unforgiveness:’ “In the short term, 
unforgiveness has been shown to produce intense negative emotions as well as physiological 
responses consistent with other stress responses.”98 They state that these negative emotions 
and physiological responses can take the form of resentment, blame, bitterness, hostility, 
hatred, anger, and fear which may be fostered through rumination. Such reactions are likely 
to hinder any potential reconciliation process.
Among the various negative impacts associated with unforgiveness presented by Harris and 
Thoresen, surely the most damaging to any reconciliation process has to be ‘enforced social 
isolation.’ They suggest that the erosion of social networks can occur either when victims 
isolate themselves from society for fear of re-victimization, or when negative emotions
97 “The Collins Dictionary o f  the English Language,” (Oxford: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd, 1979) p569.
98 Worthington, Everett: “The Handbook o f Forgiveness,” (New York: Routledge, 2005) p323.
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alienate them from their friends and loved ones." The social erosion which results from 
unforgiveness can also promote the enforced exclusion of guilty parties from society.
Forgiveness therefore acts as a catalyst which fosters the long-term rehabilitation and social 
development of both the victim and the perpetrator; on this basis, the parallels between 
transitional justice and forgiveness processes are clear.
Given these apparent similarities and the significance of the role of forgiveness in 
reconciliation processes, it is necessary to assess whether or not specific conditions need to 
be present in order for forgiveness to develop. This question has drawn a clear split between 
the opinions of Amstutz and Wolterstorff. Amstutz claims that forgiveness is dependent on 
the presence of various ‘core elements:’ “including consensus about past wrongdoing, 
remorse and repentance, renunciation of vengeance, cultivation of empathy and mitigation or 
cancellation of a deserved penalty.” 100
Wolterstorff on the other hand argues that forgiveness can occur irrespective of some of these 
factors. He states that there are two conditions in which forgiveness can occur. The first is 
when the victim forgets the wrong which has occurred; reconciliation through amnesia. The 
second is when the wrongdoer disassociates himself from the wrong through repentance, 
allowing forgiveness without forgetting the sin.101
Though W olterstorff s argument would definitely prove more favourable for truth 
commissions and the reconciliation processes they often aim to foster, I would suggest that it 
presents a somewhat simplistic analysis of this concept; can ‘reconciliation through amnesia’ 
really be classed as a form of forgiveness? Whilst carefully considering these questions, it is 
possible to draw reference to the aforementioned policies of the government of Mozambique 
upon the cessation of its civil war. When the Frelimo Government disregarded the possibility 
of establishing any truth-seeking process to investigate the crimes committed during the civil 
war, it was questionable whether or not the people of Mozambique could honestly say that 
they had forgiven their oppressors, as opposed to being forced to forget their wrongdoings.
Worthington, Everett: “The Handbook o f Forgiveness,” (New York: Routledge, 2005) p325.
100 Wolterstorff, Nicholas: “The Place o f  Forgiveness in the Actions o f  the State,” (taken from Philpott, Daniel: 
“The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame, 2006)) p96.
101 Wolterstorff, Nicholas: “The Place o f  Forgiveness in the Actions o f  the State,” (taken from Philpott, Daniel: 
“The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame, 2006)) plOl.
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Andrew Schaap’s ‘Political Forgiveness, ’ presents a comprehensive analysis of the concept 
of forgiveness in the political realm.102 This analysis starts by looking at the argument that 
forgiveness requires the setting aside of resentment. Schaap states that the action of the 
oppressor leads the victim to resent both the material harm inflicted and the insulting message 
that comes with it. Although he states that forgiveness should not rely upon retribution, 
remorse, reparation or restitution, he concedes that remorse does encourage forgiveness as it 
results in the wrongdoer withdrawing the endorsement of the insulting message.
With reference to the works of fellow theorists, Schaap then looks at the inadequacies of
necessity and reason as grounds for forgiveness in politics from the liberal and realist
perspective. Firstly, he argues that the realist approach, which claims that forgiveness is a
‘necessity’ for the survival of political association is flawed because in this case ‘forgiveness
is not freely given but bargained away.’ He also argues that forgiveness involves the
condonation of the initial wrongdoing: “Forgiving risks lapsing into condonation when we do
1 rnnot protest but simply overlook a wrong in order to maintain a relationship with the other.”
Schaap also finds flaws in the liberal perspective, which states that forgiveness is appropriate 
in terms of moral reason; forgiving ones oppressor and overcoming resentment and anger 
towards them is the right thing to do in order to promote the wellbeing of both parties. He 
states that although forgiveness in terms of moral reason may be appropriate in private life, it 
should be considered redundant in political life: “For, although it may be laudable to strive to 
overcome resentment towards others in our private lives, we stretch the bonds of ordinary 
human sentiment too far in seeking to extend such generosity to those with whom we lack 
sustained emotional contact and whose values seem alien to our own.”104
Having dismissed these perspectives, in line with Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility, 
Schaap states that political grounds for forgiveness is furnished by an ‘ethic for worldliness:’ 
“In undertaking to forgive for the sake of the world we share in common, we must consider 
the significance and consequences of our act for our life in common.” 105 This approach, he 
claims, avoids the flaws of the realist and liberal approaches. This justification for 
forgiveness is in-keeping with one of the central claims of this thesis; that the restorative 
justice concepts presented through Chapter 1 are justified if they achieve a positive outcome
102 Schaap, Andrew: “Political Reconciliation,” (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) pl03.
103 Murphy, Jeffrie: “Forgiveness and Mercy,” (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Press, 1988) pl5.
104 Schaap, Andrew: “Political Reconciliation,” (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) pl08.
105 Schaap, Andrew: “Political Reconciliation,” (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) p i 12.
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for the transitional societies which they seek to assist. This ‘consequentialist argument’ is 
looked at it greater detail when assessing the role of justice in assisting transitional states. It is 
also possible to draw parallels between this approach and the concept of communitarian 
responsibility promoted by the Ubuntu philosophy, which will be discussed shortly.
What cannot be denied is the impact that forgiveness can have on a reconciliation process: 
“In the act of forgiveness we are declaring our faith in the future of a relationship and in the 
capacity of the wrongdoer to make a new beginning on a course that will be different from 
the one that caused us the wrong. We are saying here is the chance to make a new 
beginning.”106 As Tutu demonstrates here, forgiveness helps victims and perpetrators 
reconcile. It is difficult to envisage a thorough, comprehensive reconciliation process that is 
not facilitated by some level of forgiveness.
The Role of Religion
“Theologians and religious activists, in their theorising and their political involvements, have 
fashioned an approach to transitional justice with a distinct centre of gravity that has
1 Q7
important consequences for politics. Reconciliation is their axial idea.”
It is very difficult to discuss the concepts of reconciliation and forgiveness without discussing 
religion; after all, many past truth commissions have utilised their peoples’ faiths in order to 
encourage the development of reconciliation and forgiveness: “One of the long-term
influences of Christianity on our polities has been the tempering of the demands of retributive
108justice with forgiveness.”
Throughout ‘What Religion brings to the Politics o f  Transitional Justice, ’ Daniel Philpott 
discusses the “Rise of religion as a political force,” 109 and its influence on transitional justice. 
He looks at the two contrasting paradigms of ‘liberal human rights’ and ‘reconciliation,’ and 
examines the approaches they take when dealing with those responsible for the orchestration
106 Tutu, Desmond: “No Future without Forgiveness,” (London: Ryder, 1999) p220.
107 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f Transitional Justice,” (Journal of 
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) p97.
108 Nicholas Wolterstorff: “The Place o f Forgiveness in the Actions o f the State,” (taken from Philpott, Daniel: 
“The Politics o f  Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas o f Transitional Justice,” (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame, 2006)) pl09.
109 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f Transitional Justice,” (Journal of 
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) p93.
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of human rights violations. His analysis o f today’s mainstream religions shows that despite 
their fundamental differences they do come to some form of consensus with regards to 
political reconciliation: “In all o f these traditions, reconciliation means, broadly, restoration 
of a broken relationship to a state of right relationship... They envision a fuller restoration, 
involving apology, forgiveness, empathic acknowledgement of suffering and the 
transformation of enmity between both groups and individuals.” 110 The shared moral beliefs 
between the mainstream religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) and the concept of 
reconciliation are clearly demonstrated by Philpott here. He then examines the impact of 
religious groups upon reconciliation and transitional justice processes in recent history. He 
states that out of the fifteen cases where religion has held a prominent presence in societies 
undergoing political transition, 8 of these cases demonstrate the successful impact of these 
religions upon transitional justice processes. With reference to these specific examples, 
Philpott argues that these religious structures influenced transitional justice processes by 
“shaping the decision for truth commissions through speaking out publically, lobbying and 
sometimes even organising efforts to investigate past injustices themselves... They also 
shaped the actual functioning of truth commissions by influencing the selection of 
commissioners, providing logistical support for organising and conducting hearings, locating 
and supporting victims and witnesses and providing counselling in the wake of hearings.” 111
The most obvious example of this is the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: “The TRC process is one o f the most dramatic and helpful signs of an 
authentically Christian contribution to political life to emerge in many years.” 112 Though 
hesitant at first, Desmond Tutu began each truth commission hearing with a recital of the 
Lord’s Prayer. By doing this he sought to harness his peoples’ religious beliefs to encourage 
them to forgive their oppressors. As the TRC process continued, he placed more and more of 
a religious emphasis on proceedings. This course of action, though widely criticised by those 
who believe that religion should be kept separate from the affairs of the state, is considered 
key to the success of the South African TRC. It is unsurprising therefore, that many modern- 
day truth commissions seek to mirror the TRC’s religious format.
110 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f  Transitional Justice,” (Journal of 
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) p97.
111 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f  Transitional Justice,” (Journal of 
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) plOl.
112 Jones, Gregory L: “Embodying forgiveness: A Theoretical Analysis,” (Michigan: B Eerdmans Pub co, 1995)
p22.
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J. S. Mbiti makes similar claims to Philpott, by stressing that religion often acts as ‘an agent 
of social reconstruction “which provides people with a view of the world, and as that which 
inspires new ideas.” Similarly, Jesse Mugambi argues that “religion is the most vital 
project for the people who are undergoing a rapid change -  as in the post-colonial era.”114
The question arises; in which instances can religious institutions have a positive impact upon 
transitional justice processes? After all, as Philpott’s statistic demonstrates, in 7 out of 15 of 
the aforementioned cases, religious groups failed to positively influence transitional justice: 
“Religious actors who influenced their government’s institutions o f transitional justice, held 
both a political theology of reconciliation and institutional autonomy.” 115 As well as stating 
that religious institutions must represent a significant proportion of their population in order 
to be able to influence such a process, Philpott also suggests that in the past, religious actors 
were able to influence proceedings because of their ability to articulate and promote the 
language of reconciliation whilst operating independently from their government. Though the 
latter requirement will protect the impartiality and integrity of the process, this should not be 
seen as a compulsory pre-requisite; religious institutions in societies which do not 
characterise a clear separation between church and state can still influence transitional justice 
processes.
Philpott also stresses the significant presence of reconciliation and transitional justice theory 
within many different religious infrastructures; it is not solely present within Christian based 
institutions: “Comparative analysis reveals the presence of a political theology or culturally- 
rooted concept of reconciliation, with variations in its propositions and its warrants, in an 
impressively wide array of religions and cultures.”116
To conclude, Philpott has highlighted the possible contributions which can be made by 
religious institutions towards reconciliation and transitional justice processes operating in 
transitional and post-conflict societies. Evidently, this will not always be the case as various 
conditions must be present for this to be possible; in order to effectively assist these 
processes, religious institutions must have a considerable support base and must support and 
promote the language of reconciliation. Operational independence from government
113 Mbiti, J. S: “An Introduction to African Religion,” (London: Heinemann, 1975) pl95.
1,4 Mugambi, Jesse: “From Liberation to Reconstruction: Africa after the Cold War,” (Nairobi: E.A.E.P., 1995).
115 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f Transitional Justice,” (Journal of  
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) pl02.
116 Philpott, Daniel: “What Reconciliation brings to the Politics o f Transitional Justice,” (Journal of  
International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, vol.61, no.l) pl06.
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influence will also assist this process. The versatility of truth commission frameworks should 
enable them to adapt to accommodate the various religions and belief systems followed by 
each society. For this reason, a comprehensive understanding of the social fabric of each 
society is necessary, prior to the establishment of the transitional justice body.
Inevitably, not all transitional societies will benefit from the impetus of pre-existing religious 
institutions and belief systems. And indeed, where present, history shows that sometimes 
religion can also have a divisive effect upon the social fabric of societies. In such situations, 
this thesis argues that these processes are still possible if the society contains a pre-existing 
‘commitment to justice.’
The Necessity of a Pre-existing ‘Commitment to Justice’
In addition to the conditions mentioned here, the successful impact of truth commission 
investigations can also be heavily influenced by the ethical characteristics of a society. By 
ethical, the thesis refers to the basic beliefs and moral codes which exist within specific 
cultures. One of the central claims of the thesis argues that one of the most decisive factors, 
which often dictate the successes or failures of truth commission bodies, is the pre-existence 
o f a ‘commitment to justice.’
The presence of a ‘commitment to justice’ within a society, means that, on a subconscious 
level, the individuals and groups involved and effected by the state’s transition want to 
develop a just and fair society. In other words, they understand the difference between right 
and wrong, and want to create a society with laws which protect and promote this basic moral 
fabric. The justice we are referring to here is not necessarily retributive, but more restorative 
(as introduced in the next section of this chapter). Such an ethos cannot by forced upon a 
society; it cannot be introduced by a government or an international organisation as part of a 
restoration process. It must pre-exist and must be present within the subconscious of the 
collective; having said that, it can be harnessed and developed by an influential authority or 
institution.
Within many African cultures, various ethical beliefs and attitudes exist which make the 
successful contribution of transitional justice processes a distinct possibility. This thesis looks 
specifically at the influence of Ubuntu upon post-conflict African societies, and the role it
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plays in promoting this ‘commitment to justice.’ The Ubuntu philosophy itself, present 
among many African communities, stresses the importance of an individual’s commitment to 
the wellbeing of their community. This communitarian philosophy promotes an 
understanding of the prioritisation of the collective over the individual and in this way helps 
individuals see how their destinies are intertwined. This philosophy promotes a ‘commitment 
to justice’ because those who believe in it understand the importance of preserving justice 
and peace throughout their communities, even if this requires individual sacrifice.
As this chapter stresses, this commitment to justice can be reinforced by various institutions 
which exist within societies. In the West, various religious groupings may promote such an 
ethos for justice. However, African cultures benefit from a wider array of institutional layers 
which can reinforce and develop this commitment within their societies. As well as the 
various religious institutions which are present around the world, Africa also benefits from 
various tribal structures which may also promote such a commitment. These grassroots 
structures reinforce this commitment to justice by promoting the Ubuntu philosophy and 
stressing the importance of the preservation and restoration of one’s community.
Sadly for Africa, a negative consequence of the existence of infrastructures which promote a 
commitment to justice is that they can often make these societies more prone to conflict; 
justice can be pursued through conflict as well as through peaceful means. To demonstrate 
this, it is possible to draw reference to the aforementioned Northern Ireland case study; 
although this thesis suggests that civil society groups have assisted the development of micro- 
level reconciliation in Northern Ireland, they were also responsible for igniting the initial 
conflict.
That being said, these infrastructures provide much hope for transitional and post-conflict 
African states, as they often promote the necessary ethical and moral belief systems which 
uphold this commitment to justice. Such belief systems can be harnessed by truth commission 
bodies to encourage communities to embrace the transitional justice processes they seek to 
establish. The various successes of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission can 
be attributed to its ability to harness the ‘commitment to justice’ promoted by the Ubuntu 
philosophy, which is instilled by the country’s grassroots tribal and religious structures.
By adapting its frameworks to harness the ethical and moral beliefs present within African 
societies, this thesis can ensure that truth commission bodies continue to successfully assist 
transition processes throughout the African continent. That is not to say that where these
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ethical and moral beliefs are lacking, transitional justice mechanisms should not be 
considered, but rather that the expectations placed upon them should be scaled down 
significantly.
The Impact of the Ubuntu Philosophy upon Reconciliation and Forgiveness Processes
“Ubuntu refers to the person who is welcoming, who is hospitable, who is warm and 
generous, who is affirming of others, who does not feel threatened that others are able and 
good for [this person] has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that they belong 
in a greater whole, and know that they are diminished when another is humiliated, is 
diminished, is tortured, is oppressed, is treated as if they were less than who they are. What a 
wonderful world it can be, when we know that our destinies are locked inextricably into one 
another’s.”117
This quotation, taken from Desmond Tutu’s ‘The New World Order,' provides both a broad 
definition of Ubuntu and demonstrates the impact that this philosophical concept could have 
upon the possible success of transitional justice processes. In recent times, the concept of 
Ubuntu is increasingly placed under the microscope, as analysts seek to examine how its 
qualities can help societies reconcile after periods of conflict and political transition. This is 
mainly as a consequence of its contributions towards the successes of South Africa’s ‘Truth 
and Reconciliation’ processes: “Ubuntu was the glue which held together traditional societies
in Southern Africa, and which undergirded the remarkably peaceful transition in South Africa
118from Apartheid to democracy.”
General consensus defines Ubuntu as “a traditional African philosophy that gives an 
understanding of us as human beings in relation to the rest of the world.” 119 According to 
Louw, “Ubuntu serves as the spiritual foundation of African societies.”120 The Zulu word 
‘Ubuntu’ directly translated means ‘humanness.’ The complete definition o f this concept is 
notoriously difficult to put into words; as Nussbaum states, “Africa’s traditional culture is
117 Tutu, Desmond: “The New World Order,” (The International Foundation fo r  Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies, Moscow Conference: July 14th-  15th, 1992).
118 Tutu, Desmond: “Reflections on adopting an Ubuntu way o f life,” (The Tutu Foundation: 
www.tutufoundation.org) pi.
119 Suze Manda, David: “Ubuntu Philosophy as an African Philosophy for Peace,” (www.africafiles.org).
120 Louw, Dirk: “Ubuntu: An African Assessment o f the Religious Other,”
(w w w . bu. edu/wep/Papers/Aff \1 AfriLou w. htm).
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inaccessible because most of it is oral rather than written and lived rather than formally
121communicated in books or journals; it is difficult to learn about from a distance.” A key 
figure, who many consider provides the most comprehensive explanation of Ubuntu, is 
Desmond Tutu: “[Ubuntu] speaks of the very essence of being human... It means my 
humanity is in caught up, inextricably bound up, in theirs. We say ‘a person is a person
through other people.’ It is not ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I
122belong.’” Tutu explains how according to Ubuntu, the individual is defined by his 
relationship with his or her surrounding community, rather than by his or her own actions or 
achievements.
However, a complete understanding of Ubuntu cannot be gained by studying other peoples’ 
definitions, but rather by spending time within the cultures where it is ever present. Only then 
can you really grasp the meaning of this philosophy. During research trips to sub-Saharan 
Africa, on numerous occasions the researcher experienced the presence of Ubuntu, first hand. 
During one particular visit, various discussions were held with the families of victims of 
Apartheid crimes. They were asked how they were able to forgive and reconcile with those 
who had inflicted so much harm upon their loved ones. More often than not, they replied by 
saying that such sacrifices needed to be made for the betterment of their community and for 
their state to recover from what it had endured. It is possible to draw a clear link between this 
justification and the consequentialist argument which features as a justification for the 
application of restorative justices processes, throughout the final section of this chapter; both 
prioritise a positive outcome for the society.
Tutu takes this concept one step further by stating that the victims of Apartheid forgave their 
oppressors because they believed that they were also victims: “The humanity of the 
perpetrator o f Apartheid’s atrocities was caught up and bound up in that of his victim whether 
he likes it or not... In the process of dehumanising another, in inflicting untold harm and 
suffering, the perpetrator was inexorably being dehumanised as well... I used to say that the 
oppressor was dehumanised as much as, if not more than, the oppressed.”123
That being said, throughout the research trips, no feelings of pity were detected during 
conversations with the victims of Apartheid, but rather a feeling that forgiveness was the best
121 Nussbaum, Barbara: “Ubuntu: Reflections o f  a South African on our Common Humanity,” (Reflections, Vol. 
4, No. 4, 2003).
122 Tutu, Desmond: “No Future without Forgiveness,” (London: Rider Press, 1999) p34-35.
123 Tutu, Desmond: “No Future without Forgiveness,” (London: Rider Press, 1999) p35.
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way of healing and reuniting one’s community, as opposed to more destructive forms of 
retributive justice. These encounters demonstrate the critical contribution which Ubuntu can 
make towards transitional justice processes; encouraging the restoration of the humanity of 
both victim and perpetrator through forgiveness and reconciliation. The stark contrast 
between these behavioural patterns and the Western behavioural patterns with which the 
researcher is most familiar, makes the power and presence of Ubuntu all the more evident.
Throughout ‘Ubuntu: Reflections o f  a South African on our Common Humanity, ’ Barbara 
Nussbaum provides many examples which exhibit the presence of Ubuntu throughout 
African societies. Some examples of Ubuntu presented by Nussbaum, range from the 
exchanging of day-to-day pleasantries in Africa, the style of African leadership, and the way 
in which African wars are conducted. The first example may seem a little weak to an 
outsider, but to an African who embraces the Ubuntu philosophy, he or she shows genuine 
concern as to the welfare o f his or her fellow human: “We are so connected that if you did not 
sleep well, or if you are not having a good day, how can I sleep well or have a good day?” 124 
Ubuntu is also evident among African leaders who listen to the opinions of all of the people 
they serve and make decisions which reflect the overall consensus of this group. Finally, 
following the cessation of African wars, it is not uncommon for a ‘cleansing ceremony’ to be 
arranged, in order to cleanse the spirits of killers: “This mature, profound skill demonstrates 
an inbuilt capacity for reconciliation and healing after war.”125 This particular example 
demonstrates the impact which the Ubuntu philosophy could have on post-conflict 
reconciliation processes in Africa, by encouraging victims of human rights violations to 
forgive their oppressors for the greater good of their society. The fact that Nussbaum is 
herself a South African citizen, who has had first-hand experience of this philosophy, has 
evidently equipped her with a greater understanding of Ubuntu.
Is Ubuntu Solely an African Philosophy?
There is also a general consensus among recent literature on the subject that Ubuntu is 
generally ‘an African philosophy,’ which is scarce among most non-African societies. This, 
according to Michael Battle, is because of the differing social characteristics that these
124 Nussbaum, Barbara: “Ubuntu: Reflections o f a South African on our Common Humanity,” (.Reflections, Vol. 
4, No. 4, 2003).
125 Nussbaum, Barbara: “Ubuntu: Reflections o f a South African on our Common Humanity,” (Reflections, Vol. 
4, No. 4, 2003).
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societies possess: “Ubuntu, the African concept of community embraced by Tutu, provides a
1 r\s
corrective hermeneutic for Western salvation theology that focuses on the individual.” 
Throughout ‘Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology o f  Desmond Tutu, ’ Battle explains Tutu’s 
claim that the Ubuntu philosophy is incompatible with Western societies, because in the 
West, human society is defined by material possession: “Secular prosperity seduces us into
127judging others as if value were dependent upon the production of goods.” This is labelled
n o
by Battle as ‘the dehumanisation o f materialism.’
To further explain this, Battle touches on the contrasting ways in which African societies and 
Western societies define ‘personhood,’ according to Tutu. In the West, he states that the 
definition of ‘personhood’ focuses on the individual and his or her actions and achievements. 
By contrast, African cultures define a person’s meaning in the context of his or her 
environment: “[In Africa] human community is vital for the individual’s acquisition of
129personhood.” These varying definitions of ‘personhood’ clearly illustrate why 
reconciliatory processes may be more compatible within African societies. Put simply, by 
focusing less on the individual, and more on the future of humanity as a whole, the African 
people focus more on reconciliation and forgiveness and less on retribution.
Nussbaum also looks at the possibility of spreading the Ubuntu philosophy across the world 
to encourage non-African societies to think and act more in terms of the betterment of their 
communities rather than for individual empowerment, or as she puts it: “sprinkling Ubuntu 
on the consciousness of mankind.”130 Tutu himself argues that this would not be possible in 
the West, due to its focus on material wealth and self-determination rather than the welfare of 
the collective. For these reasons, he argues that the Ubuntu philosophy is incompatible with 
modem capitalist societies.
Therefore, although those who see economic development as a positive step for a society, 
might see Africa’s underdevelopment as a shortcoming, it could be argued that this may 
indeed be the continent’s saving grace. Although it is likely that African communities have 
always been plagued by warfare, economic development has introduced these societies to 
new forms of conflict which stem from the desire for individual empowerment. Had
126 Battle, Michael: “Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology o f Desmond Tutu,” (Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1999) p5.
127 Tutu, Desmond: “General Secretary’s Report to National Conference o f SACC,” June 25th -  29th 1984.
128 Battle, Michael: “Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology o f Desmond Tutu,” (Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1999) p37.
129 Battle, Michael: “Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology o f Desmond Tutu,” (Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1999) p38.
130 Nussbaum, Barbara: “Ubuntu: Reflections o f a South African on our Common Humanity,” (Reflections, Vol. 
4, No. 4, 2003).
68
economic development not reached Africa, it is possible that the power and influence of 
Ubuntu there would be far greater than it is today. Either way, the preservation of the Ubuntu 
philosophy is essential to continue the spread of reconciliation and forgiveness across 
modern-day, post-conflict societies in Africa.
Given that the Ubuntu philosophy still maintains a strong presence throughout many 
transitional African societies and given its apparent incompatibility with Western states, why 
then are Western transitional justice frameworks consistently applied to assist with the 
political transitions of African states? Perhaps one immediate response to this important 
question would be that these aforementioned frameworks have been introduced by Western 
governments in an attempt to repair the damage caused by their previous foreign policy 
exploits. Though this might well be the case, this thesis recognises that although Ubuntu may 
not be compatible with Western capitalist societies, Western transitional justice frameworks 
can build upon the principles of this powerful African philosophy; Ubuntu embodies and 
stimulates the processes which make reconciliation possible.
Reconciliation in the Absence of Ubuntu
In order for transitional and post-conflict societies to adequately accommodate truth 
commission enquiries, it is clear that a pre-existing commitment to justice must be present or 
at least retrievable. When examining African societies, it is often the case that the Ubuntu 
philosophy provides this. However, as previously discussed, this is usually only an African- 
based philosophy. Therefore, suitable substitutes need to be found within non-African 
societies. In some cases as Philpott has already demonstrated, religion may play a key role in 
reinforcing this commitment and laying the foundations for transitional justice mechanisms. 
However, in other instances, religious influences may also be lacking, or may be 
counterproductive; on these occasions equivalent forces which embody this commitment to 
justice must be found. That being said, it is by no means the case that in such circumstances 
truth commissions should not be considered, but that the expectations placed upon these 
commissions should be scaled down significantly.
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Potential Problems with Reconciliation Processes
In addition to the many benefits of reconciliation processes, it should also be noted that there 
are also negative attributes which accompany these processes. These are as follows:
1. As Bloomfield argues, it is impossible to design a ‘one-size-fits-alf reconciliation 
process -  the problems faced by different transitional states vary significantly; those 
who believe that the South African reconciliation process is suitable for any post­
conflict situation are mistaken. Reconciliation processes need to be tailor-made for the 
society in which they are introduced: “As every conflict is different, and every 
democratic settlement is different, so a reconciliation process will differ from all
131others in important respects, even if it shares many similarities with them.” This 
means that reconciliation processes often take much time and effort to develop.
2. Despite their potential, reconciliation processes are often viewed with cynicism and 
negativity by victims of human rights violations who consider truth commissions and 
reconciliation processes to be ‘second best’132 options for societies where criminal 
justice is not possible: “The rhetoric of reconciliation is particularly common in 
situations where traditional judicial responses to wrongdoing are unavailable because 
of corruption in the legal system, staggeringly large numbers of offenders, or anxiety 
about the political consequences of trials and punishment.”133 As will be discussed in 
the next section, this is a common misconception which severely damages the 
reputation of reconciliation processes. Truth commissions should not be seen to 
replace justice, but as mechanisms which promote restorative justice.
3. The final criticism is that there are some societies and cultures with which 
reconciliation processes are simply not compatible. As Dwyer stresses in 
‘Reconciliation fo r  Realists, ’ reconciliation has powerful overtones and benefits from 
the attributes promoted by certain religions. However, certain cultures and religions 
can also directly clash with the concept of reconciliation and the commitment and 
sacrifices it requires. Therefore truth commission architects need to assess whether or
131 Bloomfield, David: “Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook,” (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005) pl6.
132 Dwyer, Susan: “Reconciliation for Realists,” (Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, March
1999) p82.
133 Dwyer, Susan: “Reconciliation for Realists,” (Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, March
1999) p82.
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not reconciliation processes will be compatible with specific religions and cultures 
within their societies.
Conclusions
Reconciliation is a highly complex phenomenon which needs to be properly understood prior 
to its application by transitional governments. These governments need to understand the 
following:
1. Reconciliation should be considered as both a long-term ‘process’ and an ‘end 
product.’
2. Reconciliation cannot be enforced by state action, though effective ‘macro-level’ 
policies, such as the introduction of transitional justice bodies, can encourage it. 
Instead, reconciliation will occur when individuals (‘micro-level’) feel ready to 
peacefully co-exist once again alongside their former oppressors. Micro-level 
reconciliation can be facilitated by grassroots civil society groups and religious belief 
systems.
3. An understanding of the different stages of reconciliation and of the varying 
consequences of past state violence will help governments comprehend what policies 
they can implement and when, to assist this process.
4. Truth, justice, forgiveness and healing can contribute towards the reconciliation 
process to varying degrees; this will entirely depend on the circumstances and context 
faced by the state in question.
5. The presence of a ‘commitment to justice’ will assist with the development of 
successful reconciliation processes in transitional and post-conflict societies. This 
commitment can be promoted by pre-existing religions and philosophies.
6. Finally, reconciliation processes are not compatible with all societies and cultures. It 
is essential that governments assess the relative merits and pitfalls of the 
reconciliation processes within their particular context, prior to a truth commission’s 
establishment.
What cannot be denied is the substantial impact differing reconciliation processes have had 
on past and present transitional and post-conflict societies. If successful, these reconciliation
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processes, often promoted by truth commissions, can reunite people previously in conflict 
and promote peace when the reoccurrence of further conflict appears inevitable.
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C. Justice
“If empowered properly, commissions can help to fill some of the state’s obligations under 
international law to respond to human rights abuses.” 134 As Hayner stresses here, truth 
commissions can be employed by transitional governments as a direct response to gross 
violations of human rights. As mechanisms of restorative justice though, truth commissions 
do not provide traditional forms of retributive justice in response to these violations. Instead, 
they seek to establish the truth and formally acknowledge human rights violations in the hope 
of achieving reconciliation and returning societies to peace.
Such an approach attracts much criticism among groups who believe that those guilty of 
human rights violations should be tried and punished in accordance with international law. 
Furthermore, said critics believe that truth commissions are only employed because the states 
in question do not have the means or resources necessary to punish the guilty. Truth 
commission advocates argue that the first task is to dispel this myth: “Non-judicial truth 
bodies do not and should not be seen to replace judicial action against perpetrators, and 
neither victims nor societies at large have understood them to do so in those countries where 
truth commissions have been put in place.”135 In fact, as these experts will testify, truth 
commissions can adapt to work alongside judicial mechanisms and assist them through the 
provision of evidence which can lead to successful prosecutions: “A truth commission can 
most directly strengthen trials through its vast collection of information pertaining to crimes,
i o / r
which can be forwarded directly to persecuting authorities.”
As a result of the mixed feelings which arise from the introduction of truth commissions in 
response to human rights violations, a fierce debate emerges between those in favour of 
enforcing retributive justice and those in favour of the introduction of truth commissions 
(restorative justice) within these societies. The strengths and weaknesses of each case are
137explored below. Whilst highlighting the differences between the two forms of justice, this
134 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: 
Routledge, 2002) p i05.
135 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions,” (London: 
Routledge, 2002) p88.
136 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge o f  Truth Commissions,” (London: 
Routledge, 2002) p i02.
137 This is an expanded/developed version of the Retributive v Restorative Justice debate which formed part of 
my MA International Relations Thesis (Crowcombe, Matthew: “Post-Apartheid South Africa: ‘Amnesty in 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Process,’” (Swansea University: MA International Relations Thesis, 
October 15th 2007).
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section will demonstrate the ways in which truth commissions can help promote restorative 
justice within transitional and post-conflict societies. It will also highlight the inadequacies of 
the retributive approach to transitional politics. This debate will also address the issue of 
whether or not the prioritisation of restorative justice is in some important sense immoral in 
transitional contexts, with specific reference to the application of comprehensive amnesty 
processes.
The Case for ‘Retributive Justice’
Retributive justice is a specific type of justice which deems that it is morally acceptable for a 
state to issue proportionate punishment to individuals responsible for the orchestration of 
specific crimes: “The state determines blame and administers pain in a context between
1 TRoffender and the state directed by systematic rules.”
A key issue discussed by Robert Rotberg in ‘The Morality o f  Truth Commissions, ’ is the 
question of whether it is morally right that those responsible for punishable crimes should go 
unpunished. This argument arises as a direct criticism of the restorative approach which often 
results in the introduction of various forms of amnesty, preventing the punishment of guilty 
parties, in the interest of promoting future peace and stability. Rotberg argues that the 
introduction of amnesty by governments pursuing the restorative approach prevents justice 
from being served: “[retributive] Justice is not achieved when a murderer or rapist publicly
1 OQ
acknowledges his crimes but is not brought to trial and suffers no further punishment.” 
This is the most common criticism of the restorative justice; it is, in some sense, morally 
wrong and unjust for individuals who have admitted to breaking the law and to violating the 
basic human right of others, to go unpunished. It argues that the sole pursuit of the restorative 
approach would entirely bypass criminal justice procedures, which would, in any other 
situation, be fully enforced.
Other retributive justice advocates would argue that by letting those who have violated 
individuals’ basic human rights go unpunished, governments are not adequately protecting
138 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f  Amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World 
Press, 2003) p35.
139 Rotberg, Robert I.: “The morality o f  Truth Commissions -  Truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press, 
2000) p25.
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the rights of their citizens: “The crimes of Apartheid constitute an affront to the basic 
democratic principle of treating all adults as free and equal citizens... A post-Apartheid state 
that forgave these crimes could not credibly claim to be committed to the most basic 
democratic principles.”140 This suggests that there may exist a direct clash been the 
characteristics of restorative justice processes and some of the fundamental principles 
promoted by democratic states, as Rotberg suggests with reference to the introduction of 
amnesty in democratic Post-Apartheid South Africa.
Dumisa Ntsebeza argues, with particular reference to Post-Apartheid South Africa, that in 
order to promote the restoration of law and order, the enforcement of retributive justice is 
fundamental in societies in transition from authoritarian regimes: “In South Africa the lesson 
needs to be spelled out that what we witnessed under Apartheid was criminal behaviour. And 
it is here that criminal prosecutions will serve to restore the legal order and reassure the South 
African community that Apartheid was a crime against humanity.” 141 He argues that the 
actions taken by the newly appointed governments of recently established democratic states 
have serious implications for the future conduct of their citizens. Should past crimes go 
unpunished then the citizens of these societies may begin to believe that such conduct is 
condoned by the new government; a consequence of this may be the recurrence of similar 
crimes in the future. Governments need to make an example of wrongdoers to demonstrate 
that human rights violations will not be tolerated; restorative justice, it is suggested, fails to 
achieve this.
In response, Xolela Mangcu argues that this is a common misconception “based on a 
conflation of political and legal considerations.” 142 She states that authoritarian regimes are 
primarily political and should therefore be dealt with politically and that legal action is not 
necessarily the solution to avoiding the reoccurrence of such regimes. Instead she argues that 
the remedies should be more socio-economic than legal. Mangcu also highlights what she 
describes as another incorrect assumption. She criticises the common belief shared by those 
in favour of the retributive approach, that the punishment of perpetrators is an essential part 
of the healing process of all victims, irrespective of their colour or culture. Instead, Mangcu 
argues that in fact, among the black communities, “prosecution plays a relatively minor role”
140 Rotberg, Robert I.: “The morality of Truth Commissions -  Truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press, 
2000) p31.
141 (Ntsebeza, Dumisa) Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,”
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Africa World Press, 2003) p29.
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in the healing process.143 She claims that macro-level retribution processes are of more 
benefit to the restoration of the state than the individual, and that micro-level restorative 
justice initiatives will better assist healing processes within the black communities. Similar 
views have been reiterated by the architect of the South African TRC, Desmond Tutu. 
Mangcu’s argument supports the claims made in the previous section of this chapter, that 
micro-level reconciliation is more likely to be achieved in African cultures, due to their pre­
existing communitarian religious and philosophical belief systems; the healing processes of 
such communities do not always require the inclusion of comprehensive criminal justice 
practices.
In ‘An Ethic fo r  Enemies, ’ Donald Shriver argues that revenge is a natural reaction, and can 
be considered a common characteristic of the human race. Therefore, by punishing the guilty, 
the state is acting on behalf of victims to ensure that they do not seek revenge by their own 
actions. In doing so, the state is also recognising the victims’ human rights, which critics 
argue are ignored by the restorative approach: “Anger, resentment, even moral hatred are 
appropriate in certain circumstances. These sentiments often give expression to the victim’s 
struggle for self-respect and self-worth.”144 In this way many believe it to be the duty of the 
state to honour the retribution or justice owed to the individual whose individual rights have 
been violated: “What is important is to ensure that society gives the victim equal status to 
everyone else. This means readdressing the implied imbalance of human worth between 
perpetrator and victim.”145 One way to achieve this is to impede the freedom of the 
perpetrator to readdress the imbalance between himself and his victim; retributive justice 
seeks to achieve exactly this. Critics of this process would argue that “there is little evidence 
that retributive justice achieves anything more than a short-term need for revenge;”146 
therefore it is not ubiquitous in every society and not a practical solution as it contributes 
little towards the restoration of long-term peace.
Throughout ‘Radical Evil on Trial, ’ Carlos Nino argues it is only fair that a penalty should be 
paid for violating the rules of co-existence. In support of this argument he explores the 
concept of a ‘social contract’ which is shared between citizens of all societies to promote and
143 (Mangcu, Xolela) Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: ‘The Provocations o f  Amnesty,’ (Claremont: 
Africa World Press, 2003) p27.
144 Shriver, Donald: “An Ethic for Enemies,” (Oxford: Oxford Uni Press, 1995) p35.
145 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World 
Press, 2003) p40.
146 (Lyster, Richard) Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,” (Claremont: 
Africa World Press, 2003) p i86.
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maintain the common good of their society. If this ‘communal responsibility’147 is broken, 
Nino argues that it is the state’s duty to prevent further breaches of this social contract by 
punishing those responsible.
Villa-Vicencio argues that where perpetrators have been unwilling to take responsibility for 
their actions, retributive justice is essential in order to restore basic moral order to the state in 
question. Morality plays a key role in the promotion of peace throughout multi-racial 
societies. Where this moral order is weakened, so too will the bonds between different races 
and cultures. What results is the development of a system such as that which haunted 
Apartheid South Africa for many years. Therefore, as Villa-Vicencio argues, the maintenance 
of morality within societies is essential to ensure the promotion of peace between individuals 
from different races and cultures.
It is clear from this analysis that the retributive approach carries with it many strengths and 
weaknesses. Its strengths are demonstrated by its commitment to protect the rights of its 
citizens and fulfil a state’s obligations under international law. Its weaknesses are highlighted 
by its frequent inability to assist different cultures with their restoration processes and their 
return to peace and social, political and economic stability.
The Case for ‘Restorative Justice’
An alternative to retributive justice which, in recent years, is more commonly pursued by 
truth commissions is that of Restorative Justice: “Political Restorative Justice for societies in 
transition involves negotiating a way through the ambiguities inherent to political transition
1 AO
from oppressive, autocratic rule to the beginning of democracy.” Restorative Justice assists 
the transition to democracy without seeking revenge on behalf of the victims of the previous 
regime. Restorative justice proved to be a key component of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Process: “The Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) commits the nation to a 
secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the 
past which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian 
principles in violent conflicts and the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt, and revenge. These can 
now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not vengeance, a
147 Nino, Carlos: “Radical Evil on Trial,” (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1996) pl60.
148 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World 
Press, 2003) p31.
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need for reparation but not retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not victimisation.”149 An 
analysis of the positive and negative attributes of restorative justice processes will allow us to 
gauge the relative strengths and weaknesses of the forms of justice promoted by truth 
commissions in response to gross violations of human rights.
As this chapter has discussed, it is necessary to understand how important acknowledgement 
of the truth is for those living in ignorance over past atrocities. Restorative justice promoted 
by truth commissions brings truth to the people who need it most: “The truth... is... much 
more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for such monstrous misdeeds are 
encouraged to disclose the whole truth and nothing but the truth with the incentive that they 
will not receive punishment.”150 For many, acknowledgement of the truth is, in itself, a form 
of justice. To be able to speak aloud about the atrocities they have had to endure for so long, 
and to have an individual or a group of individuals admit their responsibility for these acts is 
often what is required for victims to move on and begin to deal with their troubled pasts: 
“Some victims and family members of those killed say that just having the full truth publicly 
told can provide some sense of justice.”151 Acknowledgement in itself can be an important 
part of the healing process.
The restorative approach also assists the restoration of relationships in socially fractured 
societies. This is achieved through the promotion of both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ level 
reconciliation processes; these processes are discussed in the truth and reconciliation sections 
of this chapter. Villa-Vicencio argues that communication plays an important role here: “We 
need to learn to speak to one another after generations of rebuke and confrontation... Only 
this ‘deep conversation’ can lead to the kind of united action that it will take to build a lasting
152democracy.” The sole pursuit of retributive justice ignores the importance of repairing 
social divisions when repairing the social fabric of post-conflict societies.
When focusing specifically on the amnesty aspect of restorative justice, critics like Aryeh
Neier argue that “ [amnesties] create a culture of impunity that only encourages further human
1rights violations.” There is much evidence throughout history to support such a claim.
149 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World 
Press, 2003) p31.
150 Boraine, Alex: “A Country Unmasked,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p287.
151 Hayner, Priscilla B.: “Unspeakable Truths -  Facing the Challenges of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 2002) p i06.
152 Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f Amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World 
Press, 2003) p43.
153 Neier, Aryeh: “Brutality, Genocide, Terror and Struggle for Justice,” (New York: Times Books, 1998) pl03.
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President Fujimori of Peru, for example, legalized impunity through the continual granting of 
amnesties to pardon gross human right violations carried out by his death squads including 
the massacres of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta.154 As a consequence he created a culture 
which effectively condoned violence and murder, without accountability. Similarly, the 
pardoning of Hutu crimes against Tutsi elites in Rwanda acted as a prelude to the 1994 
genocide. However, it is a common misconception that all amnesties create cultures of 
impunity, as there are sometimes conditions put forward which must be fulfilled before 
conditional amnesty is granted. If we refer once again to the South African example, we can
I
see that in fact the perpetrators had to pay a considerable price for amnesty: “Public shame, 
personal alienation and familial rejection should not be dismissed as insignificant.” 155 The 
resulting disgrace and humiliation that these individuals had to endure was considered, by 
many, to be punishment enough: “Where justice is unlikely in the courts, a commission plays 
an important role in at least publicly shaming those who orchestrated the atrocities.” 156 As a 
consequence of admitting their guilt, these individuals are often alienated from their societies; 
there are numerous stories told of individuals who, despite being granted amnesty, failed to 
gain forgiveness from their loved ones and became in many instances, social outcasts.
Furthermore, individuals and groups are often subjected to further requirements prior to the 
acceptance of their amnesty applications. In post-Apartheid South Africa, those applicants 
who qualified for amnesty were required to pay their victim’s reparations payments, which 
were designed to financially compensate them for the economic hardships they had been 
forced to endure. This concept is very much in-keeping with the United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights which promotes “the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation
157for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It is argued 
that justice is being served on some level, through the fulfilment of these conditions. Such 
conditions are only present in certain instances; for not all governments or truth commissions 
are able to enforce the payment of reparations, and reparations are seldom enforced to the 
appropriate scale. In addition, such requirements are entirely absent in states where ‘blanket
154 Laplante, Lisa J: Outlawing Amnesty: “The Return o f Criminal
Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, ” (Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 49:4, 2009) p944.
155 (Bizos, George) Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: “The Provocations o f  Amnesty,” (Claremont: 
Africa World Press, 2003) p7.
156 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable Truths -  Facing the Challenges of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 2002) p i32.
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amnesty’ is imposed; the perpetrators in question are allowed to get away without 
punishment.
However, it is also important to note, that although in many cases these perpetrators go 
unpunished by the state, many believe that the psychological effects of their actions can 
prove to be extremely punishing; though this will of course depend on the conscience and 
moral standards of the perpetrator. Humans are often unable to cope with such experiences, 
and frequently the resulting guilt and self-torture proves to be extremely damaging for those 
responsible.
In response to the argument that restorative justice is immoral, and sacrifices the demands of 
justice, Rotberg introduces the realists’ approach: “Some Realists argue that because the 
injustices were so widespread and systematic, it is not practical to persecute individuals for
• 158their crimes.” It is evident that the most important word here is ‘practical.’ When deciding 
upon the most appropriate course of action to encourage the reconstruction and 
democratization of their societies, newly formed governments need to consider their state’s 
political, social and economic pre-conditions. If, for example, a transitional government is 
looking to establish a judicial process to punish perpetrators of past human rights violations, 
it will first need to consider whether or not it has the funding and resources available for this 
to be possible; in many instances it is often highly likely that the transitional government will 
also be heavily dependent up the commitment of the international community for this 
support. If funding and resources are available, it also will be necessary for this government 
to guarantee the impartiality of the judicial bodies overseeing this process. It is not 
uncommon for corrupt judicial infrastructures to survive the transition process; such bodies 
should not be involved in post-conflict criminal justice proceedings. In addition, due to the 
high cost of such processes, it is often the case that these funds could be better invested in 
economic initiatives which promote restorative justice; such decisions will depend on what is 
both possible and necessary to help rehabilitate the society in question.
Other supporters of the restorative approach argue that it would not be morally right to punish 
individuals for enforcing the ideologies of a political regime; instead they pin the blame on 
the ideology itself. In these situations it is argued that the acts referred to here were not 
carried out under the free will of the individual; rather the individual was obeying the orders
158 Rotberg, Robert I.: “The morality o f  Truth Commissions -  Truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press,
2000) p26.
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of a higher command in order to fulfil a political objective. Amnesty was granted to 
perpetrators of Apartheid crimes in South Africa according to this belief. This system works 
under the premise that the crime would not have been committed if the orders were not made; 
now that the regime has been removed, it is unlikely that the perpetrator will reoffend. It is 
often also the case that the crimes committed by the perpetrators in question were not against 
the law when they were carried out; legislation in Apartheid South Africa for example, 
legalised racial segregation. Though there are apparent strengths to these claims, they do 
ignore the long-term effects which these actions can have upon the perpetrator; it is likely 
that long-term indoctrination can increase the chances that the individual will reoffend, even 
after the cessation of the regime. The likelihood of this eventuality needs to be assessed prior 
to the granting of amnesties.
Rotberg provides a counter-argument to the claim that restorative justice and amnesty 
processes are incompatible with democracies, by suggesting that they do promote 
‘Democratic Reciprocity.’ In other words as Lawrence Becker puts it, the amnesty process is 
‘making a proportionate return for the good received.’159 It does this by attempting to create 
social stability, a quality absent in many turbulent societies. Should amnesty processes 
achieve their goals and in doing so promote democratic reciprocity, it can be argued that in 
fact they are acting justly even though they are not bringing the perpetrators responsible to 
justice: “Because this kind of exchange is in itself a form of justice, a truth commission that 
strives for reciprocity directly addresses the challenges posed by the sacrifice of other kinds 
o f justice.”160
The final report published by the South African TRC demonstrates the prioritization of 
justice through democratic reciprocity over criminal justice proceedings. It is argued that 
democratic reciprocity can be further promoted by the process of amnesty, should it be open 
to debate by citizens from all areas of the society in question. The South African amnesty 
process was accredited for its all-inclusive approach which helped promote democratic 
reciprocity. The same commission was also commended for its assessment of each individual 
case for amnesty, as opposed to granting ‘Blanket Amnesty’ as other states, in similar 
situations, have done. By doing this it both respected the rights of its individuals, and 
promoted a more thorough truth-seeking process. Truth commissions which look to pursue
159 Becker, Lawrence C: “Reciprocity” (London: University of Chicago Press, 1986) p72-144.
160 Rotberg, Robert I: “The morality o f Truth Commissions -  Truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press,
2000) p37.
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both truth and justice stand the best chance of both promoting democratic reciprocity and of 
creating a stable and democratic future on behalf of their state.
The Prioritisation of Restorative Justice Processes is Morally Justified: ‘The 
Consequentialist Argument.’
Despite their rapid proliferation, it has become clear that truth commission enquiries and the 
restorative justice processes they embody are not always well-received by the societies in 
which they are established. Critics often argue that by opting for restorative justice processes, 
states are ignoring their obligations under international law and the rights of the individuals 
they claim to represent. These criticisms were experienced first-hand by the researcher when 
discussing the possible implementation of restorative justice processes in a transitional 
Zimbabwe, with the victims of Mugabe’s regime; many of whom felt that anything but a 
criminal prosecution process would be unjust and immoral. Similar claims were also voiced 
upon the creation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995. Such 
criticisms lead to one inevitable question; is the prioritisation of the establishment of 
restorative justice over retributive justice processes morally justified?
The contributions of thorough and effective criminal justice processes detailed by Rotberg, 
Ntsebeza, Shriver, Nino and Villa-Vicencio throughout ‘The case for retributive justice’ are 
clear. Some of these arguments suggest that the implementation of retributive justice 
processes are required to fulfil a state’s moral obligation to punish those guilty of committing 
human rights violations, and defend the rights of its citizens. Others suggest that retributive 
justice is an essential requirement when restoring a society’s basic moral order. Despite 
advocating the restorative justice approach, this thesis does not dispute the validity of these 
claims; retributive justice, where possible, can assist with the restoration of law and order of 
transitional and post-conflict societies.
‘The case for restorative justice’ also presents strong arguments which show how effectively 
implemented restorative justice initiatives can assist the restoration of transitional and post- 
conflict states through the promotion of truth and both ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of 
reconciliation. Justifications for the implementation of amnesty processes are also presented 
here, along with counter-arguments which claim that blanket amnesties in particular ignore
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an individual’s right to accountability and justice. These claims are also not under dispute; it 
is clear that the implementation of amnesty processes can impede upon the fundamental 
rights of specific individuals and groups.
However, the definitive claim which settles this debate and justifies the prioritisation of 
restorative justice processes is the consequentialist argument. In the context of the 
retributive/restorative justice debate, the consequentialist argument, which takes a similar 
approach to Rotberg’s democratic reciprocity argument, contends that although the 
restorative approach does ignore some of a state’s moral obligations and often fails to 
promote some of the basic rights of specific individuals and groups, these policies are 
morally justified in the pursuit of the restoration of the society as a whole; the end justifies 
the means: “Politics is the arena in which such dilemmas can take their most dramatic form, 
though they appear in all areas of life, wherever doing what is best overall, requires the 
committing of a wrong, or the violation of a right.” 161 If the consequences of the restorative 
approach result in the reintegration and stabilisation of a transitional society then the absence 
of retributive processes is morally justified.
The consequentialist case is strengthened by the aforementioned inability of the sole pursuit 
of criminal justice processes to promote the long-term restoration of fractured societies. As a 
process, it may fulfil specific requirements, such as the punishment of guilty parties, and the 
protection of individual rights, but it should be considered fundamentally inadequate when 
promoting processes of political, social and economic stabilisation; such procedures are better 
accomplished by the application of the comprehensive restorative justice initiatives presented 
by this thesis.
Further explanation of this argument can draw reference to the South African TRC’s 
conditional amnesty policies which caused a significant uproar among the victims of the 
regime. Upon winning the 1994 elections, the newly instituted ANC government was faced 
with the difficult decision of how to best stimulate the development of a stable, united and 
peace-loving South African society. In these situations, it is sometimes suggested that the 
most natural course of action would be to pursue a Nuremburg style trial process and convict 
those responsible. However, the ANC knew that as well as being financially draining, this 
might also damage an already fragile peace process, whilst the alternative restorative justice
161 Lukes, Steven: “Moral Conflict and Politics,” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) p8.
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approach could be interpreted as failing to uphold the rights of the victims of the regime: “If 
the ANC had insisted on Nuremburg-style trials for the leaders of the Apartheid government,
1 fOthere would have been no peaceful transition to democracy.” Such a situation can be 
described as a ‘moral conflict,’ defined here by Steven Lukes: “Moral conflicts are conflicts 
between moral claims that may face persons or groups or communities or governments
163representing them, when individually or collectively they deliberate about what to do.”
By choosing to introduce the TRC and implement a comprehensive amnesty process, the 
ANC leadership decided that the course of action which would best promote peace and 
reconciliation in South Africa would be the introduction of restorative justice processes. This 
decision can be deemed as an act which ignored specific human rights of South African 
citizens (e.g. Article 8 of the Universal Dec of Human Rights164), in the interest of promoting 
the greater good; a peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa. The consequentialist 
argument states that these policies are morally justifiable because of their anticipated positive 
consequences.
Despite being morally justifiable, in order to address some of the criticisms voiced previously 
by amnesty critics, it is necessary, where possible, for a state to formally acknowledge any 
obligations not fulfilled by this course of action. For example, it should acknowledge that by 
implementing an amnesty process, it has ignored some of the basic human rights of its 
citizens, which otherwise should have been protected. The citizens of transitional societies 
need to understand that future human rights violations will not be dealt with in this manner 
and that traditional judicial practices will be reinstituted to punish future crimes, following 
the completion of the amnesty processes; this is to help prevent the manifestation of a culture 
of impunity.
In response to the initial question: ‘is the prioritisation of the establishment o f restorative 
justice over retributive justice processes morally justified,’ this thesis argues that the 
prioritisation of restorative justice processes is morally justified if it is decided that the 
implementation of these practices will have a greater impact in the pursuit of just and 
peaceful societies.
162 Goldstone, Richard: “Justice as a Tool for Peace-making,” (The Hauser Lecture, New York: New York 
University, 1997).
163 Lukes, Steven: “Moral Conflict and Politics,” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) p5.
164 The United Nations: “The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights,” Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr (Last accessed June 22nd 2011).
84
Conclusions
The opening chapter of this thesis has provided a comprehensive analysis of the invaluable 
impact truth commissions and the transitional justice processes they facilitate, can have on 
transitional and post-conflict states: “A truth commission can make a critical contribution in 
the midst of a difficult transition, fundamentally changing how a country understands and 
accepts some o f the most contentious aspects of its recent history.” 165 With reference to a 
growing pool of related literature, a greater understanding of these contributions has been 
developed through the examination of transitional justice and the different concepts it seeks 
to encompass; truth, reconciliation and justice.
It is clear that unearthing the truth behind past human rights violations, is an important part of 
most transitional justice processes. The importance of gaining an understanding of this 
concept and its different categorizations has been demonstrated here. The ability to adjudge 
the appropriateness of such a process is also essential; this chapter has shown that truth- 
seeking processes can also have negative implications for post-conflict states.
The complex concept of reconciliation, which is associated with most modern-day truth 
commissions, also requires identification and thorough analysis by future truth commission 
architects. With the assistance of Susan Dwyer, this chapter has introduced both ‘macro’ and 
‘micro’ levels of reconciliation and their influence upon these healing processes. It has also 
looked at the different stages of reconciliation, the potential impact of political violence, and 
whether or not forgiveness is a requirement of this process. In addition, it sought to develop 
its own theories on the conditions which could help foster each of these levels of 
reconciliation, including the requirement of the existence of commitment to justice.
This chapter has also covered the retributive v restorative justice debate; a greater 
understanding of the positive and negative aspects of each form of justice and its influence 
upon transitional justice processes is also essential. This analysis has concluded that both 
retributive and restorative justice mechanisms should operate, where possible, in unison when 
assisting post-conflict societies.
165 Hayner, Priscilla B.: “Unspeakable Truths -  Facing the Challenges of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions,” (London: Routledge, 2002) p23.
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In addition to the above, this chapter has also demonstrated the importance of recognising a 
state’s pre-existing political, social and economic characteristics; these will heavily influence 
the greater or lesser role played by the aforementioned concepts during each transitional 
justice process.
Each of the theories and concepts discussed throughout this chapter will be used as a point of 
reference when developing our truth commission frameworks in the penultimate chapter of 
this thesis, and when applying these frameworks to our Zimbabwe case study.
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Chapter 2
An Analysis of Previous Truth 
Commission Investigations
n  uy/u
Introduction:
“Through their hard-fought contributions to truth, justice, reparation, reform, and 
reconciliation, truth commissions have earned a justifiably privileged place in the arsenal of 
responses to mass atrocity.” 1
Since the dawn of the transitional justice era, truth commission bodies have made an 
invaluable contribution towards the development of peace and reconciliation processes 
throughout post-conflict societies. However, there exists a common misconception 
surrounding the time span during which these mechanisms have existed. It is not uncommon 
for those less familiar with these transitional justice organs to believe that they are fairly new 
entities; the researcher recalls numerous conversations when it has been suggested that South 
Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ was the first of its kind. This of course is not 
true; the first truth commission was established in Uganda in 1974, more than twenty years 
prior to the inauguration of South Africa’s well-publicised TRC.
Since the establishment of Uganda’s ‘Commission of Enquiry,’ truth commissions have 
undergone a comprehensive evolutionary process, the culmination of which has seen them 
develop into versatile structures which can adapt to assist a wide array of different societies 
and cultures, each with contrasting political, social and economic preconditions.
Despite this evolutionary process, this chapter will show that even the most recently 
developed truth commissions remain far from flawless. Kenya’s ‘Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission’ for example, which was introduced in 2007, has received heavy 
criticism for allowing a vast array of amnesties to be granted for serious human rights 
violations, failing to protect witnesses and for excluding victims from the process.2 The 
investigation of Paraguay’s ‘Truth and Justice Commission’ which eventually completed its 
work in August 2008, suffered from continual delays due lack of funding and poor 
government support. Also, Algeria’s 2003 ‘Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission,’ suffered from 
poor communication and a distinct lack of government co-operation; victims also accused the
1 Freeman, Mark: “Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p40.
2 Adow, Mohamed: “Kenya: Truth Commission’s Capacity Questioned,” (27rd April 2011). Available at: 
www.africanews.com (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
3 “Truth Commission: Paraguay, ” (The United States Institute of Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-paraguav (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
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government of bribing them to keep quiet.4 These shortcomings should have been prevented 
after nearly 40 years of truth commission development.
On the other hand, recent commissions also provide much evidence of the successful 
evolution of truth commission bodies. Peru’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ is one 
of many recent commissions that has ensured its succession by a ‘follow-up commission’ 
which oversees the long-term implementation of the original commission’s 
recommendations; prior to the introduction of follow-up commissions, there was no 
guarantee that recommendations would be implemented by the governments in question. 
More recent commissions are also developed with greater civil society consultation. National 
civil society groups were the main driving force behind the development of the mandate of 
Ghana’s ‘National Reconciliation Commission’ for instance. The broader the input into the 
design of commission investigations, the more likely it is that the resulting inquiry will 
represent the interests of all the identity groups within each specific society.
Liberia’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ took this evolutionary process one step 
further, by including testimonies of the Liberian Diaspora within its investigation. 
Additionally, Germany’s ‘Truth Commission’ permitted ‘special votes’ which allowed 
individual commissioners to voice their own opinions if they differed from the views of the 
majority of the commissioners.5 Each of these additional practices demonstrates how the 
architects of modem day commissions are continually modifying their commission structures 
and operations to improve the impact they have upon the societies within which they operate.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which the various concepts introduced 
by the opening stages of the thesis have been put into practice by past truth commission 
investigations. An examination of the successes and failures of these attempts is essential 
prior to the development of potential truth commission frameworks in the latter stages of the 
thesis.
4 “Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge of the Questions o f Disappearances,” (Justice in Perspective). 
Available at: www.iusticeinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=5&Itemid= 10 
(Last accessed June 1st 2011).
5 Kritz, Neil J: “Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes,” (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Vol. 3, Laws, Rulings, and Reports, Washington, DC: 1995) p216-219.
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Positive Aspects of Past Truth Commission Investigations:
The first task therefore will be to discuss the positive impacts that truth commissions have 
had upon transitional states in recent history. Often when political scientists study the 
performances of past truth commissions they concentrate more on their failures than on the 
positive results achieved. It is for this reason that many people are unable to comprehend just 
what can be achieved by truth commissions if they are established and run effectively. The 
sheer magnitude of the tasks faced by most truth commissions must also be appreciated 
before they are subjected to condemnation by their critics: “Truth commissions are difficult 
and controversial entities; they are given a mammoth task and usually insufficient time and 
resources to complete it. They must struggle with rampant lies, denials and deceit and the 
painful, unspeakable memories of victims to uncover still dangerous truths that many in 
power may continue to resist.”6 Despite this, and despite the relative inexperience of those 
setting up truth commissions in recent history, it is pretty clear that they have achieved much 
since the dawn of the transitional justice era.
The positive aspects of past truth commission enquiries will now be examined:
1. Truth Seeking
“If societies are to prevent the reoccurrence of atrocities and cleanse themselves of the 
corrosive enduring effects of massive injuries to individuals and whole groups, societies must 
understand -  at the deepest possible levels -  what occurred and why.” As introduced by 
Chapter 1, the first and possibly most significant characteristic of a truth commission is its 
ability to ascertain the truth about past events. As Rotberg expresses in the above quotation, 
finding out what happened and why, can be a critical part of the reconciliation process. It is 
only after finding out the truth about past atrocities that people can develop some sort of 
understanding as to why they occurred. There are numerous examples of conflicts re- 
occurring in recent history due to unresolved discrepancies over past events. There are also
6 Hayner, Priscilla B: “Unspeakable truths -  Facing the Challenges of truth and Reconciliation commissions,” 
(London: Routledge, 2002) p23.
7 Rotberg, Robert I: “The Morality o f  truth commissions -  truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press, 
2000) p3.
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many examples of recent truth commissions successfully discovering the truth over past 
events and in doing so preventing the occurrence of further conflict.
South Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ for example, established the truth 
behind long-kept Apartheid secrets by offering perpetrators amnesty in return for full 
disclosure of the truth of their involvement in proceedings. This was effective as it brought 
forward many guilty parties whom may have otherwise withheld their testimonies. It was so!
effective in fact that a study of the testimonies of those involved shows that often no details, 
no matter how upsetting or disturbing, were omitted: “The TRC’s hearings could slice closer
o
to the bone of terror and humanity in a way that the more limited commissions could not.” In 
this respect the ability of the TRC to establish the truth, stood as a benchmark for future truth 
commission investigations.
This capability has also been demonstrated by other commission enquiries. ‘The Commission 
of Truth for El Salvador’ for example, stated clearly in its mandate that as well as 
encouraging all of those either involved in or affected by the authoritarian regime to come 
forward and share their experiences, it would focus the majority of its attention on seeking 
the truth behind thirty-three specific cases.9 Although this meant that it had to take its focus 
away from other cases, it did mean that it could ensure that it established the truth behind 
those atrocities which it considered to best represent the general pattern and characteristics of 
human rights violations which had occurred. Though some criticised its narrow mandate, 
others praised the Salvadoran Commission for knowing its limitations and focusing on 
specific, highly-influential cases, rather than attempting to investigate more than it was 
equipped to manage. Uruguay’s ‘Commission for Peace’ took a similar approach and 
successfully established the truth behind the disappearance of thirty-eight individuals 
between 1973 and 1985; these findings were also formally acknowledged by the Uruguayan 
President.10
Other commissions such as the Chilean ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ sought to 
present an authoritative historical account of past events within their final reports, in the hope
8 Rotberg, Robert I: “The Morality o f  truth commissions -  truth v Justice,” (Oxford: Princetown Uni Press,
2000) p6.
9 "Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” (S/25500, April 1993). Available at: 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (Last accessed June 1st, 2011), p i8.
10 “Uruguay: Peace Commission,” (Justice in Perspective). Available at:
http://www.iusticeinperspective.org.za/index.php ?option=com content&task=view&id=95&Itemid=170 (Last 
accessed June 1st 2011).
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that it would encourage reconciliation processes to develop and lead to the eventual repairing 
of social divisions: “Only the knowledge of the truth will restore the dignity of victims... and 
in some cases make amends for the damage done.”11 It sought to expose those involved in 
Pinochet’s oppressive regime and hold them accountable for their role in the violence and 
killings which were orchestrated following Pinochet’s coup o f 1973. The commission also 
successfully helped the families of victims locate the whereabouts of their relatives. In a
similar way, South Korea’s report entitled ‘A Hard Journey to Justice, ’ presented its findings
12surrounding the suspicious deaths which occurred between 1975 and 1987. Guatemala’s 
‘Memory o f  Silence ’ report successfully detailed the numbers of those killed, and information
13regarding those responsible. This commission’s investigation even located a military log 
book which contained the names and information of persons unlawfully arrested, tortured and 
killed by a state security forces unit. Finally, Panama’s commission report documented 
information regarding the twenty-four gravesites it located in military buildings and prisons, 
during its investigation.14
These examples demonstrate the unique ability of truth commission investigations to uncover 
hidden truths surrounding past human rights atrocities. It is hoped that the truths revealed by 
these and other commissions will help fuel future reconciliation processes.
As discussed by Gready in Chapter 1, these truths can be presented by a commission in a 
number of ways; this will depend upon the objectives governed by the commission’s 
mandate, the type of information acquired and the characteristics of its intended audience.
2. Promoting Forgiveness and Reconciliation Processes
“And mercifully and wonderfully as I listened to the stories of victims, I marvelled at their 
magnanimity, that after so much suffering, instead of lusting for revenge they had this
11 “Report of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” (March 1991). Available at: 
http://www.derechoschile.com/english/resour.htm (Last accessed June 1st, 2011).
12 “A Hard Journey to Justice: First Term Report 10.2000-10.2002,” (Seoul: Samin Books, 2004).
13 “Guatemala: Memory o f  Silence,” (AAAS Science and Human Rights Data Centre) Available at: 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (Last accessed May 23, 2011).
14 Jackson, Eric: "Review of Panama Truth Commission Report." (NY Transfer News, May 27, 2002). Available 
at: http://www.blvthe.org/nvtransfer-subs/Covert Actions/Review of Panama Truth Commission Report 
(Last accessed May 23, 2011).
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extraordinary willingness to forgive.” 15 As Tutu himself reaffirmed during the 
commencement of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it was imperative 
that if anything was to be learnt from the whole process, it was that only through forgiveness 
and reconciliation could the people of South Africa learn to live together in harmony again.
As the previous chapter stated, forgiveness and reconciliation processes are extremely 
complex concepts, which are not easy to fully comprehend and even more difficult to
i
operationalize within post-conflict societies. Various techniques are employed by modern- 
day truth commissions in an attempt to foster forgiveness and reconciliation processes.
One method, which was used to great effect by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, was the introduction of public hearings. By providing victims with a forum in 
which they could share their experiences, both with their oppressors and fellow citizens and 
by giving those responsible the opportunity to confess their involvement in past atrocities, the 
TRC helped South African society take its first steps towards reconciliation: “Victims told 
me that the hearings have enabled them to finally close the book on past tragedies... they are 
tired of bloodshed, they want to move on and rebuild their country.” 16 Since the airing of 
these public hearings on television screens throughout the world, increasing numbers of 
commissions have followed suit when addressing past gross human rights violations. It 
should be noted that this process was not without its critics, who doubted its long-term 
impact. Their claims are supported by various surveys which indicate that the general feeling, 
following the conclusion of proceedings, was that victims were still resentful and angry for 
the hardships they had had to endure: “Two-thirds of the public believed that revelations 
resulting from the truth commission process had made South Africans angrier and led to the 
deterioration between races.”17 These results published by the South African Press 
Association demonstrate how difficult it is to accurately assess how affective the TRC’s 
public hearings have been in promoting reconciliation in South Africa. George Bizos 
responds to these criticisms in his essay entitled ‘Why Prosecutions are Necessary’ 
suggesting that the success of the TRC in encouraging the development of reconciliation 
should be judged on the absence of any follow-up conflicts since the fall of the regime; after 
decades of oppression and social unrest, South Africa has experienced a period of relative
15 Tutu, Desmond: “No Future without Forgiveness,” (London: Rider Books, 1999) p76.
16 Goodman, David: “Fault lines: Journeys into the new South Africa,” (University o f  California Press, London, 
1999) p69-70.
17 “Only Half the People Feel TRC is Fair and Unbiased: Survey,” (South Africa Press Association: March 5 th 
1998).
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18peace and prosperity since the conclusion of the TRC’s investigation. It is clear that if 
reconciliation proves to be a difficult process to foster, it is even harder to accurately assess 
its overall impact, as the South African case demonstrates.
Other techniques have also been adopted by truth commissions in an attempt to cultivate 
these processes. Following the completion of its public hearings, the ‘Sierra Leone Truth and
t
Reconciliation Commission,’ for example, organised a number of reconciliation workshops in 
each major district. During these sessions those involved and affected by past human rights 
violations were encouraged to share their stories; guilty parties were even invited to talk and 
ask their communities for forgiveness. These sessions were supervised by community and 
religious leaders who actively encouraged the restoration of relations between victims and 
perpetrators and the development of micro-level reconciliation processes.19
Rwanda’s ‘National Unity and Reconciliation Commission,’ set up ‘solidarity meetings,’ 
which aimed to discuss and bring about an understanding of the causes of its political 
conflicts: “It is time for the people of Rwanda to wake up and build a country with a firm 
foundation on unity and reconciliation... and to demonstrate to the world that it is not a nation 
o f killers.”20 In addition this commission held ‘National Summits on Unity and 
Reconciliation,’ which were designed to “gather Rwandans from all walks of life and from
91abroad to engage in dialogue on how to foster unity and reconciliation in Rwanda.” This 
demonstrates the emphasis truth commission investigations place on the importance of 
communication throughout the implementation of transitional justice practices; they are 
designed to help and rehabilitate their people, it is therefore critical that they interact with 
them as much as possible throughout the process.
As Chapter 1 discussed, post-conflict governments can also develop macro-level 
reconciliation processes. East Timor’s ‘Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation’ 
encouraged the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia to put aside past disputes;
18 Bizos, George: “Why Prosecutions are Necessary,” (Taken from: Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik: 
“The Provocations o f  amnesty,” (Claremont: Africa World Press, 2003)) p i 96.
19 Pettersson, Bjom: “Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned,” (Report prepared by 
International IDEA fo r  the Office of the High Commissioner fo r  Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, November 
2004) p i3.
20 NURC Member Elie Mpayinama -  Taken from: Neier (University of Berkley War Crimes Centre).
21 Moussalli (UNCHR, 21st March 2001, point 13).
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consequently they established a ‘Commission for Truth and Friendship’ in December 2004.22 
This commission issued a report in July 2008, which formally acknowledged the 
responsibility of both governments; through leading by example, governments can often 
influence their societies to follow suit.
j The Chilean Commission oversaw the construction of one version of its nation’s past, which 
could be accepted by the entirety of its society, as a priority in assisting its reconciliation 
processes: “The Chilean Commission was based on the premise that creating a version of the 
past that was commonly held in society was a first step towards reconciliation.”23 In this way 
it was believed that a shared understanding could be developed between the victim and the 
perpetrator.
There is no instant solution/formula when attempting to re-unite and reconcile divided 
societies. The aforementioned techniques represent a few of the many practices utilised by 
modern-day commissions. The architects of future commissions could learn much from both 
the successes and failures of these attempts at fostering reconciliation processes.
3. Promoting Human Rights Laws
“Truth commissions can legitimise the culture, beliefs and values associated with human 
rights as the new framework for managing social relations”24 Given that truth commissions 
were originally developed by Western states, it is hardly surprising that their mandates are 
generally geared towards the promotion of basic human rights throughout the countries in 
which they operate. Some commissions are so influential that they are able to effectively 
influence governments to reform their laws and constitutions to be more in keeping with 
human rights standards.
The UN backed ‘Commission of Truth for El Salvador’, went to great lengths to stress the 
importance of respecting individuals’ basic human rights. The report published by the
22 “Truth Commission: Timor-Leste (East Timor), ” (The United States Institute of Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-timor-leste-east-timor (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
23 Gairdner, David: ‘The Role of truth commissions in political transition in Chile and El Salvador,” (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and human rights, R 1998: 8) p52.
24 Gairdner, David: “The Role of truth commissions in political transition in Chile and El Salvador,” (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and human rights, R 1998: 8) p51.
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commission recommended various measures and reforms which could be implemented to
25better defend the basic human rights of the people of El Salvador. The Chilean Commission 
also developed a series of recommendations and structural adjustments within its report for 
same purpose.
I The South African TRC influenced the introduction of significant reforms to South African
law which prevented its government from legalising the physical abuse of its citizens for
26political ends. Through various redevelopment programmes, The African National 
Congress also introduced pieces of legislation which promoted the basic human rights of the 
nation’s black majority and attempted to reintegrate them into South African society: “For 
blacks who make up 79% of the total populace of some 47 million, a new sense of freedom 
prevails.”27
Argentina’s ‘National Commission for the Disappearance of Persons,’ also prioritised the 
promotion of human rights laws in Argentina; a country where human rights laws had long
been forgotten: “The human rights movement educated and transformed Argentine society in
28many important ways.” Within quick succession, the newly instituted President, Raul 
Alfonsin, introduced a series of rights based reforms, which were supported and promoted by 
international human rights organisations. These were also upheld by the truth commission, 
which worked alongside the media to ensure that guilty parties would be held accountable 
and such rights violations would not be repeated.
Paraguay’s ‘Truth and Justice Commission’ created an ‘Archive and Documentation Centre 
for the Defence of Human Rights.’29 This was the first repository of its kind and worked to 
preserve evidence of past human rights violations, for future reference. Such operations can 
promote an understanding of past atrocities and can prevent their repetition.
25 “Report o f  the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” (S/25500, April 1993). Available at: 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (Last accessed June 1st, 2011).
26 “Truth and Reconciliation Commission o f South Africa Report,” (21st March, 2003). Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/ (Last accessed 1st June 2011).
27 “If Only Adults Would Behave Like Children,” (The Economist, 23rd April 2005) p29.
28 Brysk, Alison: “The Politics o f Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization,” 
(California: Stanford Uni Press, 1994) p680.
29 “Truth Commission: Paraguay, ” (The United States Institute o f  Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-paraguav (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
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|Indeed, the truth commissions of Chad, Ghana, Guatemala and Uruguay all highlighted the 
importance of the restoration of human rights, within their individual mandates; this
i
demonstrates how highly truth commissions regard the endorsement of these core principles.
It is important to acknowledge that not all states recognise human rights laws and that truth 
commission bodies should not force such policies upon societies; this could be seen as an 
encroachment into the sovereignty of the states in question.
4. Acknowledgement of Past Atrocities
Modem day tmth commissions place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of allowing 
victims to not only share their horrific experiences but to have them formally acknowledged 
either by their oppressors or by the state. When human rights violations occur over sustained 
periods of time without intervention, they often become part of the victim’s everyday life to 
the point where it is difficult for a society to differentiate between right and wrong. 
Therefore, an integral part of the healing process is to grant victims the opportunity to share 
their experiences, and to express their long-term effects. This process breaks down the 
desensitisation which often occurs during sustained periods of oppression and helps victims 
express their emotions when for so long they have been prevented from doing so.
Rwanda’s ‘National Unity and Reconciliation Commission,’ for example, was introduced in 
1999 to try and appease the anger and tension which was felt by the victims of the genocide. 
Its commissioners recognised the importance of acknowledging victims’ grievances and 
helped them regain their sense of human worth and dignity: “Should a truth and 
reconciliation commission be established, victims across the spectrum will have a credible 
and legitimate forum through which to reclaim their human worth and dignity; perpetrators, 
irrespective of persuasion and motivation, will have a channel through which to expiate their 
guilt.”30 Here Sarkin recognises that it is also important to give perpetrators the opportunity 
to talk about the crimes they have committed and to repent. It is often the case with post- 
genocide nations such as Rwanda, that victims are often also guilty of violating the rights of 
other individuals; such is the nature of genocide that often the victims were also at one stage
30 Sarkin, Jeremy: “The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
Rwanda,” (Human rights Quarterly 21, 1999) p799.
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the oppressors. When this is the case, it is even more essential that a forum be created for the 
benefit of both victims and perpetrators.
Other commissions such as the Ugandan ‘Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of 
iHuman Rights’ have taken similar measures to acknowledge the experiences o f victims and 
perpetrators. As Quinn concisely puts it, the Ugandan Commission provided for “a process of 
active participation in which the wider community deliberates over past crimes, giving centre 
stage to both victim and offender in a process which seeks to bestow both dignity and 
empowerment upon victims... and when their crimes have been acknowledged, individuals 
and their communities can begin once again to form relationships with their neighbours and 
to participate in the social activities and civil structures of society, finally defeating deep
a i
routed conflicts which have served to paralyse that society.”
In addition to the acknowledgement provided by public and private forums, similar ends can 
be achieved through the written recognition of the existence of past events. Truth 
commissions can achieve this by publishing a written acknowledgement of past atrocities 
within their final reports. Ideally these acknowledgements should be supported by a body of 
concrete, indisputable evidence, gathered during a truth commission’s investigation. As 
Chapter 1 discussed, with reference to Paul Gready, there are a number of ways in which 
truth commissions might wish to present this information depending on the political and 
social context and the specific objectives of the enquiry.
The report published by Ecuador’s ‘Truth Commission to Impede Impunity’ formally 
acknowledged that 456 individuals were victim to human rights violations (torture, sexual 
violence and execution) during President Leon Febres Cordero’s repressive campaigns
32against student and social movements between 1984 and 1988. Similarly, East Timor’s 
‘Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation’ produced a comprehensive report 
which acknowledged that 102,800 Timorese deaths were attributed to the Indonesian 
occupation. The report itself declared the responsibility of some of the highest levels of
33government authority. Also, Peru’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ released an 
8,000 page report in August 2003 which detailed the number of people affected and
31 Quinn, Joanna: “An Analysis o f  Uganda’s Truth Commission,” (YCISS Working Paper Number 19, March
2003) p4.
32 “Truth Commission Report: Ecuador 07,” (June 7th 2010). Available (in Spanish) at: 
http://www.coverdad.org.ee/informe-final (Last accessed 1st June, 2011).
33 “The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation: Chega,” (October/November 2005). Available at: 
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm (Last accessed 1st June, 2011).
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information regarding those responsible.34 Each of the above examples demonstrates how 
truth commissions can promote accountability through the publication of detailed final 
reports.
A public acknowledgement that past crimes are wrong and that they will not be tolerated by 
| future governments, is also important. This can result from the official endorsement of a truth 
commission’s findings by a government representative; this occurred following the
• ^  Spublication of Uruguay’s ‘Common for Peace’ report. In this instance the Uruguayan 
President formally acknowledged the commission report and established a ‘follow-up 
commission’ to ensure that its recommendations were implemented.
Public acknowledgement can also occur through a public apology, as Peru’s President Toledo 
demonstrated in November 2003 when he publically apologised for the suffering of the 
victims of the civil war. This can have a positive effect on the willingness of victims to 
reconcile with their oppressors and with the state. These processes of acknowledgement have 
been encouraged by truth commissions in recent years.
5. Working Alongside other NGOs and Civil Society Groups
Another positive characteristic of truth commissions that has been demonstrated is their 
ability to work alongside other non-government organisations and civil society groups in the 
interests of promoting peace and democratic values. The commissions themselves have also 
benefited from the essential support provided by these groups. This support usually consists 
of the provision of funding and personnel or assistance with the supervision and running of 
commissions. This assistance is often vital to the success of truth commission operations. The 
expertise provided by NGO members and members of previous commissions also plays an 
integral role in both the construction and maintenance of truth commissions.
“Civil Society, particularly religious and community-based organizations, played a critical 
role in the reconciliation processes in Sierra Leone... These organizations’ familiarity with
34 “Truth Commission: Peru 0 1 ,” (The United Stales Institute o f Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01 (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
35 “Informe Final de la Comision para la Paz,” (April 10th, 2003). Available (in Spanish) at: 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Uruguay-Report Informal.pdf (Last accessed 
1st June, 2011).
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traditional methods of reconciliation and their access to religious and traditional leaders make
f^\them very well-suited to initiate and support local reconciliation initiatives.” As already 
briefly mentioned, in co-ordination with the ‘Inter-Religious Council,’ the UNDP funded 
reconciliation workshops in each of the twelve districts of Sierra Leone. These workshops
[attempted to educate communities about reconciliation processes and encouraged the active
i
participation of those involved and affected by past human rights violations. Reconciliation 
support committees were also created to organise and fund local community building 
initiatives. Further support also came from the international community; representatives from 
truth commissions in East Timor, Peru and South Africa shared their experience and assisted 
with the organisation of a three day workshop focusing on national reconciliation and the role 
of forgiveness as part of reconciliation processes. Likewise, Rwanda’s commission 
benefitted from the support of members from the commissions of Germany, South Africa and 
Namibia.
Ghana’s ‘National Reconciliation Commission’ also benefitted from the widespread 
involvement of national and international civil society groups, during the drafting of its
a o
mandate and throughout its investigation. The involvement of civil society groups often 
ensures a more balanced, impartial and community-driven approach to proceedings, 
particularly when these groups represent a society’s various religious and cultural factions. A 
key feature of the Zimbabwean Truth Commission framework, presented in Chapter 4, is the 
role which should be played by Zimbabwe’s civil society groups. As well as opening up a 
vast pool of resources and expertise to the commission’s investigation, the involvement of 
Zimbabwe’s civil society will also increase its credibility and ensure that it represents the 
interests of the different identity groups present within Zimbabwean society.
As well improving the operational procedures of commissions, by seeking the support and 
endorsement of well-established and well-recognised international bodies, the overall 
credibility of said commissions is significantly strengthened. The Salvadoran Commission
36 Pettersson, Bjom: “Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned,” (Report prepared by 
International IDEA fo r  the Office of the High Commissioner fo r  Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, November
2004) p i7.
37 “Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report,” (October 2004). Available at: 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2009/ll/sierra-leone-truth-and-reconciliation.html (Last accessed 
June 1st, 2011).
38 “Ghana: National Reconciliation Commission Report” (October 2004). Available at: 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=117:the-national-reconciliation- 
commission-report&catid=59:reports&Itemid=208 (Last accessed June 1st, 2011).
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conducted its investigation under the authority of the United Nations and even submitted its 
report to the Secretary General of the UN. This undoubtedly increased the commission’s 
|authority and legitimacy: “The endorsement of an authoritative body enhanced the 
commission’s legal and political power, access to information, state protection to undertake 
their investigations and increased likelihood that its conclusions and recommendations would
39be given serious consideration.” Where possible, the United Nations should become more 
pro-active in assisting the development of truth commission bodies in the future; the benefits 
of such a course of action are clearly demonstrated by the exploits of the Salvadoran 
Commission. This commission was also commended for its ability to work alongside other 
NGOs such as ‘The United Nations Observer Mission’, ‘The National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace’, and the ‘National Commission for the Protection of Human Rights.’
Argentina’s ‘National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons’ also benefitted from the 
involvement of international figures and legal experts when drafting its mandate.40 As 
Chapter 1 discussed, this document is of vital importance to commissions as it sets out their 
aims and limitations. By seeking the assistance of experienced international figures and 
NGO’s, commissions can ensure that their mandates are clear and precise, to avoid future 
disputes. The fact that these NGO’s and influential international figures have been so willing 
to provide this support is a clear indication of the respect and faith they have in truth 
commissions and their ability to assist nations in political transition. In the future 
commissions should seek external assistance where possible to increase the success rates of 
their investigations and overall efficiency.
6. Working Alongside other Structures
As well as working alongside other organisations, truth commissions of recent years have 
demonstrated that they are also able to work alongside other structures. This is essential 
because it is often the case that commissions are established in conjunction with other 
institutions or organisations which have been created to achieve similar objectives. It is
39 Hayner. Priscilla B: ‘Questioning the truth: Further Research Questions,’ {Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, 
No. 1, 1996) p21.
40 “Truth Commission: Argentina, ” (The United States Institute o f Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-argentina (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
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therefore necessary for commissions, where possible, to coordinate with these structures; 
cooperation can be mutually beneficial for all concerned.
This was demonstrated aptly by Rwanda’s commission. The NURC was praised for its ability 
| to work in conjunction with other mechanisms such as the Gacaca Courts. This partnership 
proved effective; because the Gacaca Courts were justice-seeking bodies, the NURC was not 
seen as a replacement for justice. The two structures were also compatible because the NURC 
was able to pass on to the Gacaca Courts any evidence that might assist with prosecutions.
East Timor’s truth commission operated alongside a ‘Serious Crimes Unit.’ By providing 
evidence gathered during the commission’s investigation, the ‘Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes’ was able to successfully convict 84 individuals.41 As previously mentioned, truth 
commission bodies often have access to resources which allow them to gather evidence 
inaccessible to most judicial investigations. By coordinating with judicial bodies, and passing 
on this evidence, both mechanisms can promote justice and prevent impunity.
7. Reforming Societies and Addressing Structural Problems
A critical part of a state’s political transition to democracy is the introduction of reforms to 
the state’s political, social and economic infrastructures; this ensures the state is able to better 
protect and promote the basic human rights of all its citizens. Truth commissions can 
influence the reformation process both directly and indirectly.
Though it is not often the case, truth commissions are occasionally granted the authority 
within their mandates allowing them to introduce reforms to the societies in which they 
operate in an attempt to prevent the reoccurrences of past atrocities. This was demonstrated 
by the Rwandan Commission which was granted the authority to make significant changes to 
aspects of Rwandan societal infrastructures. In particular it focused on reforming the 
Rwandan education system, by introducing changes to its school syllabuses. Among these 
changes, the commission decided to create a single narrative version of Rwanda’s history; the
41 “The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation: Chega,” (October/November 2005). Available at: 
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm (Last accessed 1st June, 2011).
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commission believed that it could “cultivate peace and democracy and encourage the 
rebuilding of social relations.”42
[It is more often the case that truth commissions can indirectly influence the introduction of 
^societal reforms through the inclusion of reform recommendations within their final reports. 
Although, this provides less of a guarantee that these changes will be introduced, there are 
numerous examples where the governments concerned have implemented these suggested 
reforms.
The reforms recommended by South Africa’s TRC for instance, resulted in the subsequent 
transformation of the state’s political system, faith communities, businesses, judiciary, prison 
services, armed forces, health sector, media and educational institutions. It also introduced a 
‘follow-up commission’ to oversee the implementation of these reforms. The reform 
recommendations made by Paraguay, Guatemala and Haiti’s truth commissions also had a 
strong influence over the subsequent legal and institutional changes which were introduced.
8. The Publication of Recommendations
As previously mentioned, one of the ways in which truth commissions can influence change 
is by formulating sets of recommendations which are published in their final reports 
following the conclusion of their investigations. These recommendations are then submitted 
to the state’s leadership for review. A good example o f the type of recommendations which 
are made can be observed by referring to the report published by the Salvadoran 
Commission. This particular commission published a series of recommendations which were 
designed to encourage the government to restructure its laws so that they would become more 
attuned to promoting the basic human rights laws of it citizens: “The mandate of the 
commission shall include recommending legal, political or administrative measures which 
can be inferred from the results of the investigation. Such measures may include measures to 
prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation.”43 It also 
recommended a comprehensive reparations programme, a strict system of discharge for
42 Hodgkin, Marian: ‘Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State,’ (Journal of International 
Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol. 60, No. 1) p202.
43 "Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” (S/25500, April 1993). Available at: 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (Last accessed June 1st, 2011), p i8.
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officers involved in human rights violations and lustration policies which prohibit human 
rights violators from ever holding office.
Unfortunately for the Salvadoran Commission, as is the case with many other commissions of 
this kind, it was often left up to the government to decide whether or not to enforce these 
recommendations. Given the time, money and expertise invested in the investigations of truth 
commissions, it is advisable for governments to give truth commission recommendations due 
consideration; not only will the implementation of truth commissions’ recommendations 
prove beneficial for the recovery of the societies concerned, such a course of action will 
demonstrate a government’s commitment to the democratization process.
There are examples where governments have followed through with this commitment. The 
recommendations published in the report of Morocco’s ‘Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission’ for example, were not only publically endorsed by King Mohammed VI, but 
were also drafted into a revised constitution.44 In a similar way, some of the central 
recommendations presented in the report of Germany’s ‘Truth Commission’ were also 
implemented; such as its recommendation to establish an independent foundation to carry out 
further investigation into East Germany’s communist past.45
Chapter 4 ’s formation of a three-prong truth commission framework suggests that guarantees 
should be made by the governments responsible for the establishment of truth commission 
bodies, to ensure that they review and implement some or all of the recommendations 
published in these commission reports; this would increase the positive impact commissions 
are likely to have upon the societies within which they operate.
9. Developing/Introducing Reparations Programmes
Another source of support discussed in Chapter 1, which is often provided by truth 
commissions to victims of human rights violations, is the development and introduction of 
reparations programmes. Although it not possible to put a price on the emotional costs
44 “Morocco: Equity and Reconciliation Commission,” (December 1st, 2005). Available at: 
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.Org/upload/documents/7 20061221082659.pdf (Last accessed June 1st, 
2011).
45 Kritz, Neil J: “Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ” (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Vol.3, Laws, Rulings, and Reports, Washington, DC: 1995) p216-219.
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endured by these victims, reparations programmes are deemed to be an appropriate way of 
compensating them in the absence of more suitable solutions. Ultimately reparations will be 
supplied either by the state or by external donors; truth commissions are often given the task 
of deciding which individuals and groups are worthy of this compensation.
i
There are many examples of the successful implementation of reparations programmes by 
recent truth commission bodies. Algeria’s ‘Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission,’ for example, 
developed a successful reparations programme which compensated 2,640 victims families 
with a total of $37million.46 Morocco’s ‘Equity and Reconciliation Commission’ instigated 
the distribution of $85million among 16,000 victims.47 Similar programmes were also 
developed by the truth commissions of Paraguay and Brazil.
As previously mentioned, truth commissions can also either implement or recommend other 
measures designed to help restore the dignity of victims and their families. These can take the 
form of public apologies made by representatives of those responsible, the creation of public 
memorials and the introduction of public holidays. Guatemala’s ‘Commission for Historical 
Classification,’ for instance, established a ‘National Reparations Commission’ which 
encouraged the President to make a public apology on behalf of the state, and introduced an 
annual day of remembrance which it called ‘The Day of Dignity.’48 Similarly, as well as 
influencing the state to enact reparations laws, Germany’s truth commission established 
public memorials at former detention facilities to ensure that East Germany’s troubled past 
would neither be forgotten, nor repeated. Such actions provide solace for victims and send 
out a powerful message that such atrocities must never be allowed to reoccur.
10. Promoting Accountability
As the opening chapter of the thesis discussed, one of the more commonly voiced criticisms 
of truth commission bodies, is that they are sometimes established in the absence of criminal 
justice processes. This suggests that truth commission investigations fail to provide
46 “Truth Commission: Algeria, ” (The United States Institute of Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-algeria (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
47 “Morocco: Equity and Reconciliation Commission,” (December 1st, 2005). Available at: 
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.Org/upload/documents/7 20061221082659.pdf (Last accessed June 1st, 
2011).
48 “Guatemala: Memory o f  Silence,” (AAAS Science and Human Rights Data Centre) Available at: 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (Last accessed May 23, 2011).
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accountability and promote impunity. Such claims ignore the ability of a truth commission to 
work alongside prosecutor bodies, and overlook the accountability obtained through the 
publication of detailed truth commission reports.
;There are numerous examples of truth commissions working alongside judicial bodies and 
helping them to secure successful convictions. In October 2006, a civil anti-terrorism court 
used evidence provided by Peru’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ to successfully 
convict the leader of ‘The Shining Path’ and his deputy to life imprisonment.49 The same 
court also delivered lesser sentences to ten other leaders. Similarly, Haiti’s ‘National Truth 
and Justice Commission’ assisted with the November 2000 ‘Raboteau Case’ in which more 
than fifty defendants including the entire military high command and the heads of the 
paramilitary FRAPH were convicted.50 In Feb 2010, former Uruguayan President Juan Mana 
Bordaberry was sentenced to 30 years in prison for crimes against humanity, using evidence 
passed from the ‘Commission for Peace’ to the Supreme Court.51 Truth commissions assisted 
with similar convictions in Guatemala, Chad and South Africa.
In addition, the International Criminal Court has recently used information gathered by the 
DRC’s truth commission in the successful conviction of Thomas Lubanga (leader of the 
UPC) for recruiting child soldiers under the age of 15. Similarly, it is hoped that evidence 
gathered by truth commissions operating in the DRC and Kenya will be used in the upcoming 
trials of Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba and 6 top Kenyan officials who are accused of
53being responsible for masterminding Kenya’s recent post-election violence.
Many truth commissions have also encouraged accountability by publishing, in their final 
reports, information concerning the identity of those individuals and groups guilty of the 
orchestration of human rights violations. South Africa’s well-publicised TRC report, for 
example, clearly stated the names of individuals who had instigated and implemented
49 “Shining Path Leader Sentenced to Life,” (International Justice Tribune Archive, October 23rd, 2006). 
Available at: http://www.mw.nl/international-iustice/article/shining-path-leader-sentenced-life (Last accessed 
June 2nd, 2011).
50 “Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial,” (Institute fo r  Justice and Democracy in Haiti). Available at: 
http://iidh.org/articles/article justice-for-haiti raboteau-trial.php#intro (Last accessed June 2nd, 2011).
51 “Uruguay’s Ex-ruler Bordaberry Jailed for 30 years,” (BBC News Website, February 11th, 2010). Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/8511204.stm (Last accessed June 2nd, 2011).
52 “Justice in Congo: A Victory for Congo’s Children,” (Human Rights Watch, March 15th 2012) Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/node/105817 (last accessed: March 26th 2012).
53 “Lubanga Trial Begins at ICC,” (The Hague Justice Portal, January 26th, 2009). Available at: 
http://www.hagueiusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/10/216.html (Last accessed February 5th, 2009).
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Apartheid crimes.54 Numerous other commissions followed suit, though such policies are 
only possible if they do not provoke violent backlashes from those exposed or their victims.
The aforementioned examples demonstrate how accountability can be achieved by truth 
commission bodies, even though they are not granted the powers required to convict 
criminals.
Having analysed the strengths of recent truth commission enquiries, their contribution 
towards the reconciliation of transitional and post-conflict states, is evident. These strengths 
will be strongly considered when developing possible truth commission frameworks in the 
latter stages of the thesis. Future truth commission architects should assess whether or not 
their investigations may also benefit from the incorporation of these policies.
54 “Truth and Reconciliation Commission o f South Africa Report,” (21st March, 2003). Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/ (Last accessed 1st June 2011).
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Negative Aspects of Past Truth Commission Investigations:
Given the nature of the political, social and economic conditions faced by modern-day truth 
commissions, it is hardly surprising that they have faced many difficulties since their 
inauguration. Unfortunately for these commissions, it is often the criticisms which develop as 
a consequence of their failure to deal with these difficulties, which overshadow the positive 
results which they have achieved in recent history.
The best way to develop truth commission frameworks which can effectively deal with these 
conditions, without criticism, is to analyse each of these flaws in order to ensure that they are 
not repeated by future commission enquiries.
The negative aspects of recent truth commission investigations will now be examined:
1. Limited Power/Influence
A common criticism of modem day truth commissions targets their limited powers in 
comparison to alternative mechanisms which seek to deal with gross human rights violations. 
It is often claimed that this lack of influence makes these commissions appear weak; the 
various restrictions placed upon commissions by their mandates, leave them ill-equipped 
when dealing with difficult political, social and economic pre-conditions.
This criticism is often fuelled by the following inadequacies which often hamper the 
perceived success of truth commission investigations:
i. Truth commissions cannot convict guilty parties
One specific characteristic which strengthens this argument is the lack of powers of 
prosecution granted to modern-day truth commissions. This handicap prevents these organs 
from punishing those individuals and groups found guilty during their investigations. It is for 
this reason that those in favour of retributive justice processes see truth commissions as 
inadequate replacements for more powerful and influential judicial bodies. This is a common 
misconception; as already discussed, truth commissions are often granted alternative powers 
to judicial bodies and better access to evidence. As previously mentioned, truth commissions
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are also most effective when they work alongside judicial bodies, as they can often provide 
them with invaluable evidence which frequently leads to successful convictions.
jThat being said, in many instances truth commissions are employed as isolated organs. On 
these occasions, where commission mandates are particularly restrictive, critics may be
I
justified in claiming that truth commissions do suffer from a distinct lack of authority.
ii. Truth commissions are often prevented from disclosing legal responsibility
In the absence of the powers of prosecution, the next best way in which truth commissions 
can promote accountability is through the disclosure of the names of guilty parties within 
their final reports. This is not uncommon and despite the absence of punishment, can satisfy 
the accountability demands of victims.
However, past truth commission bodies have been further weakened by mandate restrictions 
which have prohibited this course of action. Panama’s ‘Truth Commission’ for example, was 
explicitly prohibited from making any conclusions regarding the legal responsibilities of 
individual perpetrators. This heavily hampered the impact of its investigation.55 Similar 
restrictions were also placed on Guatemala’s ‘Commission for Historical Classification,’ 
which prevented it from naming names or calling for prosecutions in its final report, despite 
the evidence gathered during its investigation.56 Such policies are often implemented due to 
fragile political conditions which could be endangered by the inclusion of the names of guilty 
parties in truth commissions’ final reports.
iii. Truth commissions are often unable to provide compensation to victims
As previously discussed, an additional way in which truth commissions help to rehabilitate 
post-conflict societies is through the introduction of reparations programmes to compensate 
victims for the hardships they have endured. As well as fulfilling an obligation under 
international law to compensate the victims of state enforced crimes57, this is also an
55 Jackson, Eric. "Review of Panama Truth Commission Report." NY Transfer News, May 27, 2002. Available 
at: http://www.blvthe.org/nvtransfer-
subs/Covert Actions/Review of Panama Truth Commission Report (accessed May 23, 2011).
56 “Guatemala: Memory o f  Silence,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Data Centre. Available at: 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (accessed May 23, 2011).
57 Amezcua-Noriega, Octavio: “Reparation Principles under International Law and their Possible Application by 
the International Criminal Court: Some Reflections,” University o f Essex, Reparations Unit, Briefing Paper
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alternative means of satisfying the needs and demands of victims in the absence of criminal 
prosecutions. However, for this to be possible, truth commissions have to rely upon the 
financial support of domestic and international sources; recent history has shown that this 
support is not always forthcoming.
Sierra Leone’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ for example, was heavily hampered 
by the restrictions placed upon it by its mandate. These restrictions prevented it from 
providing the victims of the civil war with the socio-economic empowerment that they badly 
needed. As a result the citizens of Sierra Leone felt that real justice had not been served 
because without material compensation they would still be feeling the effects of the civil war 
long after the commission had finished its work: “Truth telling without reparation could be 
perceived by the victims as an incomplete process, in which they revealed their pain and
CO
suffering, without any mechanism in place to deal with the consequences of that pain.” 
Instead all the commission could do was include reparations recommendations within its final 
report.
South Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ promised much in the way of 
financial compensation for Apartheid’s numerous victims. However, when it came to the 
distribution of these reparations, the ANC government refused to release the money required 
to make this possible: “On April 15, as he addressed the TRC’s report, Mbeki said he had 
authorized a one-time payment of approximately US$74 million— $300 million less than the 
sum recommended by the commission.”59 This has only further increased the economic 
imbalance which continues to impoverish large sectors of South Africa’s populace.
These are a few examples of many, which show that the failure of modem truth commissions 
to develop successful compensation programmes for victims is not uncommon, irrespective 
of whether or not such powers are drafted into their mandates; their reliance upon unreliable 
domestic and international donors, continues to weaken their overall impact upon the 
rehabilitation of post-conflict societies.
N o.l, August 2011. Available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/tin/documents/paper 1 general principles large.pdf 
(Last accessed October 14th, 2012).
58 Sesay, Amadu: “Does One Size Fit All? The Sierra Leone TRC Revisited,” (Discussion Paper 36) p51.
59 Meron Tesfa, Michael: “Moment o f Truth,” (WorldPress.org, May 2nd, 2003). Available at: 
http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1077.cfm (Last accessed June 2nd, 2011).
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iv. Truth commissions are often unable to involve guilty parties within their 
investigations
In order for truth commission investigations to be successful, it is critical that they seek to
'engage both victims and perpetrators throughout their investigations; this will significantly
i
increase the lasting impact of their work. It is hardly surprising though that the testimonies of 
guilty parties are not always forthcoming. In such situations, truth commissions require the 
power of subpoena in order to force their involvement.
The influence of recent truth commissions has been heavily undermined by the absence of 
these powers, within their mandates. South Korea’s ‘Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths’ failed to gain the co-operation of many high ranking officials because it 
lacked the legal authority to force them to testify.60 Similarly, the powers granted within the 
mandate of Uruguay’s ‘Commission for Peace’ were so limited that it relied solely upon 
statements taken from those who gave them voluntarily. This commission also lacked the 
power to carry out further investigation and relied upon one support staff member.
The absence of the powers of subpoena, heavily weaken the ability of modern-day truth 
commissions to carry out thorough and all-inclusive investigations.
v. Truth commissions are often unable to influence comprehensive reform
Lastly, it is often the case that the overall authority of truth commissions is heavily 
undermined by their inability to influence the introduction of comprehensive societal reform. 
In most cases the main way in which truth commission investigations can influence societal 
reform is through the publication of reform recommendations within their final reports. As 
previously mentioned, it is not always likely that these recommendations will be 
implemented: “Even if it produces an incisive list o f recommendations, there is no guarantee 
that the political will, financial resources and administrative capacity will be able to 
implement reforms.”61
Unfortunately for truth commissions, their adjudged success or failure is often reliant upon 
whether or not their recommendations are implemented. They are therefore heavily
60 “A Hard Journey to Justice: First Term Report 10.2000-10.2002,” (Seoul: Samin Books, 2004).
61 Dougherty, Beth K: ‘Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s truth and Reconciliation commission,’ (African 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Fall 2004) p51.
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dependent upon their government’s own agenda. Future truth commission investigations 
should be strengthened by the inclusion of required legal powers, within their mandates; this 
will increase the overall impact their operations are likely to have upon post-conflict 
jsocieties, such as those mentioned here.
t
2. Lack of Government Support
In the previous section we briefly discussed how the success of truth commissions rely 
heavily upon the policies and practices of the governments they serve. Analysis of past truth 
commissions shows that they have been continually hampered by uncooperative and 
unsupportive governments. This is often the case, even when these same governments are 
responsible for the founding of these commissions.
There is much evidence to suggest that Sierra Leone’s government, for example, was not 
committed to the pursuit of a comprehensive reconciliation process; demonstrated by the lack 
of support it gave its commission and its unwillingness to work with its opposition parties. It 
also made no attempt to implement the recommendations published in the commission’s final 
report. In a similar way, Uganda’s government showed little interest in supporting its 
commission; it clearly regarded it as ‘backward-looking’ and prioritised the rebuilding of its 
nation’s economy over defending the basic rights of its people.
Truth commissions operating in Paraguay, Ghana, Panama and Nigeria also suffered from a 
distinct lack of government support. These particular commissions suffered from the 
continual withdrawal of government funding. Paraguay’s ‘Truth and Justice Commission’ 
was hit particularly hard by funding cuts. In 2007 the Paraguayan government cut the 
commission’s budget by half; as a result the commission’s investigation had to stop for two
f t  9months whilst it reassessed its funding options. Meanwhile the Nigerian government’s half­
hearted commitment to its commission’s recommended reparations programme, heavily 
weakened the assistance it was able to provide the victims it was created to serve.
In addition, the Zimbabwean government even refused to issue the final report of its 1983 
truth commission, claiming that it might endanger Zimbabwe’s fragile peace; it is clear that
52 “Truth Commission: Paraguay, ” (The United States Institute o f Peace). Available at 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-paraguav (Last accessed June 1st 2011).
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the publication of this report might also expose the role played by ZANU PF’s armies during 
the Matabeleland Massacres. As a consequence, two Zimbabwean human rights organisations 
took it upon themselves to publish unofficial reports of said events. Inevitably these reports 
were not endorsed by Mugabe’s government, but instead general amnesties were granted to 
pardon those responsible.
I
This raises the question of why these governments would establish truth commissions without 
any intention of supporting their investigations. This thesis links these policies to the type of 
political transitions which occurred, prior to the government’s establishment. It might be 
suggested for example that a newly established government which ‘overthrew’ its 
predecessor might be more co-operative than a ‘reformed’ government. This is because the 
reformed government may still contain representatives of the old regime who may hinder 
their state’s commitment to reform. Such claims will be looked at in further detail, because 
they imply that the success or failure of a truth commission may well be dependent upon the 
type of political transition which the controlling government has undergone. This argument 
heavily influences the truth commission framework development approach presented in 
Chapter 4.
3. Manipulation of Truth Commissions
Their possible manipulation is one of the more serious problems faced by modem day truth 
commissions. Unfortunately, it would appear that there are many occasions where 
commissions have been established by governments to achieve hidden objectives that were 
not stated in the commission’s mandate and were certainly not morally just.
Critics have claimed that recent truth commissions have been subject to manipulation by 
governments by the following means:
i. Using truth commissions as ‘exit strategies’
63 Dabudabu, Masola Wa: “Another Commission to Clean after Mugabe,” (NewZimbabwe.com , December 11th, 
2009). Available at: http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/masola20.12770.html (Last accessed June 2nd, 
2011).
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It has been suggested that Sierra Leone’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ for 
example, was engineered by those responsible for the civil war as an exit strategy: “It is 
possible that the TRC and even the Special Court might have been used as part of an 
elaborate exit strategy for the guarantors of the peace process.”64 Indeed the lack of post­
conflict cooperation provided by both the government and the RUF suggests that neither was 
ever really committed to comprehensive transitional justice processes in Sierra Leone, but 
instead used these organs to create the illusion that accountability would be established. 
Sesay argues that this problem is commonplace among many recent truth commissions: “This 
problem has been compounded by the fact that external engagements in post-war or post­
conflict reconciliation and reconstruction projects in many parts of the world are not only 
transient, but are at one level also elaborate exit strategies for the guarantors of peace 
agreements.”65 This thesis suggests that the use o f truth commissions as ‘exit strategies’ is 
highly dependent on the characteristics of the political transitions which have taken place. In 
Sierra Leone, the ending of the civil war resulted from a political compromise between the 
government and the RUF; the nature of this specific transition meant that the transgressors 
were also the ‘guarantors’ of Sierra Leone’s peace process. As a consequence the government 
and the RUF were able to walk away from the civil war without being subjected to a 
comprehensive accountability process. Similar manipulations can occur when the guarantors 
of transitional justice processes are ‘politically reformed;’ those in charge are also often 
responsible for the atrocities which have occurred.
ii. Manipulating the evidence/scope of truth commission investigations
Uganda’s government has been accused of manipulating the evidence gathered by its 
commission in order to protect its own interests. It has also been suggested that it 
manufactured the timeframe investigated by its commission so that it was unable to 
investigate various atrocities carried out by Museveni’s government.66 Similar concerns were 
raised over the case selection investigation process implemented by Nigeria’s truth 
commission. The scope of Morocco’s ‘Equity and Reconciliation Commission’ investigation 
was also under suspicion of manipulation; its final report remained silent about gross human 
rights violations committed in the Western Sahara (many considered this to be the hardest hit
54 Sesay, Amadu: “Does One Size Fit All? The Sierra Leone TRC Revisited,” (Discussion Paper 36) p28.
55 Sesay, Amadu: “Does One Size Fit All? The Sierra Leone TRC Revisited,” (Discussion Paper 36) p52.
56 Joanna, Quinn: “An Analysis o f  Uganda’s Truth Commission,” (YCISS Working Paper Number 19, March
2003)
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area).67 Questions were even raised over the legitimacy of the Salvadoran Commission which 
was established and run by the United Nations. Observers struggled to understand how the 
final report failed to incriminate either the guilty US advisors or President Cristiani. Given 
the significance of the role played by both, one might be forgiven for suggesting that the 
commission was manipulated or influenced into excluding these two contributors from its 
investigation. The government of El Salvador was also continually suspected of perverting 
the course of justice through the destruction of evidence and its continual lack of co-operation 
with its commission’s investigation. It was also believed to be concealing the location o f the 
bodies o f prisoners and victims: “The Salvadoran commission wrote that one thing must be 
squarely denounced: owing to the destruction or concealment of documents, or the failure to 
divulge the locations where the numerous persons were imprisoned or bodies buried, the 
burden of proof frequently reverted to the commission, the judiciary and the citizens who
zro
found themselves forced to reconstruct events.” When the commission’s report was 
published, it was condemned as being biased and inaccurate by the government, more than 
likely because many of its members were incriminated by the report.
iii. Using truth commissions to increase perceived legitimacy
The objectives o f Rwanda’s government in establishing the NURC have also been brought 
into question. Aryeh Neier has suggested that the Rwandan government had little interest in 
defending the rights of its citizens, but used its commission to give the impression that it did: 
“It (the NURC) has mostly benefited the Rwandan government, who can point to it as 
evidence of its commitment to the project of reconciliation.”69 This was important to the 
government because it needed to convince both its citizens and international actors that it was 
a legitimate government that intended to restore order in Rwanda, to avoid any threat to its 
leadership. Such strategies are not uncommon.
iv. Failure to select impartial and unbiased truth commissioners
Concerns were also voiced over the Chilean Commission; observers stressed their concern 
over the impartiality of the selected commission members. One commissioner was even a
57 “Morocco: Equity and Reconciliation Commission,” (December 1st, 2005). Available at: 
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicv.Org/upload/documents/7 20061221082659.pdf (Last accessed June 1st, 
2011 ).
58 "Report o f  the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” (S/25500, April 1993). Available at: 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (Last accessed June 1st, 2011).
59 Neier, Aryeh: “A Brief History o f the Conflict,” (U.C. Berkley War Crimes Studies Centre) p8.
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70member of Pinochet’s cabinet. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Truth Commission 
was accused of similar misgivings. In this instance, some the selected commissioners had
71informal ties with those implemented in the crimes under investigation. To avoid such 
accusations, the commissioner selection processes must be carefully planned to guarantee the 
.selection of unbiased, impartial commissioners.
I
As soon as the legitimacy of one commission is questioned, critics begin raising questions 
about the legitimacy of others. It is critical that truth commissions are only ever established 
by governments in order to promote truth, reconciliation and the defence of human rights, 
without hidden objectives. The manipulation of future truth commissions must be prevented 
in order to promote their perceived integrity as highly effective and impartial transitional 
justice bodies.
4. Encouraging Impunity
“Amnesties go hand in hand with cover-ups... In other words amnesty means wiping out the 
crime as well as the responsibility of the criminal, and is aimed at wiping out the memory of 
the dead.”72
Another concern commonly voiced by truth commission critics, surrounds the promotion of 
impunity which can result from the granting of amnesties before, during or after truth 
commission investigations. The opening chapter of the thesis addressed the contentious 
debate surrounding the morality of amnesty processes; the main consequence of which makes 
it impossible to prosecute those responsible for mass violations of human rights: “Amnesty in 
the context of national reconciliation involves waving or cancelling the punishment of 
convicted or suspected criminals in the name of peace.”73 Its critics believe that true 
reconciliation can only really be achieved through punishment, and that amnesty sacrifices 
traditional justice.
70 “Truth Commission: Chile 03, ” (The United States Institute o f Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/commission-inquirv-chile-03 (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
71 “Truth Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo, ” (The United States Institute o f Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-democratic-republic-congo (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
72 Gutierrez, Jose: “Truth commission Report Shakes El Salvador,” (31 March 1993). Available at: 
ittp://www.greenleft.org.au/node/4338 (Last accessed June 2nd, 2011) p2.13Bennett, Christopher: “Is amnesty a Collective Act o f Forgiveness?” (Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 2, 
2003) p67.
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Though the granting of ‘conditional amnesties’ are sometimes used by truth commissions to 
encourage perpetrators to come forward and reveal the truth behind past atrocities, (South 
Africa’s TRC successfully used conditional amnesties in this way), difficulties arise when 
‘blanket amnesties’ are granted prior to the commencement of commission investigations. 
This means that there is very little incentive for the guilty parties to come forward and assist 
them with their investigations, as they are already immune from prosecution.
Sierra Leone’s TRC was faced with this exact problem: “Unlike in South Africa, where 
perpetrators received amnesty only in return for truthful testimony, ex-combatants in Sierra 
Leone already had amnesty and therefore lacked the incentive to testify.”74 A general 
amnesty was also granted following the publication o f El Salvador’s Truth Commission 
report making it impossible to punish those that the commission had found to be responsible 
for the crimes committed during the Civil War: “While the Amnesties covered acts 
committed by all parties to the conflicts, the state was the main beneficiary as its agents
nc
committed the majority of the violations.” This can be seen as one of the adverse 
consequences of ‘reformed’ or ‘compromised’ transitions; the new government is allowed to 
create a situation whereby it is untouchable, despite the decisive part it played in proceedings. 
Likewise, the 1987 Amnesty Law, which was introduced by Pinochet in Chile to ensure that 
neither himself nor any of the members of his military would be punished for the atrocities 
they committed, severely hampered the progress of the Chilean Commission: “Certain 
elements of society found themselves immune from any governmental or political constraints 
and thus forged for themselves the most abject impunity.”76
It is therefore necessary to understand, irrespective of our feelings towards the amnesty 
process, that truth commissions may not be as effective at uncovering the truth surrounding 
past events if blanket amnesties have been granted prior to the commencement of their 
investigations. Unfortunately for these commissions, amnesty is often the price which has to 
be paid for achieving peace at the point of transition. It is important for the architects of 
future commissions to account for the constraints of blanket amnesties if they have already
74 Dougherty, Beth K: “Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s truth and Reconciliation commission,” (African 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Fall 2004) p47.
15 Gairdner, David: ‘The Role of truth commissions in political Transition in Chile and El Salvador,” (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and human rights, R 1998: 8) p32.
76 "Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” (S/25500, April 1993). Available at: 
ittp://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (Last accessed June 1st, 2011).
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3een enforced. These constraints should also be considered when developing the truth 
commission frameworks in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Of course the granting of blanket amnesties is not the only way in which impunity can 
develop. It can also result from the failure of truth commissions to establish accountability; 
although amnesties prevent guilty parties from being punished, they do not prevent the 
publication of the names of guilty parties within truth commission’s final reports; such 
policies are usually enforced by the architects of truth commission mandates.
The mandate o f Morocco’s ‘Equity and Reconciliation Commission’ for example, prevented 
it from naming the names of guilty parties within its final report, and in doing so prevented 
victims from gaining accountability. Those present at the commission hearings even had to 
sign agreements guaranteeing that they would not reveal the identities of guilty parties
77exposed during the process. In a similar way, Panama’s Truth Commission was prohibited 
from making any verdicts surrounding the legal responsibilities of individual perpetrators.
This lack of accountability is further upheld by commissions who refuse to publish any form 
of report after the cessation of their investigations. Algeria’s ‘Ad Hoc Enquiry Commission’ 
for example, only passed on information gained during its enquiry through selective public
78statements made by the chairman of the commission; no final report was presented. To 
shroud its responsibility, Zimbabwe’s ZANU PF government also refused to publish the 
report written by its truth commission investigating the Matabeleland massacres of the 
1980s.79
The impunity encouraged by the aforementioned case studies has served to weaken the 
credibility and operational impact of truth commission bodies. The architects of future 
commissions should ensure that their commissions are designed to promote accountability 
where possible and prevent the development of impunity to protect the often tarnished image 
3f these structures.
n “Truth Commission: Morocco, ” (The United States Institute of Peace). Available at: 
tyww.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-morocco (Last accessed June 2nd 2011). 
,8 “Truth Commission: Algeria, ” (The United States Institute of Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-algeria (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
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5. Unclear Mandates
The development of a strong, well-structured mandate is an integral part of a truth 
commission’s overall design. The most successful commissions have clear and coherent 
mandates which provide commissioners with strict operational guidance; past truth 
commission architects have often failed to acknowledge this. As a consequence, problems 
can ensue after the commission commences its investigation. Commissions with unclear and 
unrestrictive mandates often digress from their objectives. They are also in danger of taking 
on investigations which they are not equipped to handle and, as a result, end up with 
inconclusive findings.
Without realistic goals commissions are also in danger of running out of funding and fail to 
meet their operational deadlines; it is impossible for commissions to be regarded as 
successful if they are not realistic about their objectives. This was demonstrated by Sierra 
Leone’s Commission whose mandate was so open-ended that it was unable to focus on any 
specific area of its investigation. As a result, it failed to fulfil its central objective as 
Pettersson argues: “Most political analysts would argue that the government has not 
effectively addressed many of the causes behind the war.”
Neier claims that Rwanda’s NURC suffered from the same inadequacies: “The National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission suffers from the lack of a clearly defined agenda and
plan as well as a fairly small budget, and unless it reforms significantly, it will not likely
• 81improve its efforts to build a firm foundation on unity and reconciliation.”
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Truth Commission actually operated for an entire year
without a mandate; as a consequence it lacked any sense of direction or operational
82structure. Brazil’s ‘Commission of Enquiry’ even operated without any mandate 
whatsoever; the consequences of which were plain to see.
30 Pettersson, Bjom: “Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned,” (Report prepared by 
International IDEA fo r  the Office of the High Commissioner fo r  Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, November
2004) p i6.
31 Neier, Aryeh: “A Brief History o f the Conflict,” (U.C. Berkley War Crimes Studies Centre) p8.
32 “Truth Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo, ” (The United States Institute o f Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-democratic-republic-congo (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
33 “Truth Commission: Brazil, ” (The United States Institute o f  Peace). Available at: 
www.usip.org/publications/commission-inquirv-brazil (Last accessed June 2nd 2011).
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